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Abstract of Thesis 
This thesis examines Reformed epistemology as it finds expression in 
the writings of Abraham Kuyper, Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga. 
It seeks to develop three main themes of this kind of approach in 
order to see whether they constitute an adequate foundation for a 
coherent account of faith and to examine their significance for 
educational theory. 
The themes studied are: belief in God may be properly basic in a 
rational noetic structure; divine revelation can be self- 
authenticating; and sin has noetic effects. 	 Discussion of the third 
of these is focused upon rational autonomy and, in particular, upon 
the form it takes in the pancritical rationalism of W. W. Bartley. 
The position developed is a moderate form of foundationalism which 
seeks to ground belief in God in an immediate awareness of him 
speaking through the propositions of scripture. It opposes an ideal 
of theonomous response to divine revelation to that of unlimited 
rational autonomy. 
The study of educational issues commences with an examination of the 
relationship between a Reformed Christian worldview and educational 
(or other) theory construction and argues for the transformation from 
within of the areas of knowledge through the introduction into them of 
Christian presuppositions. In accordance with this strategy for the 
integration of faith and learning, a study is made of the implications 
of the Reformed critique of autonomy for educational aims and methods 
and for discussions of the issue of indoctrination. The final issue 
dealt with is that of whether or not it is right or necessary to set 
up separate schools of Reformed Christian and other outlooks in our 
contemporary pluralist society. 
	 The conclusion reached is that there 
is a place for good Reformed Christian schools but nevertheless the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Possibly the single most discussed development in philosophy of 
religion in the eighties has been the coming to prominence, through 
its advocacy by several fairly well-known American writers, of what is 
usually termed 'Reformed Epistemology'. 	 Some have described it as an 
important new approach to the philosophy of religion but in fact, 
although in the hands of these writers it has acquired a particular 
form, it is by no means a completely novel approach and the writers in 
question associate themselves with a tradition that goes back through 
several influential philosophers and theologians of the past century 
or so to John Calvin and other leaders of the sixteenth century 
Reformation. 
With a distinctive view of the nature of faith and knowledge there has 
been associated a particular kind of approach to education. 	 This is 
well represented in the United States and Canada in movements to set 
up Reformed Christian schools and a number of the new independent 
Christian schools coming into existence in increasing numbers in 
Britain are also Reformed in their basic outlook. 
This study is an attempt to develop three main themes of Reformed 
epistemology in order to see whether they constitute an adequate 
foundation for a coherent account of knowledge and faith and to 
examine their significance for educational theory. The study begins 
with a brief look into the writings of some philosophers who have 
advocated forms of Reformed epistemology and in whose work these 
themes can be identified. 
	 This is followed by more detailed study of 
each of the three themes in turn. 
	 The first of them is that belief 
in God may be properly basic in a rational structure of knowledge and 
belief. This is the theme that has received most attention in recent 
discussions, so much so that it has almost become synonymous for 
Reformed epistemology, and it will therefore receive fairly extended 
treatment in this study. However, the other themes, although 
neglected in recent discussions, would seem no less important and they 
too will be examined in their turn. They are that divine revelation 
can be self-authenticating and that sin has noetic effects. 
Discussion of the second of these will focus upon what is often taken 
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to be a particularly significant aspect of the effects of sin in the 
area of knowledge - that of rational autonomy. 
The study of educational issues will commence with an examination of 
the relationship between a Reformed Christian worldview and 
educational (or other) theory construction. This issue is related to 
a further theme of Reformed epistemology - that of what has been 
termed 'the pluralism of the academy' whereby it is held that a 
person's worldview shapes the products of his scholarship. Following 
this, some implications of the Reformed critique of autonomy for 
educational aims and methods and for discussions of the issue of 
indoctrination will be examined. 
	 This will lead into the final area 
for discussion: that of the issue of whether or not it is right or 
necessary to set up separate schools of Reformed Christian and other 
outlooks in our contemporary pluralist society. 
1 
SOME EXAMPLES OF REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, one of the foremost contemporary advocates of 
Reformed epistemology, has identified five theses on the nature of 
faith and of reason, and on the relation between them, which seem to 
be characteristic of the Reformed tradition.' 	 They are so in the 
sense that they are usually associated with the Reformed tradition but 
not in the sense that all who locate themselves in the tradition would 
accept all five of them or that only those in the tradition would 
accept any of them. 
First, Wolterstorff says that it has characteristically been 
maintained within the Reformed tradition that one can be rationally 
justified in believing in God without doing so on the basis of any 
reasons or evidence. 	 Belief in God can be justified immediately 
rather than mediately through reasons or evidence. 	 It can itself 
form the basis for mediate justification and so is 'properly basic' to 
a rational structure of knowledge and beliefs. 
Secondly, according to Wolterstorff, it has characteristically been 
maintained that belief that the Christian Scriptures are revealed by 
God can also be justified immediately rather than on the basis of 
argument from reasons or evidence. Divine revelation is not 
externally authenticated - it is self-authenticating. 
Thirdly, he says, it has characteristically been held that the effects 
of sin extend to our rational capacities for acquiring beliefs and 
knowledge. Sin not only affects our wills - it has noetic effects 
also. 
A fourth thesis identified by Wolterstorff concerns the pluralism of 
the academy. 	 It has characteristically been maintained that a 
competent specimen of science may well not be neutral with respect to 
the Christian faith and that, in the event of conflict, the science 
should be re-done rather than that the faith should be given up. The 
fifth characteristic thesis is closely related to this but is put in 
the more positive terms that a Christian's engagement in scientific 
activity should be directed in appropriate ways by his faith. 
	 These 
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last two theses could be brought together into one which maintains not 
only the inevitability but also the desirability of worldviews 
affecting theory construction in science. 
Through the centuries since the Reformation and up to the present day, 
there have been a number of philosophers and theologians of note 
within the Reformed tradition whose writings give evidence of their 
maintaining most if not all of these characteristic theses. 	 Several 
of these have had particular emphases in their thought which have 
given rise to various sub-traditions within the broad stream of 
Reformed thought2 and these are also related to varying emphases and 
sub-traditions in the application of that thought to education. 
It is impossible within the confines of this study to do more than 
look briefly at just a few of these writers and any selection will 
inevitably leave out others of equal and arguably greater 
significance. I have chosen to give a brief outline of Abraham 
Kuyper's theory of knowledge since what he wrote around the turn of 
the present century has been widely influential in a range of sub- 
traditions. 	 I shall also outline the main details of the approach of 
Cornelius Van Til as a writer from the earlier and middle decades of 
this century who represented a particular sub-tradition and who held 
to particularly strong versions of the characteristic theses of 
Reformed epistemology. 	 My main focus will be on the work of Alvin 
Plantinga since he is a very well-known contemporary philosopher of 
religion and he has been largely responsible for the remarkable upturn 
of interest in Reformed epistemology in the past decade. 
1.1 THE REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY OF ABRAHAM KUYPER 
Abraham Kuyper, founder of the Free University of Amsterdam and Prime 
Minister of the Netherlands from 1901 to 1905, must rank as one of the 
foremost Reformed thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century and one of the most quoted in later attempts to develop a 
Reformed account of knowledge and faith. 
	 The fullest account that he 
has given of his approach is to be found in his 'Encyclopaedie der 
Heilige Godgeleerheid', a major portion of which exists in English 
translation as 'Encyclopaedia of Sacred Theology'3 and it is mainly 
upon this that the following brief outline relies. 
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1.1.1 THE POETIC EFFECTS OF SIN 
Kuyper says that faith is of crucial importance within knowledge and 
by this he means not faith in God or in Christ or, indeed, faith with 
any particular content but "a function of the life of our soul which 
is fundamental to every fact in our human consciousness".4 By this 
faith function, we obtain certainty directly and immediately rather 
than by demonstrative argument, and faith is therefore opposed not to 
knowledge but to demonstration. 	 Knowledge may be the result of 
either faith or demonstration. 	 Even demonstration itself is 
ultimately grounded in faith because we cannot demonstrate the axioms 
of thought. Among the other certainties are those of our own 
existence, the general reliability of our senses, the existence of 
natural laws and the existence of other minds. By faith we know the 
ego exists and by faith we "vault the gap" from the ego to the non-ego 
in every area of knowledge. Without faith, says Kuyper, there is no 
other bridge to be built from the phenomena to the noumena.5  
Kuyper uses the word 'science' in a way that is roughly equivalent to 
'form of knowledge' and he distinguishes between those sciences which 
he variously refers to as "material", "ponderable", "exact" and 
"natural" and those which he terms the "spiritual" sciences. The 
former are concerned with the perception of objects through the senses 
but the latter have to do with the intellectual, ethical, social, 
juridical, aesthetic and theological aspects of reality. 	 In relation 
to these spiritual realities of love and of right and the like, of 
which we may often be more certain than of physical realities, Kuyper 
proposes a psychic sense whereby, as he puts it, "in entire indep-
endence of our senses and of any middle link known to us, the elements 
of the spiritual world affect our subject spiritually and thus to our 
apprehension appear to enter immediately into our consciousness."6  
The starting-point of Kuyper's theory of knowledge is in the state of 
affairs that he believes would exist if there were no disturbance 
caused by sin. 	 If there were no sin, the cosmos would be "an open 
book" for the universal human consciousness, not that we would know 
everything instantaneously and exhaustively but that there would be 
nothing without or within us to frustrate our human consciousness in 
entering more and more deeply into the cosmos in representation and 
conception.? 
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Subjective factors would not in themselves constitute a problem in 
science because there would be a natural harmony between individual 
subjects. For Kuyper it is evident that no such harmony exists 
universally or necessarily; it is lacking both within the subject and 
within the object - the cosmos of which man is a part - and, indeed, 
between subject and object. 	 As evidence of this, he lists the 
following: the presence of falsehood in the world; unintentional 
mistakes; the phenomena of self-delusion and self-deception; the 
possibility of confusion at the boundary of the real and the 
imaginary; the fact that falsehood within finds a "coefficient" in 
falsehood transmitted from without through education, language and 
general culture; the effects of bodily illness on the spirit; the 
influence of "the sin-disorganised relationships of life"; and the 
influences of falsehood and inaccuracies in one area of our individual 
consciousness upon other areas even to the extent of affecting one's 
"life-and-world-view". All of these relate to what Kuyper terms "the 
formal workings of sin on our minds" but he goes on to discuss in 
addition the workings of sin on our consciousness through moral 
motives and especially the influence of self-interest, the "darkening 
of our consciousness" through estrangement from the object of our 
knowledge so that love of child or nature or whatever is replaced by 
absence of the sympathy or affinity that formerly aided understanding, 
and the loss of harmony within ourselves in the plurality of 
conflicting motives and emotions.7  
Kuyper sees sin as something that disrupts the otherwise harmonious 
relationships that would exist among people as the knowing human 
subjects and between them and the objects of knowledge. It is this 
estrangement that frustrates humankind's deepening grasp of what is 
there to be known and understood. 	 It is not that personal holiness 
can be correlated with scientific progress on the part of the 
individual or its absence with lack of such progress on his part for 
this would be to take an individualistic and atomistic view of the 
whole process of knowledge. 
	
For Kuyper, knowledge and understanding 
are to be sought by humankind collectively and co-operatively. 
Furthermore, Kuyper maintains,8 the noetic effects of sin do not 
include loss of the capacity for logical thought and this capacity can 
be developed by training and is presumably something which varies from 
individual to individual independently of their personal holiness or 
sinfulness. 	 Kuyper also allows that the noetic effects of sin are 
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less evident where the subjective factor in knowing is less prominent, 
i.e., less evident in the material sciences than in the spiritual 
sciences, and he suggests that it is most evident in the science of 
theology because of its distinctive object, that of God himself, and 
the importance for it of the distinctive relationship between object 
and subject.9  
1.1.2 'TWO KINDS OF PEOPLE AND TWO KINDS OF SCIENCE'  
One of most controversial aspects of Kuyper's thought is his 
development of the thesis that sin has noetic effects into the 
proposal that there are two kinds of people and two kinds of science. 
Regeneration or, as he terms it, 'palingenesis', is taken by Kuyper to 
be a change of man in his very being which leads to a change of 
consciousness. What this means for science is described by him as 
follows:- 
"Both parts of humanity, that which has been wrought upon by 
palingenesis and that which lacks it, feel the impulse to 
investigate the object, and, by doing this in a scientific way, 
to obtain a scientific systemization of that which exists. 	 ... 
But however much they may be doing the same kind of thing 
formally, their activities run in opposite directions because 
they have different starting-points; and because of the 
difference in their nature they apply themselves differently to 
this work, and view things in a different way."I°  
It might be claimed, in response to such an account, that this alleged 
difference is not evident in science and that, if it were, co-
operation and even communication between the two kinds of people over 
matters scientific would be impossible but Kuyper makes a number of 
points in response to such objections:- 
(i) there is a very broad realm in which the difference between the 
two kinds of people exerts little or no influence and this includes 
matters of sense observation as the raw material of natural science, 
the facts of history and of other spiritual sciences and the laws of 
logic; 
(ii) palingenesis is a continual process so that there is not at 
once a radical and complete change in the content of consciousness; 
(iii) the Christian framework of creation, fall and redemption was 
for many centuries a common framework of thought for both groups; and 
(iv) those who are regenerate remember and can appreciate the 
viewpoint of the unregenerate." 
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There is therefore a large area in which both groups may work together 
and even attain academic laurels together without the difference of 
principle becoming involved; and even when the lines divide, it is 
still possible to appreciate mutually the reasons for the divergence 
and, taking into account the differences of premise or starting-point, 
to criticise logically the other's progress. This should not be 
taken to mean that there will be a uniform set of results obtained by 
each of the two groups. 	 Subjective factors will operate for both 
because in both groups individuals differ from one another and because 
no individual has mastery of the field so that, in both groups, 
different schools of thought will emerge. 	 A starting-point in 
Christian premises will not wholly determine the outcome any more than 
will one in naturalistic premises.12  
If there are two kinds of people and two kinds of science and this 
difference is most strongly felt in theology, then it is likely to 
issue in two views of the very nature of theology itself. 	 Indeed, 
Kuyper argues that naturalistic premises and the premises of 
palingenesis do logically lead to two different views of theology. 
He claims that to omit the facts of sin and of palingenesis from 
science means that everything must be considered normal as it is, so 
that man is not alienated from God, his being and his consciousness 
are not influenced by sin and he needs no restorative power from 
without and no special revelation to his consciousness in order to 
attain to a true view of the cosmos.13 	 The existence of God must 
then become questionable simply because in this 'normal' world there 
are those who deny it and those who question whether God can be known 
even if he exists. The consequence is that the object of theological 
thought becomes uncertain as to its existence and so theology cannot 
be a science since, argues Kuyper, theological science requires an 
object in a God who certainly exists. 	 Naturalistic premises lead 
inevitably to the conclusion that theology is not a science. 
	 Kuyper 
allows that, on such premises, there is still the possibility that 
religion may be studied scientifically but, he argues, this is not 
theology but religious studies. 
Since for Kuyper science is the study of the cosmos under its various 
aspects and theology is a science, he says that divine revelation must 
lie not outside of but within the cosmos and always present itself in 
cosmical form.14 	 Further, he maintains, revealed knowledge of God 
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belongs to spiritual science and is analogous to man's knowledge of 
his fellow man both in that it must be disclosed by the other and also 
in that man must begin from the knowledge he has of himself. 
Therefore, if God is to reveal knowledge of himself within the cosmos, 
it must be revealed within man himself for him even to begin to grasp 
it and, since God is pure Spirit, within his psychic existence and not 
in his body. 	 So, just as our self-knowledge is linked with and the 
basis of our knowledge of others, it must also be the case that 
knowledge of God "coincides" with man's own self-knowledge and be 
"given 'eo ipse' in his own self-consciousness ... not as discursive 
knowledge, but as the immediate content of self-consciousness".15 As 
the image of God, man is in his inner being a revelation of God so 
that, as Kuyper puts it:- 
"If the cosmos is the theatre2f revelation, in this theatre man 
is both actor and spectator."1°  
This constitutes in man that part of an innate theology which, 
according to Kuyper, is what Calvin meant by his talk of the "seed of 
religion", that spiritual eye within, the lens of which may be dimmed 
but always so that lens and eye remain even in fallen man. The faith 
function of the inner being, which bridges the gap from the ego to the 
non-ego of other minds, to the data of our perceptions, to the axioms 
of thought and the like, operates too in relation to the revealed 
knowledge of God and is "but the opening of the spiritual eye and the 
consequent perception of another Being, excelling us in everything, 
that manifests itself in our own being".17 By the "logical action" 
of our minds - another part of the image of God within - we turn this 
perception into (scientific) knowledge of God. 
1.1.3 REVELATION IN THE SCRIPTURES  
Kuyper claims that man can never rid himself of the seed of religion, 
the sense of deity within, but, because of the nature of sin, the 
manifestation of God within the inner being of man as sinner must be 
no longer of a God with whom he has an affinity but rather of one who 
is antipathetic to him. 	 Kuyper claims that the sinner can never rid 
himself of faith either but it must turn into unfaith in attaching 
itself to something other than God and therefore something creaturely 
which the sinner finds sympathetic or, at least, not antipathetic. 
Man as sinner seeks something to which he can cling by faith. 
Logical action remains in the sinner as long as he is not insane but 
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it leads not to the knowledge of God but to his denial in the 
intellect. We retain the power of thought but, says Kuyper, "the 
pivot of our thought becomes displaced".18  
The effects of sin are such as to make the knowledge of God impossible 
apart from modifications in the way in which God is revealed. In the 
intermediate state of the cosmos in which, because of God's 'common 
grace', "the wheel of sin is revolving but the brakes are on", man is 
in a state in which palingenesis is still possible. In palingenesis, 
the revelation of God comes from without rather than from the seed of 
religion within and is of a sympathetic God in the incarnate Christ of 
the scriptures. 	 In palingenesis, recovery of the original working of 
faith is possible "by bending right again, from the root up, the 
direction of his psychical life".19 Logical action regains its power 
in relation to divine things through what Kuyper takes to be the 
illumination of the Holy Spirit in palingenesis. This does not imply 
anything for the acuteness of the action of logical thought since this 
differs from person to person regardless of the effects of sin or 
palingenesis. What it does is to restore the displacement of the 
"pivot of our thought" .20 
Because of sin, natural theology is unable of itself to give what 
Kuyper terms "any pure knowledge of God". On the other hand, special 
theology presupposes natural theology and cannot be conceived apart 
from it. Kuyper argues that this is necessarily so because grace 
creates no single new reality and no new component part is added to 
man in palingenesis. 	 Palingenesis is a re-creation and not a 
creation of something new, otherwise the organic nature of the cosmos 
would be destroyed. Miracles should be seen not as magical incidents 
but as integral to the palingenesis of all things; and to see them out 
of this relation is "to debase the Recreator of heaven and earth to a 
juggler" .21 	 The miracle of the incarnation is such that our own 
human nature becomes the revelation of God. 
	 The same God reveals 
himself to the same ego of man in the same consciousness through 
natural revelation before the fall and special revelation in this 
present temporary age between the fall and the complete renewal of all 
things. If man had not been created capable of receiving knowledge 
of God in the first place, he could not now know him by means of 
special , revelation. Kuyper writes of the relationship between 
natural and special revelation in the following terms:- 
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"It is upon the canvas of this natural knowledge of God itself 
that the special revelation is embroidered".22 
Kuyper denies that the reality and reliability of special revelation 
can be demonstrated "at the bar of human reason" because it is not a 
matter of rational demonstration and, even if it were, the natural is 
so affected by sin that it cannot judge the special. 	 This does not 
mean that reason may be ignored so that we can believe anything we 
like. Kuyper suggests that it is important that the believer be able 
to see for himself the reasonableness of his beliefs and be able to 
prove this to those who share his premises and even be able to show to 
somebody else that with the assumption of the believer's premises he 
can accept his conclusions. Kuyper is also pessimistic as to the 
value of apologetic attempts to bring forward positive evidences for 
faith in the form of miracles, the fulfilment of prophecies, the 
majestic style of the scriptures and the like. 	 The divine character 
of the scriptures will shine out from them but not to the person who 
will not see. 	 Evidences may be of value to those within the faith in 
order to combat doubt but no giving of reasons, refuting of 
objections, adduction of evidence is of value either as the ground of 
the believer's confession of faith or as a means to compel another to 
such confession. 	 Certainty concerning special revelation is given 
only by the witness of the Holy Spirit just as the witness of our own 
spirits - which coincides with the witness of the Creator - gives 
certainty concerning the natural revelation of the sense of our own 
ego, the laws of thought and the existence of others.23  
1.2 THE REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY OF CORNELIUS VAN TIL 
Cornelius Van Til of Westminster Seminary, Philadelphia was strongly 
influenced by Abraham Kuyper in his development of what he termed "a 
Christian theory of knowledge".24  
Van Til is one of the most forthright and controversial of recent 
Reformed writers but his writings are often somewhat lacking in 
clarity of expression and in the analytical rigour that can be 
expected of most of the best of modern philosophers. He gives much 
space to the repetition of what sound like bold and extravagant claims 
without always fully explaining what he means and he does not always 
clearly justify steps in his arguments. 
	 In spite of these problems, 
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the main thrust of his thought seems fairly clear and provides an 
example of one of the boldest versions of the characteristic theses of 
Reformed epistemology. 
1.2.1 TWO BASIC PRESUPPOSITIONS  
Van Til's position on the subject of the place of argument and 
evidence in relation to belief in God is often termed 
'presuppositionalist'. He makes the startling claim that "God cannot 
be proved to exist by any method other than the indirect one of 
presupposition"25 	 and he boldly asserts that man presupposes either 
God or himself as "the final reference point in all human 
predication".26 	 If the God believed in by Christians exists then he 
is self-sufficient and if he is self-sufficient then, Van Til argues, 
he alone is self-explanatory and so must be the final reference point 
in human predication. 	 On the other hand, if man assumes himself to 
be "autonomous", he thereby takes himself to be the final reference 
point and he virtually negates the Christian God. The issue between 
these two presuppositions cannot be settled by direct appeal to facts 
or laws because the question is as to what is the final reference 
point required to make facts or laws intelligible. 	 The only way to 
proceed is by an indirect method of reasoning by presupposition, i.e., 
the Christian must adopt the non-Christian position for argument's 
sake in order to show that on its presupposition "the 'facts' are not 
facts and the 'laws' are not laws" and he must also ask the non-
Christian to adopt the Christian position for the sake of argument "in 
order that he may be shown that only upon such a basis do 'facts' and 
'laws' become intelligible".27  
A recurring theme throughout Van Til's writings is that to take man as 
final reference point is a sinful assumption of autonomy. He does 
not define clearly what he means by 'autonomy' but the following are 
typical of what he says about it:- 
"Man has set aside the law of his Creator and therewith has 
become a law to himself. 	 He will be subject to none but 
himself. 
	 He seeks to be autonomous. 
	 He knows that he i% a 
creature and ought to be subject to the law of his Creator."2°  
"There is no autonomy of theoretical thought as such. There is 
a would-be autonomous man, who thinks about his entire 
environment in terms of his thought as legislative and as 
determinative of the structure of the temporal world."29  
It would seem that Van Til means by 'autonomy' some kind of radical 
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independent-mindedness whereby man takes his reason to have the final 
say on what he can accept as true, meaningful or good. The 
alternative for Van Til is to take what God reveals to man as the 
final authority as to what is true, meaningful or good. This seems 
to amount to a broadening to extend to the whole of knowledge of the 
particular thesis in ethics that good is what God is and what he 
commands. In that particular context, autonomy is often discussed 
over against such arguments as that the basis of the obligation to 
recognise God's commands as our duties lies in the fact that he is our 
Creator.30 Van Til may be seen as presenting an epistemological 
analogue of the divine command theory of ethics. 
Van Til distinguishes between what he terms "the ultimate starting-
point" and "the proximate starting-point" and he argues that "the 
human consciousness must, in the nature of the case, always be the 
proximate starting-point" but that "God is always the most basic and 
therefore the ultimate or final reference point in human 
interpretation".31 This seems to mean that it is the self which 
makes the decisions in thought and practical life but that the 
standard for such decisions is in an authoritative divine revelation. 
A person's thinking should therefore be authentically his own.32 	 At 
the same time, he should obey God's authority but not as that of an 
expert whose credentials he has first autonomously accepted for, as he 
writes:- 
"If we must determine the foundations of the authority, we no 
longer accept authority on authority. 	 Authority could be 
authority to us only if we already knew that it had the right to 
claim authority. 	 Such could be the case only if we knew in 
advance the nature of that authority. 	 Thus we would have a 
theory of being, already taken for granted at the outset of our 
investigation." 
Van Til believes that ontology can and should have priority over 
epistemology and claims that his theory of knowledge is what it is 
because his theory of being is what it is. 'What is there to know?' 
or, rather, 'Who is the original knower?' must be asked before we ask 
'How do we know?'.34 The Creator-creature distinction is central to 
Van Til's theory of being so that he claims he does not start with 
being in general but with God's being as self-contained and created 
being as dependent upon God. 35 To the objection that the 
epistemological question can and must be asked without saying anything 
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with respect to the ontological question, Van Til has the ready 
response that to assume this already excludes one answer to the 
question of knowledge itself.36 Such a being as God could not speak 
otherwise than with absolute authority and to assume that man has 
either the capacity or the right to judge what God says is to deny 
both his authority and his being. The assumption of autonomy 
reflects a prior ontological commitment which itself prejudges 
epistemological issues. 
1.2.2 SELF-AUTHENTICATING REVELATION 
Van Til holds that there is a two-fold revelation of God in nature and 
in the scriptures and these form a unity in which general and special 
revelations presuppose and supplement one another. He follows 
Calvin, Kuyper and others in holding that there is a sense of deity 
within man whereby self-knowledge and knowledge of God are given 
together. 
	
Man's mind cannot be conscious of itself without being 
conscious of its creatureliness so that man cannot truly know himself 
without knowing himself for what he is, that is, unless he knows 
himself as a creature made in the image of God. 	 In this way, Van Til 
claims, self-consciousness presupposes God-consciousness but this 
sense of deity within must be distinguished from man's reaction to it 
as a sinner whereby he seeks to suppress it.37  
Van Til holds that the Creator's revelation to man as creature must be 
authoritative and self-authenticating because otherwise such a 
revelation would be subject to an authority and test for validity 
which would have to be held to be more certain that that which it 
tests. It is the work of the Holy Spirit that results in the 
knowledge that the scriptures are the Word of God but, says Van Til, 
this testimony of the Holy Spirit does not give additional information 
alongside that which the revelation contains. 
	 Witness to truth 
cannot be by way of further truth, otherwise the truth is not self-
authenticating and if there were further truth it would need yet 
further truth to testify to it and so on 'ad infinitum'.38  
This testimony of the Spirit is a divine activity that "opens (men's) 
eyes to see things as they truly are".39 The metaphor Van Til uses 
here is that used by Calvin of sight being needed to distinguish light 
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from darkness. 	 The need is of sight, not of further light. 	 The 
work of the Spirit is immediate even though it may use argumentation 
and take place in the presence of the evidence of "the heavenly 
content of the Word".40 Preaching and reasoning are therefore not in 
vain, according to Van Til, because it is the sense of deity within 
along with all the evidence of nature and scripture that provides "a 
background and foundation" for the work of the Holy Spirit.41  
Nevertheless, reason is not competent to judge revelation because it 
is from revelation that reason learns its proper function as created 
by God and properly subject to the authority of God.42  
1.2.3 THE NOETIC EFFECTS OF SIN 
Van Til makes a distinction between intellectual understanding of the 
issues between Christian and non-Christian presuppositions and the 
knowledge that is the result of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. 
This knowledge is "ethical" and he writes:- 
"Though he is dead in sins, this deadness of the natural man is 
an ethical deadness, not a metaphysical escape from God. 	 As 
the image of God and therefore endowed with the sense of deity, 
man can very well understand intellectually what is meant when 
the preacher tells him that he is a sinner and that he ought to 
repent. 
	
He knows God as Paul says so specifically in his 
letter to the Romans. 	 Yet ethically he does not know God. 
His mind is darkened and his will is perverted, as Paul says 
with equal clarity. 	 ... As a consequence of this darkness of 
mind, this spiritual blindness, the natural man does not know 
truly that which, in the sense above defined, he knows and 
cannot help but know."43 
Here and elsewhere in his writings, Van Til merges ethical and 
epistemological aspects of man's activities so that, for example, he 
defines an "epistemological reaction" as a "reaction as an ethically 
responsible creature of God".44 For Van Til, man's assumption of his 
own autonomy is a manifestation of his own sinfulness. His ethical 
rebellion consists, at least in part, of the choice of the wrong 
epistemological principle. 
	 In seeking to interpret the universe 
without reference to God, man sets himself an ideal which is 
inconsistent with his own creatureliness and, in taking the right to 
decide on such issues, he actually decides these issues about the 
final reference point in a certain way. 
Of the effects of sin upon man's use of his intellectual powers, Van 
Til writes:- 
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"The saw may be very shiny and ever so sharp; if the set is 
wrong it cannot but do damage. So the intellect of fallen man 
may be ever so brilliant, but since the set of his person, as a 
covenant-breaker, is wrong, it will in the ultimate sense do all 
the more damage. It may also at the same time, because of 
God's common grace, do all the more good for the progress of 
culture."45 
Although the gulf between ultimate presuppositions is very wide and, 
as he puts it, "epistemologically the believer and non-believer have 
nothing in common" ,46 Van Til is often at pains to point out that the 
difference is in principle only and, because of God's common grace, is 
not fully worked out in practice. 
	
Fallen man in his scientific 
activity makes use of what Van Til terms "borrowed capital" and makes 
positive contributions "in spite of his principles and because both he 
and the universe are the exact opposite of what he, by his principles,- 
thinks they are."47 His discoveries of truth are adventitious as far 
as his principles are concerned but, from the point of view of 
Christian presuppositions, the evidence of God's common grace to all. 
1.3 THE REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY OF ALVIN PLANTINGA 
It was in the eighties that contemporary analytical philosophers first 
began to take notice of Reformed epistemology. 	 Their interest in the 
subject was sparked off by the publication around the beginning of the 
decade of three seminal papers by Alvin Plantinga.48 It was in these 
papers that Plantinga first began to set forth his version of the 
first of the characteristic themes of Reformed epistemology but it can 
be viewed as a development of his earlier studies of rationality and 
religious belief. 	 In particular, it follows on from the conclusions 
of his book 'God and Other Minds' which was published about twelve 
years earlier,49 in which he examined the traditional arguments for 
and against the existence of God and decided that 	 both natural 
theology and natural atheology were unsuccessful. He went on in that 
book to explore various analogies between belief in God and belief in 
other minds and concluded that these two beliefs were on 
epistemological par so that, he says, since we hold belief in other 
minds to be rational, we must say the same for belief in God. It is 
but a step from this to the argument that it is perfectly rational to 
accept belief in God without accepting it on the basis of evidence or 
argument from other beliefs. In other words and using the phrase 
that Plantinga has successfully implanted into the language of 
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philosophical discussion of the rationality of religious belief, it is 
but a step to the argument that belief in God is 'properly basic'. 
Although most of the work that Plantinga has published to date on 
Reformed epistemology" - and most of the discussion that it has 
engendered51 - has been concerned with this theme of the proper 
basicality of belief in God, he has also indicated his acceptance of 
the other characteristic themes identified by Wolterstorff. 	 He 
accepts that in reading the Bible a person may find himself with the 
properly basic belief that God is speaking to him and refers to "the 
internal testimony of the Holy Spirit" as being "a source of reliable 
and perfectly acceptable beliefs about what is communicated (by God) 
in Scripture".52 	 He also says that if it were not for the existence 
of sin in the world we would all wholeheartedly and spontaneously 
believe in God.53 	 His inaugural address contained advice to 
Christian philosophers to exhibit more autonomy and integrality and 
maintained that they have a perfect right to start with the views they 
hold as Christians rather than from the naturalistic perspective from 
which, he says, most contemporary philosophers do in fact start.54 
However, since to date Plantinga has not really developed these 
comments on the other themes, this outline of his version of Reformed 
epistemology will be focussed mainly on the first theme - that of the 
proper basicality of belief in God. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff is another analytical philosopher who has been 
associated with Plantinga in this interest in Reformed epistemology. 
They jointly edited the published essays that arose out of a yearlong 
project of the Calvin (College) Center for Christian Studies, a 
project on the topic of "A Reformed View of Faith and Reason "55 and 
Wolterstorff has made his own contribution in work on the criteria of 
rationality, of which I shall give some more detail in the next 
chapter.56 	 William Alston has also been associated with Plantinga 
in this development. 	 He says that he almost entirely agrees with 
Plantinga's position'57 and he has attempted to develop it further 
particularly in his work on religious experience and on what he terms 
"the perception of God".58 I shall also refer to this in the next 
chapter." 
1.3.1 FAITH, EVIDENTIALISM AHD CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONALISH 
A major element of Plantinga's Reformed epistemology is his rejection 
of what he terms "the evidentialist objection to belief in God". 	 He 
cites a number of philosophers - notably W. K. Clifford, Bertrand 
Russell, Brand Blanshard, Michael Scriven and Anthony Flew - who have 
argued that belief in God is, in some sense of the term, irrational 
because, they claim, there is a lack of evidence or reasons for it.60 
Although the philosophers he mentions have all concluded that belief 
in God is irrational, it would seem that Plantings is opposed to all 
forms of the thesis that belief in God should be based on reasons or 
evidence even when it is held by those who do believe in God. 
	 He 
allows that, when he began writing 'God and Other Minds', he himself 
had taken it for granted that the right way to approach the question 
of the rationality of belief in God was by way of considering the 
evidence for and against such belief but he had subsequently come to 
regard this approach as mistaken.61 	 The issue between Plantinga and 
those he opposes is not over whether there is or could be adequate 
evidence for belief in God but over whether the rationality of such 
belief depends upon there being such evidence. 
Plantings says that evidentialism is of at least two distinct kinds 
which are distinguished by what is meant by describing a belief as 
rational or irrational.62 The first of these is the position of what 
he calls "the deontological evidentialist" who thinks of rationality 
in terms of intellectual duties, norms or obligations and who claims 
that the person who believes in God without adequate evidence or 
reasons is guilty of failing in these duties. 
	 According to this form 
of evidentialism, there is at least a prima facie obligation not to 
accept belief in God without sufficient evidence. The second form of 
evidentialism is "axiological evidentialism" or "value evidentialism" 
which takes irrationality to be a matter of some flaw or defect in a 
person's structure of beliefs. Belief in God without adequate 
evidence is seen as such a flaw or defect. 
Plantings takes the former of these views of rationality to be more 
problematic than the latter because of the difficulty of talking about 
intellectual duties if, as it seems plausible to suggest, our beliefs 
are not within our control. However, he challenges adherents of both 
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forms to show why it is that, on their view of rationality, belief in 
God without adequate evidence is irrational. 	 He writes:- 
"The crucial question here is this: Why does the objector think 
these things? 	 Why does he think there is a prima facie 
obligation to try not to believe in God without evidence? 	 Or 
why does he think that to do so is to be in a deplorable 
condition? Why is it not permissible and quite satisfactory to 
believe in God without any evidence - proof or argument - at 
all? 	 Presumably the objector does not mean to suggest that no 
propositions can be believed or accepted without evidence, for 
if you have evidence for every proposition you believe, then 
(granted certain plausible assumptions about the formal 
properties of the evidence relation) you will believe infinitely 
many propositions; and no one has time, these busy days, for 
that. 	 So presumably some propositions can properly be believed 
and accepted without evidence. 	 Well, why not belief in God? 
Why is it not entirely acceptable, desirable, right, proper, and 
rational to accept belief in God without any argument or 
evidence whatever?"63  
Plantinga holds that the explanation for the evidentialist assumption 
that evidence is required to justify belief in God and not to justify 
certain other beliefs lies in "the fact that the evidentialist 
objection is typically rooted in some form of classical 
foundationalism" .64 	 Foundationalists agree that there are 
propositions that can be rationally held without being believed on the 
basis of any other propositions at all, i.e., that there are 
propositions that are properly basic. They disagree as to what kinds 
of proposition are properly basic. 	 Plantinga says that the "ancient 
and medieval foundationalism" - of Aristotle and Aquinas, for example 
- accepts only self-evident propositions and propositions evident to 
the senses whereas the "modern foundationalism" - of Descartes „Locke 
and Hume, for example - accepts only self-evident propositions and 
incorrigible propositions directly about one's experience. 
	 Ancient, 
medieval and modern foundationalisms are all forms of what Plantinga 
terms "classical foundationalism" and, because the belief that God 
exists is neither self-evident nor evident to the senses nor an 
incorrigible belief about one's own immediate experience, it is not 
acceptable as a properly basic belief. Classical foundationalism in 
all its forms therefore holds that belief in God cannot rationally be 
accepted without adequate evidence. 
Plantinga defines foundationalism in terms of a "rational noetic 
structure" where a person's noetic structure is taken to be the set of 
propositions he believes together with the epistemic relations that 
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hold among these propositions and between him and them. 	 In a 
rational noetic structure, the relation of support of beliefs for 
other beliefs is both asymmetric and irreflexive so that if belief A 
is based on belief B then belief B should not be based on belief A and 
belief A should not be based upon itself. Also a rational noetic 
structure has a foundation in basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs 
derive their support from basic beliefs. 	 It might seem that the more 
basic a belief is in a noetic structure the more firmly it should be 
held but Plantinga suggests that basicality and degree of belief can 
vary independently of one another as can basicality and depth of 
ingression and also degree of belief and depth of ingression - "depth 
of ingression" he takes to be a matter of distance from the 
"periphery" of a noetic structure and of the consequent 
"reverberations" through the structure of change in a belief.65  
Against this background Plantinga rejects classical foundationalism 
and, with it, the evidentialist objection to belief in God insofar as 
it is rooted in this form of foundationalism, and he does so on the 
grounds that foundationalism of this kind is not true or, even if it 
is true, it is probably self-referentially incoherent. 	 His argument 
against the truth of classical foundationalism is that it would 
exclude many propositions that are generally taken to be basic and 
dismiss as irrational much of what we all in fact believe, e.g., 
propositions that entail that there are persons distinct from myself 
or that the world has existed for more than five minutes.66 This is 
a fairly common objection to classical foundationalism. 	 The Scottish 
philosopher of 'common sense', Thomas Reid - a writer who seems to 
have been particularly influential upon Wolterstorff and Alston as 
well as upon Plantinga67 - had advanced it in the eighteenth century 
and G. E. Moore and many others have echoed it in the present century. 
Plantinga's second objection to classical foundationalism is more 
unique to him. 	 This is to the effect that classical foundationalism 
is probably self-referentially incoherent. His argument here is that 
the classical foundationalist accepts something like the following 
statement of rational.acceptability but his acceptance of it does not 
meet its own requirements:- 
"p is rationally acceptable for S only if either (a) p is self-
evident or evident to the senses or incorrigible for S, or (b) 
there are paths in S's noetic structure from p to propositions 
ql 	 qn that (1) are basic for S, (ii) are self-evident, 
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pevilint to the senses or incorrigible for S, and (iii) support .floo 
Plantinga says that this statement itself is neither self-evident, 
evident to the senses nor incorrigible so, if the classical found-
ationalist is to be rational in accepting it, he must believe it 
ultimately on the basis of propositions that are self-evident, evident 
to the senses or incorrigible and that support it. 	 Plantinga claims 
that no foundationalist has ever produced a successful argument for 
this statement from propositions that meet this condition and, 
further, that it is very difficult to see how such an argument could 
go. 	 From this he concludes that such a statement of classical 
foundationalism is probably self-referentially incoherent. 	 He adds 
that he believes that the classical foundationalist, without any 
reason for doing so, commits himself to reason or to self-evidence as 
an acceptable means of acquiring, fixing and sustaining belief.69  
1.3.2 FAITH, BVIDENTIALISH AND COHERINTISN 
Plantinga allows that the evidentialist objection to belief in God is 
not usually explicitly linked with a classical foundationalist stance 
and that it need not be based therein but he insists that it is 
plausible to claim that it is typically rooted in it and it is, after 
all, "a powerful and pervasive epistemological tradition". Indeed, 
he says that it was "a kind of incipient classical foundationalism" 
that led him to adopt the approach to rationality that he took when he 
began to write 'God and Other Minds1.70 	 In spite of this and noting 
that Brand Blanshard was both an evidentialist objector to belief in 
God and clearly not a foundationalist of any kind but a coherentist, 
Plantinga also presents a fairly detailed argument to the effect that 
coherentism does not provide any more viable basis for 
evidentialism.71  
In fact, Plantinga's argument is two-fold: not only does he find 
little hope for a coherentist version of the evidentialist objection 
to belief in God, he also argues that coherentism itself should be 
rejected as neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality of 
belief. First, he argues that, for what he calls the "pure 
coherentist", what matters is not really whether some beliefs provide 
reasons or evidence for holding other beliefs but rather whether these 
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other beliefs cohere with the rest of a person's noetic structure. 
It is not that 'B coheres with the rest of my noetic structure' is 
one's evidence for B but that coherence is itself the "source of 
warrant" just as self-evidence, perception, introspection, memory and 
the like may be sources of warrant for various kinds of 
foundationalism. A belief is rational if it coheres with the rest of 
one's structure of beliefs and it is not necessary that it have the 
evidential support of any of these other beliefs. 	 So, as Plantinga 
puts it, the pure coherentist "holds that all warranted propositions 
in a noetic structure are properly basic in that structure"72 and he 
cannot therefore object to belief in God on grounds of lack of 
evidence. 
Even if the coherentist objects to theistic belief on the grounds that 
it does not cohere with the rest of the theist's noetic structure -
what Plantinga terms a transposition of the evidentialist objection 
into the coherentist key - it does not follow that it is belief in God 
that has to be replaced. 
	
Revision in other beliefs to make them 
cohere with belief in God could do just as well. 	 Plantinga points to 
the example of the incoherence between belief in a personal God and 
the belief that it is impossible for there to be a person who has no 
body. Coherence - and, therefore, rationality of belief - could be 
achieved here not by giving up belief in God but by giving up instead 
those beliefs that imply that every person must have a body.73  
Having argued thus that the evidentialist objection to belief in God 
can not easily be rooted in coherentism, Plantinga goes on to reject 
coherentism itself on the grounds that it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for rationality. Against its sufficiency, he makes use of 
the familiar argument that coherent structures of belief may be 
inconsistent with one another so that at least one of them cannot be 
true. 	 He also argues that coherence is not necessary for warrant 
nondefectiveness. 	 One example he gives here is of an unduly 
impressionable student who is convinced by an eminent but 
idiosyncratic epistemologist that no one is ever appeared to redly and 
who goes away with a noetic structure that coheres with this belief. 
The student could later be appeared to redly and notice that he is 
thus appeared to and, assuming his noetic structure does not undergo 
instant change, his belief that he is being appeared to redly will not 
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be warrant defective even though it does not cohere with the rest of 
his noetic structure.74 
Neither coherentism nor classical foundationalism can therefore 
provide a basis for the evidentialist objection to belief in God. 
Plantinga suggests too that some other forms of foundationalism will 
prove no more adequate in this respect; for example, the inclusion of 
memory beliefs or beliefs about the mental states of other people in 
the set of properly basic beliefs does not help because, he says, the 
self-referential argument will hold equally against these forms.75  
1.3.3 THE PROPER BASICALITT OF BELIEF IA GOD  
To argue that the evidentialist objection to belief in God does not 
have an adequate epistemological basis does not, of course, establish 
that belief in God is properly basic. 	 All it does is to remove an 
objection to taking it as such. 	 Plantinga goes on to tackle the 
problem of the need of a criterion for proper basicality. 
His approach is not to propose criteria from the start but to advocate 
a particularistic method for arriving at them, as he puts it, "from 
below rather than above". 	 We do not need to have an explicitly 
formed criterion to hand to replace the classical foundationalist 
criterion in order to be able to recognise examples of properly basic 
beliefs or to recognise the conditions under which they are properly 
basic, just as, he says, we do not need a replacement of the 
positivists' verifiability criterion of meaning in order to recognise 
which statements are meaningful and which are not. 	 He accordingly 
suggests a broadly inductive method whereby we assemble examples of 
beliefs and conditions and frame hypotheses as to the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of proper basicality, hypotheses which can be 
tested against these examples. 	 The sample set of belief-condition 
pairs should be revisable as theories are formed and argument 
continues and Plantinga admits that this process may well be fairly 
inconclusive. 	 It may yield only some necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions of proper basicality and, indeed, the best that can be done 
may well be to give some sufficient conditions of prima facie, not 
ultima facie, justification. 	 Further, he writes:- 
"There is no reason to assume, in advance, that everyone will 
agree on the examples. 	 The Christian will of course suppose 
that belief in God is entirely proper and rational; if he does 
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not accept this belief on the basis of other propositions, he 
will conclude that it is basic for him and quite properly so. 
Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray O'Hare may 
disagree; but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those 
of the Christian community conform to their examples? 	 Surely 
not. 	 The Christian comunity is responsible to its set of 
examples, not to theirs."" 
Plantinga goes on to suggest some examples of properly basic beliefs 
and their justifying conditions. The perceptual belief, 'I see a 
tree', is typically taken as basic when a person is being appeared 
treely to. 	 It is not held on the basis of other beliefs but at the 
same time it is not groundless. 	 Being appeared to in this 
characteristic way plays a crucial role not only in the formation of 
the belief in question but also in its justification. 
	
The memory 
belief, 'I had breakfast this morning', is properly basic under the 
circumstance of having a certain "past-tinged experience". 	 The 
belief ascribing a mental state to another person, 'That person is in 
pain', is properly basic under the circumstance of seeing a person 
displaying typical pain behaviour - it is not inferred from other 
beliefs. 	 Each of these are cases of properly basic beliefs with 
their grounds and the grounds are circumstances or conditions that 
ground the beliefs rather than evidence from which the beliefs may be 
inferred. 
Plantinga says that similar things can be said about belief in God and 
he points to conditions that may "trigger the tendency or disposition" 
to believe in God. 	 For example, one may be impressed with a sense 
that God is speaking to him upon reading the Bible, with a sense of 
guilt in God's sight upon having done something wrong, with a sense of 
being forgiven by God upon repenting and confessing sin or with a 
spontaneous sense of gratitude to God in some deeply satisfying 
circumstance. Strictly speaking, he says, it is not the belief that 
God exists that is properly basic. Rather it is such beliefs as 'God 
is speaking to me', 'God disapproves of what I have done', 'God 
forgives me ' and 'God is to be thanked and praised' that are properly 
basic in the relevant circumstances. They self-evidently entail 'God 
exists' just as 'I see a tree' entails 'Trees exist'.77  
Because of the importance of such grounds for the justification of 
properly basic beliefs, Plantings says that the person who holds that 
belief in God is properly basic is not thereby committed to the view 
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that just about any belief is properly basic in any circumstances or 
even that just about any belief is properly basic in certain 
circumstances. 	 This is his response to what he calls 'The Great 
Pumpkin Objection'. 	 The Reformed epistemologist can properly deny 
that belief in the Great Pumpkin is properly basic even though he does 
not have a fully developed criterion of proper basicality. The 
differences between belief in God and belief in the Great Pumpkin have 
to do with the conditions that ground belief in God. Plantinga 
writes:- 
"Thus, for example, the Reformed epistemologist may concur with 
Calvin in holding that God has implanted in us a natural 
tendency to see his hand in the world around us; the same cannot 
be said for the Great Pumpkin, there being no Great Pumpkin and 
no natural tendency to accept beliefs about the Great 
Pumpkin."78  
Some would say that this is a rather too easy dismissal of the Great 
Pumpkin objection. 	 Both the objection and Plantinga's response to it 
will be dealt with in greater detail in later chapters of this present 
study. 
1.3.4 THE PLACE OF ARGUMENT AND APOLOGETICS  
Plantinga denies that accepting belief in God as basic entails 
accepting it dogmatically. 	 The person who accepts belief in God as 
basic will not necessarily hold this belief in such a way that no 
argument could move him to give it up. 	 It could be, Plantinga says, 
that such a person also accepts as basic some propositions from which 
it follows that God does not exist. When this is pointed out to him, 
some change in his noetic structure will be called for but it may be 
other beliefs - rather than belief in God - that have to be given up. 
Where the change should be made will depend on the relative strengths 
of the beliefs in question.79  
Further, even if belief in God is not only basic but also properly 
basic for a person in certain conditions, it.does not follow that he 
would remain justified in this belief no matter what arguments are 
produced against his belief in God. Plantinga holds that the 
conditions under which belief in God is properly basic confer prima 
facie justification upon that belief and not ultima facie or all- 
things-considered justification. Prima facie justification can be 
overridden and Plantinga, adopting the usage of John Pollock, says 
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that a condition that overrides a person's prima facie justification 
for a belief is, fOr that person, "a defeating condition or defeater". 
An argument against the existence of God is a potential defeater of 
the proper basicality of a person's belief in God but such a defeater 
is itself a prima facie defeater and may itself be defeated by an 
argument that refutes that argument. An "undercutting defeater" is 
all that is required for the person to be justified in continuing to 
accept his belief in God as basic. Plantinga claims that it cannot 
be required of him that he produce a "rebutting defeater" by way of an 
argument for the existence of God. Further, a successful 
counterargument to an argument against the existence of God does not 
constitute evidence for the existence of God. 
Even the conditions themselves that justify a properly basic belief 
may be sufficient to overcome the challenge put by the potential 
defeaters and so it is not necessary to have as "defeater-defeaters" 
reasons which are independent of a person's belief in God. 	 Plantinga 
accordingly considers what happens when potential defeaters arise such 
as the probabilistic argument from evil or Marxist and Freudian 
theories of religious belief and he writes:- 
"Two questions then arise. 	 First how does the degree of 
nonpropositional warrant enjoyed by your belief in God compare 
with the warrant possessed by the alleged potential defeater? 
It could be that your belief, even though accepted as basic, has 
more warrant than the proposed defeater and thus constitutes an 
intrinsic defeater-defeater. 	 When God spoke to Moses out of 
the burning bush, the belief that God was speaking to him, I 
daresay, had more by way of warrant for him than would have been 
provided for its denial by an early Freudian who strolled by and 
proposed the thesis that belief in God is merely* a matter of 
neurotic wish-fulfilment. 	 And secondly, are there any 
extrinsic defeaters for these defeaters? 	 Someone argues that 
the existence of 1013 turps of evil is inconsistent with the 
existence of God; I may then have an extrinsic defeater for this 
potential defeater. The defeater-defeater need not take the 
form of a proof that these propositions are indeed consistent; 
if I see that the argument is unsound, then I also have a 
defeater for it. 	 But I needn't do that much to have a 
defeater. 
	 Perhaps I am no expert in these matters but learn 
from reliable sources that someone else has shown the argument 
unsound; or perhaps I learn that the experts think it is 
unsound, or that the experts are evenly divided as to its 
soundness. Then too I have or may have a defeater for the 
potential defeater in question, and can continue to
00 
 accept 
theistic belief in the basic way without irrationality. 
In all this, Plantinga is making the claim that all that is needed to 
respond to potential defeaters that threaten the propriety of basic 
-31- 
belief in God is negative apologetics in the form of attempts to 
refute the arguments brought against theism. Positive apologetics in 
the form of attempts to develop arguments for the existence of God are 
not needed.81 
He further claims that it is not required for knowledge that something 
is the case that a person should be able to demonstrate to another 
that it is. 	 This he opposes to the classical foundationalist picture 
of knowledge according to which a necessary condition for knowing that 
something is the case is being able to prove it from beliefs common to 
all reasonable persons. 	 Against this, Plantinga says "surely it 
could be the case (in fact it is the case) that many Christians know 
that God created the world even if they cannot convince the Bertrand 
Russells of this world".82 Plantinga denies that this commits him to 
a relativism whereby, at the same time, it could be the case that 
Bertrand Russell could know that God did not create the world. 
Properly basic beliefs do not have to be common to all rational 
persons and, at one level, it would seem that there can be 
epistemological deadlock between those have belief in God as a basic 
belief and those who do not. 	 This does not mean that the person who 
holds that belief in God is properly basic and the person who denies 
that it is can both be right. 	 Plantinga insists that at least one of 
them is mistaken.83 	 However, this is by no means the end of the 
matter for him for he evidently sees great point in attempting to 
convince others that belief in God can be held to be properly basic. 
This discussion is at the meta-level of epistemic principles rather 
than at that of first-order religious beliefs. 	 If belief in God is 
properly basic it does not follow that the belief that this is so is 
also properly basic so, at this level, there is plenty of space for 
discussion and argument. Reasons why belief in God can be held to be 
properly basic do not constitute reasons for belief in God and so do 
not undercut the claim that it is properly basic. 
	 So, for Plantinga, 
although apologetics may be limited to the negative task of refuting 
arguments against the existence of God, there is much that is positive 
in elucidating and arguing for the rationality of the Reformed 
epistemologist's claim that belief in God is properly basic. 
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1.3.5 SIN AND COGNITIVE DYSFUNCTION 
Plantings holds that it is the existence of sin in the world that, for 
many, interferes with belief in God. 	 He denies that it follows that 
if a particular person finds it particularly difficult to believe in 
God that he is particularly sinful any more than saying that disease 
is a result of sin means that the person who is diseased is any more 
sinful than the one who is not. 
	
Referring to Thomas Reid's account 
of belief-producing mechanisms and Calvin's of a "sense of deity 
inscribed in the hearts of all", Plantings refers to a disposition to 
believe in God under certain conditions that has been implanted in us 
and he writes:- 
"The disposition to form these beliefs, then, is really a 
capacity for grasping certain truths about God. 	 This capacity 
is part of our native intellectual endowment. 
	 It has been 
distorted and partially suppressed by sin, but it is present 
nevertheless; it is among the epistemic powers and capacities 
with which God has created us. Of course, in creating us he 
has also given us other capacities for grasping truth: 
perception, memory, and the capacity to apprehend certain truths 
as self-evident. 	 As a result of sin these capacities and 
powers sometimes malfunction. 	 Sometimes they fail to work as 
God intended them to. 	 Furthermore (also as a result of sin), 
human beings sometimes don't employ these capacities as God 
intended them to be employed. The result is error, confusion, 
fundamental wrong-headedness, and all the other epistemic ills 
to which humanity is heir. But when our epistemic powers are 
employed the way God meant them to be, and when, furthermore, 
they work ir; the way God intended them to work, the result is 
knowledge." 84  
What Plantings says here is rooted in his account of the nature of 
epistemic justification.85 	 He prefers to speak of 'positive 
epistemic status' rather than to use the deontological term 
'justification' since he does not regard epistemic dutifulness as 
being sufficient for such status and doubts whether it is even 
necessary.86 	 As we have seen, he also doubts that coherence 
	 is 
either necessary or sufficient for positive epistemic status. 
	 A 
third popular contemporary account of the nature of positive epistemic 
status is that of the reliabilist but Plantings sees his own approach 
as being sufficiently different from this kind of account to merit a 
separate category. He talks not of 'belief-producing mechanisms' 
being 'reliable' but of our 'epistemic powers' being in a condition 
where they are 'working properly'.87 
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Plantings proposes three necessary conditions for positive epistemic 
status. The first of these is that a belief has positive epistemic 
status for a person only if his faculties are 'working properly', 
i.e., working in the way that God had designed that they should, in 
producing the belief in question. 
	 Typically, we do not decide to 
hold or form such beliefs but, even when it is a matter of considering 
evidence, we "simply find ourselves" with them. 
	 Plantings insists 
that this notion of working properly is to be sharply distinguished 
from that of working normally in a broadly statistical sense of the 
term. 	 Wishful thinking may be widespread among human beings but to 
give way to it may not be to employ our cognitive equipment the way it 
was designed to be employed by God, 
	 Plantings points out that the 
idea of one's faculties working properly is no more problematic for 
the person who believes that a good God has created us according to a 
plan than -the idea of any human creation working in the way it was 
designed to work. 
A second necessary condition is that our cognitive faculties be 
properly attuned to their environment. They might have to be attuned 
differently if they were to cope with invisible elephants on Alpha 
Centauri. 	 A car might be in perfect working order but it will not 
run well under water. 
	 A belief has positive epistemic status for a 
person only if his cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to 
the one for which his faculties were designed. 
The third necessary condition has to do with the degree of inclination 
or impulse a person has to accept a certain proposition rather than 
another. 
	 Here Plantings suggests that experience has a role to play 
but not that of the variable experience of sensuous imagery. 
	 Rather 
it is a matter of "feeling impelled, or inclined, or moved towards a 
certain belief" and he says "there is a sort of inevitability about 
it".88 	 Thinking of 2 + 1 = 3 feels different, Plantings suggests, 
from thinking about 2 + 1 = 4 and not only because of the sensuous 
imagery of Descartes' clarity and distinctness but because of feeling 
impelled to believe the first proposition rather than the second. 
So, he claims, when a. person's cognitive equipment is working properly 
and is correctly attuned to its environment, the strength of the 
inclination towards believing a given proposition will be related to 
the degree of positive epistemic status it has for the person. 
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In this chapter the characteristic themes of Reformed epistemology 
have been introduced and the ways in which they have been developed by 
notable Reformed writers have been outlined. 	 Abraham Kuyper deals 
with all of the themes identified but that of the proper basicality of 
belief in God, although present, was not dealt with in quite as 
explicit a manner as in the case of Van Til and, especially, 
Plantinga. 	 All the themes are present in Van Til's theory of 
knowledge but the ideas of opposing basic presuppositions and of the 
sinfulness of the assumption of autonomy were more prominent with him 
than with either of the others. Although Plantinga has indicated his 
support for all the themes identified, most of his work in the area of 
Reformed epistemology has been focussed on that of proper basicality. 
The noetic effects of sin have also received some attention at his 
hands. Because he is a contemporary writer and largely responsible 
for contemporary interest in Reformed epistemology, what he has had to 
say on these subjects has been given rather more space in this chapter 
than what has been said by either Kuyper or Van Til. The three 
chapters that follow will be concerned with exploring further the 
first three themes. 
2 
BELIEF IN GOD IS PROPERLY BASIC 
Of the three characteristic themes of Reformed epistemology that are 
being discussed in this chapter and the following two, that of the 
proper basicality of belief in God is the one that has received most 
attention in recent discussions, i.e., by such as Plantinga, Wolter-
storff and Alston. 	 It may be that a too exclusive concern with this 
one theme may lead to a somewhat distorted view of Reformed 
epistemology as a whole, an imbalance that I shall seek to redress in 
the following chapters. 
	
However, in this present chapter I shall be 
mainly concerned to present a particular account of how belief in God 
could be held to be properly basic which differs in some important 
respects from that of the contemporary writers and which also seeks to 
go beyond them - or, at least, beyond that of Plantinga - to a fuller 
account of the way in which a properly basic belief in God may be 
grounded in experience. 	 The resulting account is by no means free 
from fairly substantial philosophical problems but it does represent 
an attempt to come up with an account of this first theme which is as 
coherent and complete as possible. 
I shall first briefly outline what I mean by belief in God since this 
is what is being taken to be properly basic. To say that this belief 
is properly basic is to make a claim about its justifiedness or 
rationality so I shall also give a brief outline of what I am taking 
to be the nature of epistemic justification. 	 To talk of a belief 
being basic and properly so is to espouse some version of 
foundationalism so I shall attempt to develop a case for 
foundationalism against its main contemporary alternatives. 
Foundationalism comes in various forms but I shall focus mainly on an 
intuitionist form which makes much of the idea of immediate awareness 
and I shall seek to develop this with relation to belief in God. 
Finally I shall indicate some ways in which it may be possible to 
respond to some major objections to this kind of account of properly 
basic belief. 
2.1 BELIEF IN GOD 
I shall assume in what follows a traditional orthodox Christian view 
of the nature of God as, apparently, have the majority of Reformed 
epistemologists. 	 In other words, I shall assume that God is, among 
other things, personal, infinite, the self-existent Creator of 
everything outside of himself, both transcendent and immanent, holy, 
omnipotent, omniscient and loving. Philosophical problems concerning 
many of these attributes and the relations among them I shall leave to 
one side for the purposes of this study. 
'Belief in God' is ambiguous between 'belief that God exists' and 
'trust in God'. 	 Belief that God exists is belief that 'God exists' 
is a true statement. 
	
Trust in God, on the other hand, involves 
commitment, reliance, dependence and other such personal relations 
between the believer and God. The ambiguity is between propositional 
belief and what might be termed 'personal' belief. 
Two opposite kinds of reduction are possible because of this 
ambiguity. 	 On the one hand, it is possible to reduce belief in God 
to its cognitive component in a way that equates it with purely 
empirical belief so that belief that God exists is on a level with 
belief that an object in the universe exists. 	 The opposite position 
reduces belief in God to its conative component and guts commitment of 
its cognitive elements altogether. 	 Belief in God is certainly more 
than assenting to or accepting the proposition 'God exists' but I 
shall assume that it is at least that. " I shall assume that one 
cannot trust in God or commit oneself to God without believing that he 
exists. 	 The converse may not hold since the Bible tells us that the 
devils believe that God exists but it would seem odd to suggest that 
they trust in God. 	 The Bible adds that they also tremble so perhaps 
the belief that God exists is of such a kind that it is usually, if 
not always, accompanied by a certain affective attitude towards God, 
if not trust then perhaps fear. 
Plantinga, Wolterstorff and other present-day Reformed epistemologists 
insist on this cognitive aspect of belief in God.' 
	 Indeed, it would 
seem that this is at least one important respect in which their 
position differs from that of many philosophers of religion who 
propose varieties of what has come to be termed Wittgensteinian 
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contextualism. 	 Reformed epistemologists generally seem to take 
belief in God to be an existential belief rather than, say, a 
commitment to an attitude or policy or way of living which does not 
have any entailment of the existence of God. 
It would appear to be this cognitive core that is to the fore in talk 
of the proper basicality of belief in God so I shall generally use 
'belief in God' as a shorthand for 'belief that God exists'. 
2.2 XPISTENIC JUSTIFICATION  
If a belief is properly basic for a person then, it would seem, he is 
epistemically justified in taking it to be basic. 
	 This is not the 
same as being morally justified or being prudentially justified in 
doing so. Epistemic justification is usually taken to have something 
to do with the aim of maximising truth and avoiding falsity in a large 
body of beliefs.2 Replacing the aim of maximising truth and 
minimising falsity by that of maximising moral goodness and minimising 
moral badness could serve to demarcate the area of moral 
justification.3 	 Likewise, the aim of maximising physiological, 
psychological, social and other forms of non-moral well-being and 
minimising their opposites could do the same for the area of 
prudential or pragmatic justification. 
	
The relationships and order 
of priority among these aims are themselves problematic4 as is also 
the issue of the justification of the aims themselves. 
	 However, in 
what follows, I shall be concerned with epistemic justification and I 
shall take its sphere to be defined approximately along the lines 
indicated. 
Epistemic (and other kinds of) justification would also seem to be a 
matter of degree. 
	 A belief may be more or less strongly or weakly 
justified. 	 An acceptable degree of justification would seem to be 
less than absolute because to insist otherwise would be to restrict 
the set of justified beliefs over much. 
Prima facie justification is to be distinguished from ultima facie or 
all-things-considered justification. 
	 Here 'prima facie justified' is 
to be taken not in the conditional sense of 'justified provided 
certain conditions are met and otherwise not at all justified' but in 
the sense of 'having some degree of justification and justified on 
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balance if the justification is not defeated'.5 	 This distinction is 
independent of that between strong and weak justification and a prima 
facie justified belief may well be strongly justified in that its 
grounds may be more than adequate for rational acceptance. 
A further distinction of importance is that between the state or 
condition of being justified in believing something and the activity 
of showing that one is so justified. 	 I shall take it that it is 
possible to be justified in a belief without engaging in the activity 
of showing to another or even to oneself that one is. 	 I suggest too 
that being able to show that one is justified in believing something 
is distinct from being so justified and that it is unnecessary for 
being so justified since, after all, most people are unable to carry 
out a justification of any of their perceptual or introspective 
beliefs.6 
2.2.1 NORMATIVE AND EVALUATIVE JUSTIFICATION 
Justification in general and epistemic justification in particular is, 
in a broad sense, an 'evaluative' notion. 
	
In this sense, it 
contrasts with 'factual' in that it refers to a condition which is 
considered desirable, valuable or commendable from an epistemic point 
of view, i.e., from that of the aim of maximising truth and minimising 
falsity. However, there is a narrower sense of 'evaluative' as well 
in which it is contrasted with what is usually termed 'normative', and 
sometimes 'deontological', justification. 
Prominent among the epistemologists that make this distinction is 
William Alston. He says that normative justification "has to do with 
how we stand vis-a-vis our intellectual duties or obligations, 
obligations that attach to one qua cognitive subject, qua truth 
seeker" whereas evaluative justification has to do with the assessment 
of a person's condition "as a desirable or a favourable one from an 
epistemic point of view, vis-a-vis the aim of the attainment of truth 
and the avoidance of error".7 Alston adduces examples of cases where 
practices of belief formation could be justified in one sense but not 
in the other. 
	 He suggests that a naive member of an isolated, 
primitive tribe who, along with his fellows, unhesitatingly accepts 
the traditions of the tribe is normatively justified in doing so if he 
has no reasons for doubting the reliability of these traditions but he 
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might not be evaluatively justified since this might not in fact be a 
reliable method of maximising truth and minimising error. 	 Alston's 
second example is of a person who has been presented with evidence 
that is overwhelming but entirely spurious that for about half the 
time over the previous ten years he has been in a physiological 
laboratory where his sensory experience was artificially produced. 
In such circumstances the person in question would be evaluatively 
justified in taking his perceptual belief-forming mechanism to be 
reliable because as a matter of fact it is reliable but he would not 
be normatively justified in doing so because he has stronger reasons 
for not taking it to be reliable. 
In spite of the presence of a normative element in the very use of the 
term 'justification', some have claimed that it does not make sense to 
talk, of intellectual obligations or duties since our believings are 
not, they say, subject to our direct voluntary control. The "'ought' 
implies 'can'" principle would require that they be so but it is 
generally, if not always, the case that we cannot simply will, decide 
or choose to believe something. 	 We cannot help believing something 
if we have sufficient grounds or evidence and we cannot refrain from 
believing what we already believe unless we are persuaded by an amount 
of contrary evidence or grounds. 	 There is, however, an effective 
response to this and that is to appeal to the possibility of indirect  
voluntary control over our beliefs. Unless we take a wholly 
determinist point of view, it would seem plausible to suggest that we 
can choose to engage in activities that influence the conditions under 
which our beliefs are formed and maintained. 	 A useful analogy is 
with the obligation to be in good health and the steps we can take to 
influence the conditions that make for good or bad health.8 	 So, if 
we can do something to influence our beliefs, it would seem that it 
does make sense to talk of intellectual obligations. 
In view of the conceptual link between 'justification' and 
'obligation', it would seem plausible to suggest that meeting one's 
intellectual obligations is necessary for justified belief. 
	 But is 
it sufficient? 
	 Certainly, some specifications of a normative 
criterion of rational belief seem to leave one looking for more. 
	 An 
example is Nicholas Wolterstorff's proposal of such a criterion:-
"A person S is rational in his eluctable and innocently produced 
belief Bp if and only if S does believe p and either: 
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(i) S neither has nor ought to have adequate reason to cease 
from believing p, and is not rationally obliged to believe that 
he does have adequate reasons to cease; or 
(ii) S does have adequate reason to cease from believing p but 
does not realize that he does, and is rationally justified in 
that."9 
An 'eluctable' belief here is one that the person could have refrained 
from believing through the exercise of voluntary control whether 
direct or indirect. The main problem with this criterion is that it 
rests on an 'innocent-until-proved-guilty' principle and is 
essentially negative, making rationality a matter of not being obliged 
not to hold a belief. 
	
Believing is therefore rational as long as it 
is not irrational but this seems a fairly minimal notion in the light 
of the epistemic aim of maximising truth and minimising falsity. 
Taking normative justification as a matter of merely being rationally 
permitted to go on believing something in the absence of negative 
considerations seems somewhat inadequate and leaves many people 
wanting something more. 
Perhaps, the 'something more' is the strengthening of what seems a 
weak principle. This could be a replacement of the 'innocent-until-
proved-guilty' principle by a 'guilty-until-proved-innocent' 
principle. 	 This distinction derives from a famous debate in the 
ethics of belief between W. K. Clifford and William James and the 
harsher principle can be seen to underlie the objections to belief in 
God brought by Clifford and some other evidentialists opposed by 
Plantinga. But this stronger requirement seems too strong since it 
would exclude as irrational many of our beliefs that are generally 
accepted. 
	 We can not surely be expected to refrain from believing 
anything unless we have evidence or reasons for doing so. 
	 Perhaps it 
can reasonably be asked of us in relation to certain doubtful or 
controversial beliefs but surely not in relation to most of our 
everyday beliefs, e.g., our ordinary perceptual beliefs. If so, 
strengthening the normative principle to this extent cannot satisfy 
our demands for something more for rational acceptability. 
Perhaps, the something more is also something else - something other 
than a purely normative criterion. 
	 Evaluative justification was 
defined above as having to do with the assessment of a person's 
condition as a desirable or a favourable one from an epistemic point 
of view. A person may have done all that could be required of him in 
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relation to the formation and maintaining of his beliefs and still be 
in a very unfavourable position with regard to the aim of maximising 
truth and minimising error, as, for example, the case of the 
culturally isolated mentioned by Alston. The analogy with health 
could be used here again since the ill effects of some kind of 
physical handicap could be totally outside a person's control. 
	 This 
is a different concept of epistemic justification and some would argue 
that 'justification' is not a wholly appropriate term to apply to 
favourable status from an epistemic point of view where there is no 
reference made to intellectual obligation. 
	 However, its usage in 
this way seems fairly well established in the literature and provided 
it is being understood in this wider sense it seems sensible to 
continue with it. 
Of course, how precisely this kind of concept might be 'filled out' is 
not specified in merely formulating it in terms of favourable status 
from the point of view of maximising truth (any more than the 
normative one is without specifying intellectual obligations). 
Plantinga's 'working properly' notion would be one way of specifying 
an evaluative concept more precisely as would various versions of 
reliabilism where to say that a belief was formed in a reliable way 
is, more or less, to say that it was formed in a way that can 
generally be relied upon to form true rather than false beliefs. 
Without being more specific at this stage, I shall assume that for a 
belief to be justified - or, more particularly, for a belief to be 
properly basic - it is necessary not only that the believer fulfil his 
intellectual obligations but also that he be in a favourable position 
from the point of view of maximising truth and minimising falsity. 
For the present, I leave open the basis on which this evaluative 
status may 'supervene'. 
2.2.2 MINIMALIST AND EXTIMNALIST JUSTIFICATION 
The distinction between internalist and externalist approaches to 
epistemic justification has only come to prominence in the post- 
Gettier age of epistemology. Internalist approaches held sway from 
the time of Descartes until such as D. M. Armstrong began to talk of 
an alternative.10 
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The internalist holds that the believer's perspective upon a situation 
is of central importance for the justification of his beliefs. 
Epistemic justification of a belief depends upon what support or 
ground is available for it from within the believer's perspective so 
that it is based on matters which are in some significant sense 
internal to that perspective. 	 Internalist accounts differ in 
relation to acceptable kinds of support or grounding relations and 
what can be regarded as being within the believer's perspective. 
Some limit the support relationship to inference and the believer's 
perspective to his other beliefs or, more narrowly, to his other 
justified beliefs. 	 Others include a grounding relationship which is 
not inferential and they extend the believer's perspective to include 
his experiences in variously broad or narrow senses of 'experience'. 
Alston suggests that what a belief is based upon could even include 
psychological states and what goes on below the conscious level, e.g., 
subconscious processes in the formation of short-term perceptual 
beliefs." 
On the other hand, the externalist holds that what matters for the 
justification of a belief is the obtaining of a relation between the 
believer and the world which is such as to make it at least probable 
that his belief is true. This relation has been characterised in a 
number of ways: Armstrong wrote of a 'nomological relation', others of 
a causal relation and many make reference to the reliability of 
belief-forming mechanisms. 	 What is radical about externalist 
approaches is that the relation between the believer and the world 
which justifies his belief may be entirely external to his own 
perspective upon the world. 	 No awareness of this relation is 
required of the believer for him to be justified in believing as he 
does. 
At first sight, it might seem that this could be better termed a 
subjectivist/objectivist distinction. However, the distinction 
between subjective and objective can be made among internalist 
approaches themselves. 
	 Indeed, most internalist approaches would be 
(at least partly) objectivist in that they make much of logical 
relations among propositions as determinants of whether beliefs are 
justified as against (purely) subjectivist considerations of, say, 
personal whim or fancy. 
	
	 It would seem better therefore to use the 
internalist/externalist terminology. 
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A common objection to externalist justification is that it provides 
for the justification of 'epistemically irresponsible' believings in 
that a belief may be justified simply on the basis of relations 
between the believer and the world which are external to his 
perspective and regardless of evidence or grounds he may have against 
the belief or, simply, in the absence of any evidence or grounds for 
or against it.12 	 The case where the believer has evidence against 
the belief can be met by the addition to any statement of an 
externalist criterion of a non-undermining condition: a belief is 
justified only if it is not undermined by other beliefs already 
accepted by the believer. The case of complete absence of evidence 
or grounds seems rather more difficult to meet and, I think, 
constitutes an insuperable objection to externalism. 	 If it is 
conceivable that a belief could be produced by some reliable mechanism 
of which the subject is completely unaware so that, as far as he is 
concerned, they simply pop into his mind, it seems counter-intuitive 
to say that such beliefs are justified. I shall therefore assume 
that justified beliefs must be based on adequate grounds from within 
the subject's perspective on the world. This excludes unfounded 
hunches, mere wishful thinking or what are from his point of view 
accidentally true beliefs. 
I am therefore taking for granted that justification should be 
regarded from a broadly internalist point of view. 
	
I shall not 
restrict the grounds to other beliefs a person may hold but rather, at 
least for the present, I shall hold open the possibility of 
experiences providing grounds for justified beliefs, including those 
experiences that are religious or aesthetic and not only what we 
usually term 'sense experience'. 	 I shall therefore be assuming that 
the believer's perspective upon the world is of importance at least 
insofar as it is necessary for a belief of his to be justified that he 
have some awareness of the conditions that justify it. 
2.3 FOUNDATIONALISM 
Talk of the proper basicality of belief in God assumes a 
foundationalist view of the structure of a person's beliefs. 
Foundationalism comes in a number of different forms, some of which 
have been identified, as we have seen, by Alvin Plantinga. All share 
a view of a person's justified beliefs and knowledge as of an 
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architectonic structure in which there is an asymmetric relation of 
physical support between floors and a foundation which supports them 
all but which is supported by none of them. Foundationalists 
disagree as to what the foundations consist of, how fixed and certain 
they are and how precisely the floors are supported by them. 
Coherentism is a leading alternative to foundationalism or, as Ernest 
Sosa puts it, the choice of metaphors for the structure of justified 
beliefs is between the pyramid and the raft.13 	 The raft metaphor - 
suggested by Otto Neurath - sees the structure of justified beliefs as 
floating free of any link to an external point by tie or anchor. Any 
part can be repaired or replaced but to do so the person must take his 
stand on other parts. The relation of support between parts is 
mutual or symmetric - unlike that between the parts of the 
foundationalist's pyramid. 
There are other alternatives which show that foundationalism and 
coherentism may 'shade off' into one another. Quine's metaphor of 
the 'web of beliefs' is an example of this for, as he puts it, the 
fabric "impinges upon experience only along the edges" although it is 
"underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience".14 	 In this 
figure, there is both the idea of anchoring, albeit of a loose and 
adjustable kind, and also a distinction between central and peripheral 
beliefs and both of these elements tend to give something of a 
foundationalist shade to the picture. Imre Lakatos' talk of the 
hard core and protective belt of his 'scientific research programmes' 
also presents something of an in-between metaphor. 
In what follows I shall take it that pure coherentism does not provide 
an adequate account of epistemic justification. 	 I do not have space 
to do much more than mention the arguments involved. 	 The first of 
them is that, if coherence is to be a sole criterion for acceptability 
of a structure of beliefs, this would seem to provide for the 
possibility of a plurality of internally coherent structures with 
nothing to choose between them. A second main and related objection 
is often referred to as 'the isolation objection' and this arises from 
the belief structure's detachment from the empirical world or, more 
generally, from reality. 
	 The problem arises at the periphery of the 
fabric of coherent beliefs and beliefs there may be replaced by 
different and inconsistent beliefs without affecting the coherence of 
-45- 
the whole structure. 	 For example, replacement of 'There is an 
armchair before me' by 'There is a three-legged milking-stool before 
me' may not affect the coherence of my belief structure but it is 
impossible that both be true or justified in the same circumstances. 
The point about such beliefs is that they may be at the periphery of 
the system of coherent beliefs but nevertheless require justification 
and the justification provided by their coherence with the rest of the 
structure may be rather weak whereas it would seem plausible to claim 
that such perceptual beliefs could be very strongly justified. Both 
of these objections arise from the fact that pure coherence makes 
justification a matter which is wholly internal to the system of 
beliefs and totally unaffected by what lies beyond. 	 Admittedly this 
is the response of a realist and this itself is a far from 
uncontroversial philosophical position but, again, it is one that I do 
not have space to defend against anti-realist alternatives and I shall 
therefore have to take it for granted in what follows. 
Further problems with pure coherentism include the difficulty of 
defining coherence and of justifying the adoption of coherence as the 
sole criterion of rationality. 	 In taking pure coherentism to be an 
unacceptable alternative to foundationalism, I am not dismissing 
coherence altogether as of no relevance to epistemic justification. 
On the contrary, it would seem that significant lack of coherence must 
count against the overall perspective of a belief-system being 
accepted as true. 	 How much incoherence is acceptable or in what 
respects it may be present is difficult to say but at some point it 
would seem irrational to continue to accept the hard core or basis of 
an incoherent 'system'. 
2.3.1 THE REGRESS ARGUMENT  
The case for the necessity of properly basic beliefs has its starting- 
point in what has become known as 'the regress problem'. If a belief 
is justified by inference from another belief or set of beliefs, then 
this belief or set of beliefs requires in turn further beliefs for its 
justification and a chain of justification is set up. There are four 
possible alternatives for this chain:- 
(i) It continues infinitely; 
(ii) It forms a circle or loop; 
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(iii) It terminates with beliefs that are groundless or 
unjustified; or 
(iv) It terminates with beliefs that are justified otherwise 
than by being inferred from other beliefs. 
The first of these is often dismissed very quickly as if no reason 
were required for ruling out an infinite regress of justification but 
such a ready rejection can be questioned.15 Arguments against the 
rejection of an infinite justificatory regress tend to consist in 
attempts to produce actual counter-examples and these are usually 
mathematical. 	 Ernest Sosa makes a distinction between actual 
justificatory regresses and those that are merely potentia1.16 	 A 
potential justificatory regress is one of conditional justification so 
that each member of the chain is justified if its successors are 
justified. An actual justificatory regress differs in that not only 
can each member be justified on the basis of its successors but it is 
also the case that each member is actually justified. 
The example Sosa gives of an actual justificatory regress is as 
follows:- 
There is at least one even number 
There are at least two even numbers 
There are at least three even numbers 
If the second of these beliefs is justified then the one above it in 
the chain, the first, is justified, and if the third is justified then 
the second is, and so on ad infinitum. 	 So it is a justificatory 
regress. 	 And it is an actual one since it is the case that every one 
of these beliefs is justified. 
Sosa's example of a potential justificatory regress is as follows:-
There is at least one perfect number > 100 
There are at least two perfect numbers > 100 
There are at least three perfect numbers > 100 
Again if the second is justified then so is the first, and if the 
third then so is the second, and so on. 
	
Again this is a 
justificatory regress but where it differs is in that, if a person has 
no other belief about perfect numbers apart from the belief that a 
perfect number is an integer equal to the sum of its whole factors - 
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so that, for example, 28 = 14 + 7 + 4 + 2 + 1 and is therefore perfect 
- then he is not justified in believing any member of the sequdhce in 
spite of the fact that each member is conditionally justified by its 
successor. 
However, I do not think Sosa has shown that there is an actual 
justificatory regress where the only way of justifying beliefs in the 
chain is on the basis of their successors. There is a proof of the 
denumerably infinite cardinality of the set of even numbers but not, 
as far as is known, of that of the set of perfect numbers. 
	 In the 
absence of external information, any infinite justificatory regress is 
merely potential rather than actual. This is the essence of proof by 
mathematical induction where the establishment of the potential 
justificatory regress is readily seen to be insufficient for proof of 
a conjecture for all positive integers unless the regress can be 
terminated by independent demonstration of its truth for the first 
integer in the chain. 
Until an incontrovertible example of an actual justificatory regress 
is produced then it seems plausible to follow the intuition that rules 
out an infinite regress of justification. 
	 In addition, it seems 
questionable to generalise from the rather specialised area of 
mathematical justification to that of empirical or other beliefs. 
The second alternative above was that of the justificatory chain 
forming a circle or loop. 
	 This seems relatively easy to dispose of 
since it amounts to the claim that a belief can be ultimately 
justified by itself. If the other three alternatives were ruled out, 
it would mean that all justified beliefs must lie somewhere along 
circular chains of justification and it would be true of all beliefs 
that they are ultimately justified by themselves. It is very 
difficult to see how all beliefs could be ultimately self-justifying 
in any straightforward sense of 'justifying'. 
The third alternative is to claim that the justificatory chain 
terminates with beliefs that are groundless or unjustified. 
Something along these lines is the alternative preferred by those who 
share an outlook that has come to labelled 'contextualist'. 
	 A very 
wide range of philosophical viewpoints have had this label applied to 
them - viewpoints as diverse as those of Pierce, Dewey, Quine, Kuhn 
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and Michael Williams - but perhaps the best known and most 
influential, not least in relation to religious belief, is that of the 
later Wittgenstein and such as Norman Malcolm and D. Z. Phillips. 
Roughly speaking, the common core of all these approaches is that they 
make epistemic justification relative to some context of human action 
and social life. 
The solution that contextualism provides for the regress problem is 
the claim that the justificatory chain terminates with beliefs that 
are unjustified. 	 But to sum up the position in such terms, as some 
indeed do,17 does not really do justice to the subtleties of the 
contextualist viewpoint when expressed by someone of the stature of 
Wittgenstein or many of his interpreters. 	 For to say of such 
terminating beliefs that they are unjustified is to suggest from the 
outset that they lack something that they ought to possess. 	 But this 
is a long way from what Wittgenstein probably meant when he said that 
"at the foundation of founded belief lies belief that is not 
founded"18 or when he asked "Why shouldn't one form of life culminate 
in an utterance of belief in the Last Judgement?".19 	 These beliefs 
are not like the beliefs for which they provide grounds for it is 
meaningless to say of them that they are true or false and it follows 
from this that it cannot be said of them that they are justified or 
unjustified. As Wittgenstein himself said, "If the true is what is 
grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false".20 Malcolm and 
others follow in describing such beliefs not as ungrounded but as 
groundless, because they require no grounds. Truth, meaning and 
justification are all interwoven with the practices of a way of life 
of a human group and religion is a form of such life. There are no 
standards of justification, conditions of truth or criteria of meaning 
that overarch forms of life and 'language-games'. Justification is 
internal to practices of different kinds which are embedded in forms 
of human life. Statements of belief are justified by reference to 
the paradigm-cases in which the use of such statements has been 
learned. 	 The framework beliefs which give their distinctive shapes 
to social and linguistic practices or 'language-games' are therefore 
not beliefs for which it makes sense to require evidence. 
Wittgenstein asserts that evidence for religious belief "would destroy 
the whole business" and goes on to castigate a certain Father O'Hara 
for adducing evidence saying "if this is religious belief then it is 





evidence for beliefs such as 'I have two hands' because of the role 
such beliefs play in our form of life.22 Scepticism about framework 
beliefs,is meaningless. 
It seems very far from adequate to summarise the relevant features of 
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion as briefly as this. An 
adequate account would merit a complete study in itself and an 
adequate response rather more. All one can do is to point very 
briefly to reasons why a Reformed epistemologist might opt instead for 
his account of basic belief. 	 Both Wittgensteinian and Reformed 
epistemology have in common a rejection of the evidentialist challenge 
to religious belief, the former on the basis of an appeal to 
groundless framework beliefs that constitute the religious form of 
life and the latter on that of appeal to properly basic beliefs that 
are grounded in experience. The Wittgensteinian position is bound up 
with what Bernard Williams calls its 'transcendental idealism'23  
whereas Reformed epistemology generally takes the form of a version of 
theological realism. 
	
Alston, writing on the subject of the 
differences between Plantinga's position and that of the 
Wittgensteinian, says that Plantinga differs in his insistence that 
"belief in God is either true or false in a perfectly straightforward 
sense of these terms, the same sense in which it is either true or 
false that snow is white".24 Alston insists that he himself takes an 
"objective" view of the existence and reality of God and that he finds 
it meaningful in relation to religion to ask the question "Is this 
language-game in touch with reality?", a question which the 
Wittgensteinian would not find at all meaningful.25 The gulf between 
these two kinds of outlook is both deep and wide. The differences 
are not only in the area of epistemology but, perhaps more 
fundamentally, in those of ontology and metaphysics. 	 They are from 
the point of view of Reformed epistemology differences in basic belief 
or, if it can be so stated, from that of the Wittgensteinian 
contextualist, differences in framework belief. 
An adequate defence of the foundationalism of Reformed epistemology 
would have to show• why it is preferable to the position of 
Wittgenstein and why realism is preferable to idealism and anti- 
realism. It can hardly be simply a matter of digging in one's heels 
and saying 'Here I stand' but to go into these issues now is 
impossible. 
	
	 Assuming the adequacy of a realist perspective and 
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finding that, because of this, the contextualist response to the 
regress problem is inadequate, we are now left with only the fourth 
alternative, the foundationalist response. 
The foundationalist says that justificatory chains terminate with 
beliefs that are justified otherwise than by being inferred from other 
beliefs. 	 But as it stands this statement is negative and relatively 
uninformative about these basic beliefs. A part of the task of 
showing why Reformed epistemology might be preferable to its 
alternatives is that of providing some account of how its basic 
beliefs are grounded. 	 After all, it was presumably dissatisfaction 
with foundationalism in the first place that made people turn to its 
alternatives so perhaps the task of providing a more satisfactory 
account of foundationalism is prior to that of showing flaws in its 
alternatives. 
2.4 INTUITIONISM 
Mention in philosophical discussion of intuition in general - and of 
religious intuition in particular - is likely to be met by a 'knee- 
jerk' reaction that kicks it out of court immediately. Such ready 
dismissal of a position seems so uncharacteristic and unworthy of 
philosophers that it is puzzling. Perhaps the reasons for it are to 
do with a lack of definition of what might be meant by 'intuition' and 
the assumption that what is being claimed for it is rather more 
extravagant than is necessarily the case. 
	
I shall attempt to 
develop a case for a relatively modest version of religious 
intuitionism as a way of filling out what might be meant by claiming 
that belief in God is properly basic and, in doing so, I shall try to 
formulate a more moderate form of foundationalism than that which 
claims some kind of Cartesian certainty. 
Intuition is a rather ambiguous term. 	 Anthony Quinton distinguishes 
three senses of the word.26 	 First, there is what he terms 
'vernacular intuition'. 	 This is the ability to form correct 
judgements in circumstances where the kind of evidence usually 
required to justify them is not available. This is what ordinary 
language usage takes intuition to be as, for example, when someone 
predicts impending disasters without having or being able to point to 
any evidence for their prediction. 	 Such intuition entails the truth 
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of that which is intuited so that 'intuit' belongs to the same class 
of words as 'know' and 'remember'. 	 A second sense of the word refers 
to what Quinton calls 'psychological intuition' and this covers 
particular beliefs formed by a particular person and accepted by him 
as justified where such acceptance is not based on inference from 
other beliefs that he holds. 	 These beliefs may or may not be true 
and may or may not be justified although the subject takes them to be 
justified. 	 The third sense is Quinton's 'logically intuitive 
beliefs' and he writes of them:- 
"The terminal intuitive beliefs that are needed to bring the 
regress of justification to a stop need not be strictly self-
evident in the sense that they somehow justify themselves. All 
that is required is that they should not owe their justification 
to other beliefs. ... (L)ogically intuitive beliefs ... do not 
need support fxqm others (but) are not necessarily excluded from 
such support."'" 
On the matter of support, Quinton distinguishes between 'essential' 
and 'accidental' support. 	 A logically intuitive belief may have 
accidental support but it does not require it for justification. 	 A 
belief that is not logically intuitive does require support to be 
justified and this support is therefore essential. 
	
He suggests the 
example of a case where, in poor light conditions, a book is asserted 
to have a red cover not because the cover can be seen but because it 
is known to belong to a particular person, all of whose books have red 
covers. The belief that the book is red is logically intuitive to 
the extent that it does not need the support of the general statement 
that all this person's books are red and can be seen to be red under 
the right light conditions. 
	 In this case, the support of the general 
statement is accidenta1.28 Logically intuitive beliefs will normally 
be psychologically intuitive as well but they do not have to be so 
because they may have (accidental) support which is recognised as such 
by the subject. On the other hand, we may accept beliefs without 
reasons and only later find that they have essential support - so 
psychologically intuitive beliefs need not be logically intuitive. 
Quinton's 'logically intuitive' corresponds to Plantinga's 'properly 
basic' and his 'psychologically intuitive' to being taken as 'basic'. 
Other contemporary foundationalists use 'immediately justified' for 
the former category. 
	 Whether they be termed 'properly basic', 
'logically intuitive' or 'immediately justified', the definitions of 
this category of beliefs that we have had so far share a negative  
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character that does little to say how they are justified apart from 
excluding their requiring the support of other beliefs. 	 I shall 
attempt to sketch out a positive account of one way in which they 
might be justified. This is through their grounding in an experience 
of immediate awareness. 
2.4.1 IMMEDIATE AWARENESS  
If a basic belief is to be properly basic (or immediately justified or 
logically intuitive, according to the terminology preferred), then it 
must be at least prima facie justified and grounded, not groundless. 
I have chosen to take a route to epistemic justification which 
requires not only that the believer's intellectual obligations be 
fulfilled but also that his position be a favourable one from the 
point of view of the aim of maximising truth and minimising falsity. 
This differs from the notion of rationality used by Wolterstorff. 
am also assuming that the believer's own perspective on the world is 
of importance for the justification of his basic beliefs at least 
insofar as he has some awareness of the conditions that ground or 
justify his belief. This differs from the approach of Plantinga 
insofar as it is correct to regard his account of 'working properly' 
as externalist. The question now is whether the notion of immediate 
awareness can help to provide an adequate account of proper basicality 
when it is understood in these terms. 
Philosophers of both past and present have sought to base their 
foundationalism in immediate awareness. 	 A cluster of related terms 
have been used with 'immediate' sometimes replaced by 'direct' and 
'awareness' by 'consciousness', 'apprehension' or 'experience'. 
Others have talked of objects (the content of perceptual experience, 
physical objects, sense-data, the meanings of some linguistic terms, 
etc.) being 'given' or 'presented' to the awareness. All seem to be 
trying to get at the same kind of idea but it has proved very 
difficult to analyse. One example of an attempt to analyse it is 
found in Russell's definition of what he termed 'knowledge by 
acquaintance':- 
"I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct 
cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware  
of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation 
here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes 
judgement, but the sort which constitutes presentation."' 
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Among recent and contemporary attempts to analyse immediate awareness, 
one of the most careful and thorough is that of Paul K. Moser." He 
puts it forward as a proposed account of empirical justification. 
Can it be of help to Reformed epistemology in providing for the 
grounding of basic beliefs like Plantinga's 'God is speaking to me'? 
I suspect that Moser would not approve of the application of his 
account to beliefs that are not empirical in the usual sense of the 
word but I think an adaptation of it can help to provide one possible 
account of how basic belief in God can be grounded in experience. It 
will have its own weaknesses and limitations but I shall seek to 
present as adequate an account as possible. If it is not really 
adequate for the task, then the tenability of this version of Reformed 
epistemology's theme of the proper basicality of belief in God may 
seem rather doubtful. But I do think that it is somewhere in the 
neighbourhood of this notion of immediate awareness, if anywhere, that 
a basis for this theme of proper basicality is to be found. 	 It seems 
to be an immediate awareness of God and his speaking to people and the 
sufficiency of the justification provided by this awareness to the 
corresponding beliefs that is at the heart of what Calvin, Kuyper, Van 
Til and other Reformed writers attempted to formulate. 
Moser treats immediate apprehension as an occurrent psychological 
state which has phenomenological content without being a belief-state. 
This immediate apprehension provides the basis for the immediate 
justification of a foundational belief without being identical with 
that belief. 	 Examples of this kind of awareness include the hearing 
of a particular tone rather than the hearing of a bell, the smelling 
of a particular smell rather than the smelling of a rose, the seeing 
of a bright yellow sphere rather than the seeing of the sun and the 
tasting of some particularly bitter taste rather than the tasting of 
vinegar. 	 It is what we experience when our attention is attracted by 
a completely novel perceptual object or when we hear two sounds in 
such quick succession - say, a gunshot followed by the loud ringing of 
a bell - that we do not have time to conceptualise the first as the 
sound of a gunshot. 
Immediate apprehension is non-propositional, i.e., it does not involve 
a judgement that something is the case. 
	 It is also non-conceptual, 
i.e., there is no conceptual relation between the perceiver and the 
content of his immediate apprehension whereby he engages in any "act 
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of classifying, categorizing, or attributing a property to this 
content in accordance with some classificatory scheme".31 	 Moser 
suggests that something like this non-conceptual awareness occurs when 
one counts objects or images without describing them or subsuming them 
under concepts, e.g., counting sounds rather than counting the chimes 
of a clock. Moser argues that if apprehension required 
conceptualisation then an endless regress of conceptual events would 
seem to threaten. 	 The mental activity of classifying an object under 
a concept requires a (logically) prior awareness of the object to be 
classified and if this awareness itself required classification then 
this further mental act of classifying would require a further 
awareness and so on ad infinitum. But ordinary perceptual experience 
would be impossible if such an infinite series of mental acts were 
required so, whatever apprehension is, it cannot be conceptual. 
Moser also argues that the given in the case of immediate apprehension 
is not some "mere homogenous this" but determinate perceptual content 
having definite ostensible empirical properties. 
	 This does not 
require conceptualisation for, he says, "it is possible to apprehend 
some determinate appearance of blue, for example, without engaging in 
the additional activity of classifying what one is apprehending, i.e., 
of deciding whether the appearance being apprehended is an instance of 
blue".32 This is because immediate apprehension may be taken to have 
a cognate accusative of a quality or content rather than an objective 
accusative of an object or property. 
	 Apprehension differs from con- 
ceptualisation then in that it has no object but a content in the 
determinate nature of the event of apprehending whereas conceptualis- 
ation has that content as its object. 
	 The appearance of blue is not 
an object of one's current visual experience, a sense-datum, but 
rather it is a kind of visual experience: Moser says that "to sense 
blue is to sense 'bluely' just as to dance a waltz is to dance 
1 waltzily".33 The fact that 'bluely' is an adverbial description 
rather than an adjectival ascription of a property to an object does 
not make it any less determinate. In addition, because the content 
of immediate apprehension is determinate, it is not ineffable, i.e., 
it is not inexpressible in language. 
In order to get from immediate apprehension characterised in this way 
to the immediate justification of beliefs about the given, Moser 
proposes the following principle of immediate justification:- 
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"A person, S, is immediately 
seems to see an F at a time, t, 
(i) S immediately apprehends an 
(ii) S understandingly believes 
hending that he seems to see an 
Moser adds that talk of seeming 
formulation by that of seeming to 
raising any special problems. 
justified in believing that he 
if and only if at t: 
ostensibly presented F, and 
in light of this event of appre-
F."'4  
to see could be replaced in this 
taste, smell, hear or feel without 
In this principle, the key justifying condition for the given belief 
that I seem to see an F is that I immediately apprehend an F. This 
apprehension does not, as it were, lie side by side in the mind with 
the given belief in an unrelated way. It is related to it by way of 
an immediate apprehension of an immediate apprehension of F and Moser 
proposes that this awareness of the apprehension of F is involved in 
the given belief - hence his use of the phrase 'in light of'. 	 This 
satisfies the requirements of a broadly internalist approach to 
justification because there is an awareness of the justifying 
condition. 
Moser includes the word 'understandingly' in his principle to meet an 
objection that could otherwise be put: one could only be justified in 
the belief that one seems to see an F if one has the independent 
information necessary to enable one to distinguish seeming to see an F 
from seeming to see a G. Moser meets this very effectively by 
arguing that the information in question is only "semantic information 
... necessary for the understanding of what it means to claim that one 
is in a certain perceptual state rather than another".35 This 
information is necessary in order that the believed proposition be 
intelligible - so that it is required for its existence rather than 
for its justification. 	 The kind of objection being met here is a 
fairly common one against properly basic beliefs and its weakness is 
that it confuses, in thinking about the 'basis' of a belief, what 
make's it acceptable with what makes it possible.36  
I think that Moser's principle could be strengthened by the inclusion 
of a non-undermining clause such as 'S does not have adequate reason 
to believe that he is not seeming to see an F'. Moser himself 
considers and rejects the possibility of adding such a clause and he 
does so mainly on the grounds that it leads to a circular account of 
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justification. 	 But, since the principle itself is designed to apply 
to immediately justified beliefs and such a non-undermining clause 
refers to having reasons for doubt, I think it avoids this danger. 
It also serves to emphasise the prima facie nature of immediate 
justification of basic perceptual beliefs. 
There does seem to be another weakness with this account but I am not 
sure how to overcome it. 
	 This has to do with the relationship 
between an immediate apprehension and the belief it justifies. 
	 Moser 
is quite insistent that apprehension and belief must be related and he 
talks of believing 'in light of the immediate apprehension but he 
accounts for this by saying that a "key component" of the given belief 
is another immediate apprehension - an immediate apprehension of the 
immediate-apprehension that justifies the belief.37 But since he has 
defined an immediate apprehension as being both non-conceptual and 
non-propositional, it remains unclear how it can be involved in the 
given belief as a de re component. 
	 He has to insist that it is non- 
propositional or else it would seem to stand in need of justification 
and the experience of immediate apprehension would become evidence 
rather than grounds or a justifying condition for the given belief. 
At the same time, unlike the justifying immediate apprehension itself, 
the second-order immediate apprehension does have an object (the 
first-order justifying immediate apprehension) so it cannot be a case 
of apprehending apprehending-ly. If so, does it make sense to regard 
this second-order apprehension as non-conceptual? There does seem to 
be some sleight of hand involved here and yet the kind of thing Moser 
wants to say somehow seems right. 
	 He does go on to say that this 
second-order apprehension does not require justification since it is a 
level-confusion to insist that if we justifiably believe something we 
must also justifiably believe that we justifiably believe it and here 
he does seem to be correct.38 	 According to a broadly internalist 
point of view, what is required of a believer is an awareness of the 
conditions that ground his belief but not necessarily a justified 
belief that these conditions provide adequate grounds for the belief. 
Whether or not this is an adequate response to the apparent weakness 
to which I have referred I am not sure. Assuming that it is and that 
Moser's account is a more or less adequate one of the justification of 
basic empirical beliefs? can it be adapted to provide an adequate 
account for the justification of basic religious beliefs? 
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2.4.2 IMMEDIATE AWARENESS OF GOD?  
Appeal to an immediate awareness of God as grounds or a justifying 
condition for properly basic belief in God is not at all the same as 
appeal to such an experience of awareness as either sufficient 
evidence for the existence of God or as part of a 'cumulative case' 
for his existence. The Reformed epistemologist denies the necessity  
of such evidence or any evidence for belief in God but he does not 
necessarily deny the possibility of its existence. It may be 
available but, like Quinton's 'accidental support', it is not required 
for justified belief in God. 
If the account in the last section of an immediate awareness providing 
justification for basic empirical beliefs is along the right lines, 
then a significant step towards showing that it could be adapted to 
cover religious experiences is to show that religious experience is 
sufficiently like sense experience. 
	 Obviously there are very great 
differences between experiences that purport to be of objects in the 
world and those that purport to be of its Creator but they can be 
disregarded if they can be shown to be epistemically irrelevant. 
Religious experience comes in a wide range of varieties and, indeed, 
it is possible to talk of any and all experiences as having a 
religious dimension. I shall be concerned with those experiences 
that purport to give an immediate awareness of God and, of these, only 
with those that are mediated through finite things. 
	 That is, I am 
concerned with the experiences of the ordinary believer who claims an 
awareness of God through the Scriptures, the words of a preacher, a 
hymn or prayer, the beauty of nature, and so on rather than with the 
special experiences of the mystic, i.e., mainly with those experiences 
which fall into the first (and possibly the second) of the classes of 
religious experiences identified by Richard Swinburne.39 Insofar as 
mystical experiences are really inexpressible in an absolute sense, 
they do not help for present purposes since it is difficult to see how 
they can be the grounds of an expressible justified belief. It is 
difficult, anyhow, to see how the object of an absolutely ineffable 
experience could be individuated as an object of worship. 
	 The 
comparative rarity of such experiences is another reason for 
disregarding them in this attempt to show that the beliefs of the 
ordinary person-in-the-pew could be properly basic. 
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The experiences with which I am concerned here have what H. P. Owen 
terms a "mediated immediacy".40  They are psychologically direct but, 
at the same time, there is an indirect process which is in some sense 
responsible for the experiences in question. 	 They differ therefore 
from the direct unmediated experiences which Alston has recently taken 
to be the basis of what he terms "the perception of God" in which 
"this presentation (of God) is not via any sensory qualities or 
sensorily perceivable objects".41 I think it can rightly be said of 
such an account that it amounts to an appeal to mystical experience 
minus ineffability.42 	 I do not wish to deny that such experiences 
could take place or that they could ground justified basic belief in 
God but I am simply concerned with what seem to me the more usual 
types of religious experience. 	 An account of immediately justified 
belief would seem to be of less value if it does not cover the beliefs 
and experiences of as wide a population as possible although, of 
course, by no means all religious believers would claim that their 
belief in God is properly basic. 
One feature shared by these purported experience of God and those of 
objects in the world is that they both seem to be of something 
separate from and independent of oneself - unlike the experience of, 
say, dizziness. 	 Obviously the Creator is not an object in the world 
and, therefore, not perceivable by the senses. 
	
But is it not what 
Alston terms 'epistemic chauvinism'43 to assume that we can only be 
aware of something that is directly presented to the senses? If such 
an assumption were correct, it would also exclude the possibility of 
the direct but mediated knowledge of other minds. So the fact that 
God is not an object in the world is not epistemically relevant to the 
extension of our account of immediate awareness to include experience 
of God. 	 This is perhaps rendered more plausible by focussing, as we 
are, on the mediated immediacy of this awareness - God is perceived 
through things observable to the senses and, Christians believe, was 
even present in the world as incarnate in Jesus Christ, 
Another difference is that sense experience is public and experience 
of God is private. As far as phenomenological content is concerned, 
both are private but, being objects in the world, the objects of sense 
experience are open to public gaze whereas it would seem that God is 
not open in this way. 	 But why should this be thought relevant to the 
matter of epistemic justification? 
	 Presumably, at least part of what 
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is meant by this objection is that there are standard ways of checking 
a truth grounded in sense experience and, it is assumed, nothing 
equivalent in the case of purported experience of God. We can check 
the evidence of one of our senses against that of the others and we 
can check further against the experiences of others and so on. 
	
But 
one does not need to engage in this process of checking in order to be 
justified in believing that things are as they seem to be through the 
operation of one of our senses just as long as others of our senses or 
the experiences of other people do not defeat this justification. 	 In 
other words, what we are concerned with here is prima facie 
justification and there are defeaters (and 'checks' - with what 
scriptures say, with fellow-believers, etc.) for the justification of 
religious belief just as there are for empirical belief. Since God 
is not an object in the world, the unavailability of confirmation by 
other senses does not defeat the justification of belief that one is 
immediately aware of him. 	 Other considerations might do so but why 
should it be thought strange that these particular checks are 
unavailable? Indeed, it would be thought strange if one engaged in a 
checking procedure for every belief based on sense experience so why 
should I need to do so for what purports to be an awareness of God? 
Moreover, the checks available for sense experience ultimately rely on 
sense experience itself. 	 There are no external checks so why should 
it be thought necessary that there should be external checks on 
religious experience? 
	 Perhaps this is also an example of the use of 
what Alston terms a double standard on the part of those who argue on 
such grounds that these differences are epistemically relevant. 
This kind of objection may be put in terms of a certain lack of 
predictability in the case of experience of God as compared with sense 
experience. 	 Again, I think that the point about the justification of 
properly basic beliefs being prima facie meets this objection 
adequately. In addition, insofar as it is true that experiences that 
purport to be of God do not have this predictable regularity, surely 
this is only to be expected given the nature of God as he is 
traditionally believed to be. 	 Although, for example, the Bible 
invites us to "taste and see that the Lord is good" and to "seek and 
we shall find", there is still no tight lawlike regularity in 
religious experiences but the traditional Christian view of the nature 
of God does not provide grounds for expecting it to be otherwise.45  
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It is therefore difficult to see why this should be thought to be 
epistemically relevant. 
Another version of the same kind of objection could be to the effect 
that we all know what we mean when we say that we see or hear 
something but we do not know what is meant by talking of hearing or 
seeing God. However, is it so obvious that we do know what we mean 
by saying that we see something or hear something or what we mean when 
we say we are aware of another person? The previous section of this 
study surely illustrates how difficult it is to analyse perception. 
Perhaps the concept of seeing is a bit like the concept of time - we 
all know what it is until somebody asks us what it is. 	 Could the 
same not be true of the notion of hearing or seeing God? 	 A person 
may know what it is like to experience "in the mind's ear", as Robert 
Audi puts it,46 the voice of God and yet find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to say what it is. 	 Furthermore, this difficulty is quite 
understandable in the light of what is believed about the nature of 
God. 
Perhaps the most commonly quoted objection to basing religious belief 
upon religious experience in this way is from the facts that the 
latter does not appear to be universal and that there is no universal 
agreement on the former. 
	
This lack of universality is apparently 
Quinton's main reason for rejecting fairly summarily the possibility 
of religious intuition (which he seems to identify with mystical 
experience without recognising the possibility of a more common non-
mystical kind of awareness of God - not that this distinction really 
lessens the force of the objection to any significant extent).47 But 
the sheer fact of the numbers who believe or disbelieve seems 
epistemically irrelevant. 
	
What might be of more importance is the 
issue of whether such experiences or beliefs are found distributed 
across cultures and time and it is not obvious that this is not so. 
However, apart from this, there is the question of the conditions that 
have to be satisfied in order to have a particular experience of any 
kind - including sense experience. These conditions are both 
subjective and objective: the observer must be in the right place 
under the right conditions, e.g., in the case of sight, the light 
conditions must be right. 
	
	 It would seem understandable that the same 
kind of thing be true of experiences that purport to be of God and 
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especially so as it seems to make sense that these should include the 
meeting of moral conditions and others that involve the whole person. 
As Alston puts it, "God is not available for 'voyeurs tif.48 	 And a 
further point made by Alston in this regard has to do with the 
learning of skills so that whereas we are almost all masters of 
perceptual practice in relation to the ordinary objects of sense 
perception, it may be plausibly maintained that we are by no means 
masters in the perception of God.49 	 There is also the fact that in 
the case of mediated experiences, one person may be aware only of the 
medium while another perceives something else through the medium." 
A technician examining a telescope mirror may see only the condition 
of the mirror whereas an astronomer sees an interesting galaxy. 	 In a 
similar way, two people may listen to the same sermon but one is aware 
only of the eloquence of the preacher while the other hears the voice 
of God in his words - and Saul of Tarsus heard the voice of Jesus 
while his companions apparently only heard a sound. 
It might seem that this argument - that the differences between sense 
experience and religious experience are quite understandable in view 
of what is traditionally believed of the Christian God - shows that 
the Christian account has built into it a kind of unfalsifiability or 
criticism-deflecting device. Is there not the possibility of a kind 
of pseudo-rational dogmatism51 whereby a theory has built into it an 
explanation-schema to cope with the fact of it not being universally 
accepted? 	 But the kind of reply that I have used to the objections 
in question is an appeal to the nature of religious belief as 
traditionally held prior to the formulation of any modern 
epistemological theory or of the particular objections under 
discussion, so it can at least be argued that this is not an ad hoc 
building in of a kind of irrefutability. 
If the foregoing responses are adequate then the differences mentioned 
above between sense experience and experience that purports to be of 
God can be set aside as epistemically irrelevant. However, there is 
a much stronger objection to grounding the justification of belief in 
God in an immediate awareness of him. It starts from the plurality 
of conceptual schemes through which religious experiences are 
understood and it is to it that I now turn. 
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2.4.3 ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES  
As a kind of prima facie justification, proper basicality grounded in 
an immediate awareness of God is defeasible. 
	 But the Christian who 
forms a belief that he seems to be having an experience of God in 
light of an immediate awareness which is non-conceptual may come to 
face the fact that there are alternative conceptual schemes available. 
Not only is it the case that there are significant differences in 
conceptual scheme among Christians themselves to say nothing of those 
between adherents of the different world religions some of which do 
not take God to be personal, but there are also naturalistic 
alternatives. 
	 Aware of this, can the intellectually sophisticated 
adult be justified in holding belief in God as a basic belief? 
	 Does 
not the existence of such a range of alternatives held by other 
intellectually sophisticated adults not defeat his properly basic 
belief? In his response to the Great Pumpkin objection, Plantinga 
may be right in pointing out that there simply is no Great Pumpkin and 
no natural tendency to believe in the Great Pumpkin. 
	 But this 
present objection cuts much deeper. 
	 It could be argued that there is 
a natural tendency to conceptualise religious experiences in terms of 
beliefs that are clearly inconsistent with Christian beliefs, e.g., 
the belief that the object of religious experience is an impersonal 
God. 
At first sight, at least, this seems to be a respect in which there is 
an epistemically relevant difference between sense experience and 
religious experience, a difference which is related to the argument 
from non-universality mentioned in the last section. Against this, 
it could be claimed that, in fact, there may be no difference here 
since, in the view of some anthropologists, not all cultures do 
objectify their sense experience in the same way. 
	 But, if so, this 
is of little comfort to the Reformed epistemologist as it may be more 
of an argument against the proper basicality of beliefs grounded in 
sense experience that one for that of belief in God. 
Leaving doubtful theses about sense experience to one side, how can 
the Reformed epistemologist respond to this argument from the 
existence of alternative conceptual schemes? I shall take a 
particular version of it which has been put forward by William 
Hasker.52 
	
	 He claims that the existence of such a range of "non- 
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discredited alternatives" to the Christian practice of forming 
Christian beliefs on the basis of purported experiences of God implies 
that the Christian practice cannot even•be weakly justified. If he 
is right, basic Christian beliefs cannot be properly basic. 
Hasker says the situation is like that in a game of 'hide-and-seek' in 
which the person who is 'it' is hiding in one of four rooms and a 
seeker has no particular reason for choosing one room rather than 
another and, because of the presence of other seekers, only has time 
to search one room. Hasker argues that in choosing a room to search, 
since the seeker has no particular reason to prefer the room he 
chooses, he is not strongly justified in his choice and, being more 
likely to be wrong that not, he is not even weakly justified. Hasker 
goes on to conclude that the Christian who conceptualises his 
experience in terms of a Christian scheme is in no better position if 
we assume that there are different conceptual schemes which are (i) 
equally comprehensive in how they deal with the experience, (ii) 
inconsistent with each other and (iii) all 'live options' for the 
believer. 	 If, in addition, like the player who does have reason to 
believe that the person who is 'it' is hiding in one of the rooms, the 
believer has reason to believe that some member of the set of non-
discredited alternatives is the right one to choose although he knows 
not which one, he may be very weakly justified in taking a gamble and 
opting for one. 	 Belief in God would not then be properly basic in 
any strong sense of 'properly'. 	 Hasker goes on to suggest that if we 
desire some stronger form of justification, we shall have to engage in 
an intellectual quest with the goal of reducing the number of non-
discredited alternatives to one. 
	 By that time, our belief in God 
would be based on argument and, presumably, no longer basic.53  
However, Hasker's version of the argument we are dealing with seems to 
make some questionable assumptions. 
	 For a start, there seems to be a 
problem with Hasker's apparent insistence that at least 50% 
probability of reliability is required even for weak justification. 
This is seen in the following extract from his argument:- 
"If B and C are non-discredited alternatives to A, then if 
either of them is reliable A is not. 
	 But since B and C are 
'non-discredited', either of them is as likely to be reliable as 
A is; so the likelihood of A's being eliable is less than one-
half, and A is not weakly justified."54  
Surely it is not the fact that the likelihood is less than one-half 
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that matters here but rather that, in accordance with the set of 
assumptions he makes, each of the three alternatives is equally likely 
to be reliable. 	 Consider the situation in which A, B, C and D are 
alternatives such that pr(A):pr(B):pr(C):pr(D) = 40:20:20:20. 	 Here 
belief that A is reliable, now that it is twice as likely as any one 
of its alternatives, and assuming that one of the four is reliable, 
seems to be fairly strongly justified in spite of its being less than 
50% and there being more alternatives than before. If probability is 
to enter into the matter then it is the relative probability of an 
occurrence and not its absolute value that matters. 
The problem just mentioned can be easily dealt with by a rephrasing of 
what Hasker says but there is a deeper assumption here which is rather 
more significant and, I think, likely to characterise other versions 
of this argument. 	 This is of a questionable doxastic voluntarism. 
At times it may be that, as Hasker says, "life makes gamblers of us 
all"55 but it seems questionable to suppose ourselves caught in a 
state of suspended judgement about to choose between rival conceptual 
schemes for our experiences in a way that is analogous to his hide- 
and-seek illustration. 	 We do not find ourselves outside on the 
landing but actually within one of the rooms so it would seem sensible 
to search that one first before deciding to go on to one of the 
alternatives and we would only do that if we found that the person we 
were seeking was not there. 
What I am suggesting here is that although there is a logical distinc-
tion between an immediate awareness and the belief that it grounds, 
i.e., the belief that conceptualises that awareness in accordance with 
a particular conceptual scheme, it seems questionable to assume that 
this distinction leaves a gap in which there is generally room for 
choice. 
	 Rather, it is normally the case that we find ourselves with 
our experience conceptualised in a certain way - the process is 
spontaneous. 
	 There may even be a kind of inevitability or 
irresistibility about it. 	 In such circumstances, the question is 
whether we have adequate grounds for trying to resist this process or 
to adopt an alternative conceptual scheme, whether we should 
consciously decide not to search the room we are in and instead go 
outside and choose another one. 
	
There seems no strong argument for 
doing so. 
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But perhaps the metaphor should be changed to one that provides time 
for reflection. Instead of talking in terms of rooms to search, we 
could see the situation as more analogous to finding an apartment in 
which to live. 	 Do we stay in the one in which we find ourselves and 
take it to be the most comfortable - in spite of that rather menacing-
looking piece of black furniture called 'the atheological argument 
from evil' - or, hearing that others find other apartments to be 
comfortable, go and try one of them? The intellectually 
sophisticated adult is aware that others like where they live and 
regard it as the most comfortable place to be and he can move if he 
wishes. 	 The upheaval in his life caused by having to move may be 
more than offset by the greater comfort of the new apartment. 
	 There 
is room for choice now, the choice of whether or not to change, but in 
the absence of strong reason to do so, it would still seem that he is 
justified in continuing to live where he is. 
	 Indeed, he may find 
himself strongly attracted towards his present surroundings and may 
even have reason to believe that the cupboard of the argument from 
evil can be accommodated there. 
In Plantinga's terms, what we have here are potential defeaters and 
defeater-defeaters. The belief grounded in an immediate awareness is 
properly basic and continues to be so as long as there is no 
overriding or undercutting argument of which the believer is aware and 
which provides adequate reason for him to consciously cast off his 
conceptual scheme and conceptualise the belief in another way. The 
knowledge that there are alternative conceptual schemes is not 
sufficient. 
	 The knowledge that there are other sophisticated adults 
who find them acceptable is not sufficient either. 
	 The justification 
of his belief is prima facie and it may well be very strong. 
	 Only 
when he actually finds it to be defeated is he no longer justified in 
holding his belief to be basic. 
This response to the argument in question comes quite close to appeal 
to something like Swinburne's "Principle of Credulity".56 	 With 
"seems epistemically" used to describe what the subject is inclined to 
believe on the basis of his present sensory experience and in 
opposition to the claim that religious experience is evidence for 
nothing beyond itself, Swinburne writes:- 
"So generally, contrary to the original philosophical claim, I 
suggest that it is a principle of rationality that (in the 
absence of special considerations) if it seems (epistemically) 
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to a subject that x is present, then probably x is present; what 
one seems to perceive is probably so. How thing4 seem to be is 
good grounds for a belief about how things are."'' 
His application of this principle to religious experiences leads him 
to suggest that:- 
"a religious experience apparently of God ought to be taken as 
veridical unless it can be shown on other ground significantly 
more probable than not that God does not exist."' 
This is certainly similar in some respects to some of the things 
Plantinga, Alston and others say. 	 Is Swinburne also among the 
Reformed epistemologists? 	 I think not. 	 In the first place, the 
whole enterprise of the book from which these quotations come is to 
show that, on our total evidence, theism is more probable than not and 
he claims that it is the evidence of religious experience that finally 
- after considering other arguments and evidence - proves sufficient 
to make theism over all probable.59 The whole context of Swinburne's. 
appeal to his principle of credulity is therefore evidentialist in 
relation to the existence of God and consequently radically different 
from that of the project of Reformed epistemology. A further respect 
in which it differs is in the very status of this and other principles 
of rationality. 
	
Swinburne describes his principle as "ultimate" and 
as "a basic principle not further justifiable".60 	 I shall shortly 
deal with the justification of epistemic principles and I shall 
suggest that they may be ultimately based on beliefs which include 
belief in God. This represents a second way in which the approach I 
am adopting - and I am assuming it to be generally in line with that 
of Reformed epistemology - differs from that of Swinburne. 
Apart from these contextual differences, there is the content of the 
principle itself. Swinburne is taking the fact that it seems to a 
person that God is present as evidence for the conclusion that God is 
probably present. I was attempting to ground a person's belief that 
he seems to be having an experience of God in an immediate awareness 
when it would seem that there are other ways in which that awareness 
could be conceptualised. 
	 The logical gap I was attempting to bridge 
is from awareness to belief that something seems to be the case 
whereas Swinburne is concerned with that between belief that something 
seems to be the case and something (not the belief that something ...) 
actually being the case. So there are differences both in starting-
point and finishing-point and Swinburne's starting-point seems to be 
my finishing-point. 
	 Swinburne is trying to establish a conclusion 
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about the existence of God. 	 I was trying to establish one about the 
justification of a particular person's beliefs under certain 
circumstances and, in particular, the belief 'I seem to be having an 
experience of God'. 
2.4.4 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL GAP  
What then of the gap between 'I believe that I seem to be having an 
experience of God' and 'I believe that I am having an experience of 
God'? 	 That the gap is there is evident since the first belief does 
not commit the believer to accept that God exists while the second 
assumes his existence. 	 The first belief, as stated, leaves open the 
possibilities that the experience is drug-induced, hallucinatory, 
produced by a deceiving demon or some such cause other than by the 
presence of God. The gap is logical and epistemological and it seems 
substantial. 
Can Swinburne's principle be used to bridge this gap? 	 I think not, 
because even if it can be invoked, its conclusion would be something 
along the lines of 'I believe that I am probably having an experience 
of God'. In other words, the belief would be tentative and this is 
not the same as the prima facie justified belief stated in 'I believe 
that I am having an experience of God' or 'I believe that God is 
speaking to me'. The evidentialism assumed in Swinburne's principle 
warrants at best a statement which is held to be probably true. 
I think a better way forward is to look at the beliefs that we 
normally find ourselves with, the actual beliefs that have the 
inevitability or irresistibility mentioned earlier. 
	 When we are 
immediately aware of being appeared to in a certain kind of way, the 
beliefs we find formed in us are not 'I seem to see something red' or 
'I am being appeared to red-ly' but 'I see something red' or the like. 
Likewise, not even the intellectually sophisticated adult believer is 
very likely to say 'I believe that I seem to be having an experience 
of God'. 	 The sceptic might say it but the believer seems to have 
vaulted the gap to 'I-believe that I am having an experience of God'. 
He has not taken his experience as evidence for a belief which is 
probably true nor has he inferred his belief from other beliefs that 
he holds. His belief that God is speaking to him is therefore basic 
but is it properly so? 
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Suppose that my response to the Hasker-type objection still applies at 
this point and that I do not need to search another room or move to a 
different apartment unless I have adequate grounds for doing so. My 
belief that God is speaking to me is basic and I do not require 
inferential justification for it so it is properly basic for me. 	 But 
something seems wrong here. 	 If a study of the complexities of the 
relationship between immediate awareness and a 'seems to be the case' 
belief was required earlier to make that small step, how can the 
apparently greater step of crossing this epistemological gap be taken 
so easily? Does appeal to immediate awareness add anything after all 
to the discussions of proper basicality of Plantinga, Alston and 
others? 	 I think it does because it.attempts to show how a belief may 
be grounded in an immediate awareness. 
	
The immediate awareness of 
this immediate awareness is not generally involved in the belief 'I am 
being appeared to redly' but actually in the occurrent belief 'I see 
something red'. And the adverbial description (red-ly) rather than 
the adjectival description (red) applies to the immediate awareness 
rather than to the belief that it grounds. 	 The point is that this is 
conceptualised spontaneously in the belief 'I am having an experience 
of God' rather than in 'I seem to be having an experience of God' and 
my response to the Hasker-type argument from alternative conceptual 
schemes applies to this belief just as effectively as to the other. 
This matter of the spontaneity of conceptualisation takes us back to 
the objection from alternative conceptual schemes. 	 As Plantinga 
says, there is no natural tendency; under conditions like those under 
which basic belief in God is formed, to form beliefs like 'I am having 
an experience of the Great Pumpkin'. But, as mentioned earlier, it 
may be argued that there is a natural tendency, under the same 
conditions, to spontaneously conceptualise one's experience in terms 
of, say, an impersonal God. 
	 But, again, whether and to what extent 
the Christian finds this to be a defeater of his belief in a personal 
God depends upon whether he finds there are convincing counter-
arguments available to him. 
	 If, indeed, it could be shown to be the 
same experience that is being conceptualised spontaneously in 
inconsistent beliefs and that his own belief-producing mechanism is 
not functioning reliably or working properly, e.g., in that his 
beliefs are due to Freudian wish-fulfilment or self-delusion or the 
like, he would have grounds to revise his belief. 
	 In the absence of 
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reason to believe that either or both of these circumstances apply, he 
is justified in holding to his basic belief in God. 
2.5 THIC BASIS OF META-JUSTIFICATION 
At this point - if not before - there is another objection to the 
proper basicality of belief in God that can arise. It has to do with 
the status of the foregoing discussion of criteria for rationality and 
principles of justification. It has to do with what I shall term 
'meta-justification', the justification not of first-order beliefs but 
of second-order epistemic principles. 
The objection is to the effect that in the foregoing there is more 
than a whiff of the threat of circular reasoning. It was perhaps 
most noticeable when I suggested that the Reformed epistemologist may 
differ from Swinburne in holding that epistemic principles stand in 
need of justification. 	 Then, just now, I mentioned an externalist 
element for positive epistemic status, that of reliable functioning 
and, as we saw earlier, Plantings and other Reformed writers have 
linked this with the idea of man being a planned creation of God.61  
It would therefore seem that the discussion of the justification of an 
epistemic principle takes for granted the existence of God but this is 
the very belief that is being held to be properly basic. 	 So the 
principle assumes the truth of the belief, the justification of which 
is in question! 
The situation seems to be as follows. 	 The foregoing discussion is 
intended to show that belief that God exists may be properly basic. 
It makes use of a number of epistemic principles, e.g., religious 
experience is a reliable source of religious beliefs. This example -
and others that could be adduced - derives at least part of its 
mediate justification from the belief that man is created by God with 
reliable belief-forming mechanisms. This assumes that God exists. 
So 'God exists' appears both at the beginning and the end of this line 
of statements and the process appears circular. 
The Reformed epistemologist is not without ways of responding to this 
charge of circularity. 
	 For a start, he can point out that, if a 
belief is properly basic, then its justification is not derived from 
any other beliefs that the subject holds - including his beliefs that 
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his epistemic principles are correct. 
	 The subject is immediately 
justified in his properly basic beliefs. 
	 It is unreasonable and a 
levels confusion to require of him not only that he be justified in 
his basic beliefs but also that he be justified in a belief that he is 
so justified. 	 It is a levels confusion because there is an 
'epistemic ascent' from the level of first-order justification to that 
of meta-justification (and, it would seem, if this is required for 
justification then there is nothing to stop the demand for meta-meta-
justification and so on ad infinitum). It is unreasonable because it 
would require of the ordinary person at least the sophistication of an 
able epistemologist if he is to have any justified beliefs at all. 
This meets the demand of what Moser terms the "JJ thesis", his 
analogue in terms of justified belief of Hintikka's "KR thesis" that 
requires not only that a person knows something but that he knows that 
he knows it.62 It is not therefore the justification of basic 
beliefs that is at issue but the whole basis of the discussion at the 
meta-level of this kind of first-level justification. 
Secondly, the kind of circularity involved here is not the 
straightforward logical circularity of the conclusion of an argument 
appearing in its premises. The conclusion here is that the belief 
that God exists may be properly basic under the appropriate 
conditions. 
	 It is not an argument for the existence of God from 
premises that include the statement 'God exists'. 
	 It is not intended 
to produce rational conviction of this conclusion - for, if it could, 
belief in God would not be properly basic at all - nor is it even 
intended to produce rational conviction of the conclusion that belief 
in God is properly basic. 
	 The intention is to show the coherence of 
the case for this conclusion rather than to convince of its truth. 
The circularity is not vicious but, rather, something like what Alston 
terms "epistemic circularity".63 
2.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have approached the question of whether belief in 
God can be properly basic by making use of a concept of justification 
which is linear rather than 'holistic, normative but not purely 
normative, reliabilist but not purely reliabilist and broadly 
internalist rather than externalist. 
	 From this standpoint, the 
epistemic regress problem appeared to be a real problem and the need 
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to show how the epistemic supervenes on the non-epistemic a real need. 
This led on to an account of some reasons for the elimination of 
various alternatives to moderate foundationalism. 
I went on to attempt to set forth the main details of an intuitionist 
account of empirical justification and of arguments to the effect that 
the differences between sense experience and religious experience were 
no obstacle to the development of an analogue of empirical 
intuitionism which grounds belief in God in an immediate awareness of 
him. I then set forth possible responses to three kinds of objection 
to this particular version of the first theme of Reformed 
epistemology. 
	 The first of these was an argument from the plurality 
of schemes for conceptualising one's experience and the response 
appealed to the spontaneous nature of conceptualisation under 
conditions of proper functioning of the mechanism of forming basic 
beliefs and to the prima facie nature of justification. 
	 The second 
problem was of the epistemological gap between statements of 
phenomenological belief and of those of beliefs expressed in object-
language and here I argued that the beliefs that are actually formed 
in light of immediate awareness are on the object-language side of the 
gap and I suggested that these could involve the immediate awareness 
in a similar way to that being postulated for phenomenological 
beliefs. The third problem was of the circularity involved in the 
justification of epistemic principles and I suggested that there were 
reasons to view this as non-vicious. 
This chapter therefore attempts to explore the notion of immediate 
awareness and to apply it to experience of God. 
	 This may help to 
account for a way in which it could be that, as Reformed epistemology 
claims, belief in God is properly basic for some people. 
Nevertheless, in addition to the problems mentioned in the chapter, it 
seems likely that it also suffers from a limitation due to its dealing 
with one theme of Reformed epistemology largely to the exclusion of 
the others. In particular, I feel that it tends to approach matters 
rather too much from the manward side and tends to take God to be 
relatively passive in relation to man's experience of him. The 
possibility of his actively revealing himself to people is almost 
completely ignored. The following chapter will represent an attempt 
to make up for this. 
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3 
BENTIATION IS SELF AUTHENTICATING 
It is the second, and arguably the most central, tenet of Reformed 
epistemology that God has given to man a self-authenticating 
revelation. 
Wolterstorff writes:- 
"It has characteristically been held that one may well be within 
one's rights in believing immediately that the Christian 
Scriptures are the revelation of God, or the Word of God. This 
... does not have to be believed on the basis of reasons, 
arguments. 	 One is not doing something intellectually 
irresponsible if one believes it immediately. 	 Scripture, it 
was often said, is self-authenticating. 
	
It does not require 
external authentication. 	 Indeed, such prominent Reformed 
thinkers as John Calvin and Karl Barth suggested it would be 
dangerous to believe on the basis of arguments that Scripture is 
the Word of God." 
There is the suggestion in this quotation that Reformed thinkers have 
held that the only locus of revelation from God is in the Christian 
Scriptures. 	 I am not sure that this is what Wolterstorff intends but 
it is certainly the case that many in this tradition of thought have 
held and do hold that God has revealed himself elsewhere than in the 
Bible, notably, in Jesus Christ and in nature, including the nature of 
man himself. Further, as we have seen earlier, the like of Kuyper 
and Van Til held that all divine revelation is self-authenticating, 
whether in the Scriptures or elsewhere. This particular theme of 
Reformed epistemology might therefore be better summarised in the 
statement: divine revelation is self-authenticating. However, my 
main concern in this chapter will be with scriptural revelation, 
albeit always with an eye to this more general statement. 
I shall first attempt an analysis of what is meant in ordinary 
language by talk of revelation. I shall then apply this to our 
knowledge of other persons as this seems particularly relevant to the 
idea of God revealing knowledge of himself. I shall next attempt to 
respond to some arguments that could be directed against the 
possibility of divine revelation. Then to the heart of the study in 
a look at the question of the authentication of divine revelation and 
at four types of approach. I shall look in more detail at those of 
them which make revelation self-authenticating in some sense of the 
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term and from them I shall attempt to move on to develop a positive 
account of how a revelation of God could be self-authenticating. 
3.1 THE CONCEPT OF REVELATION 
The word 'reveal' and its cognates are used both in ordinary language 
and in the language of theology. 	 Of course, theological usage may 
well enter into the ordinary language of religious believers but even 
among them such usage may not exclude the possibility of a wider usage 
as well, one in which the activity of revealing is not predicated of 
God, and it is with this more general usage that I shall start. 
For a start, I shall take it that revelation, in the sense of the term 
with which we are concerned, is a matter of personal communication. 
Admittedly, the term can also be used in a sense that does not require 
communication from one person to another, e.g., circumstances or the 
experiences of life may be said to reveal things to us, but talk of 
divine revelation seems to be about communication from God to people. 
I shall start with a paradigm-case of revelation through personal 
communication. Any choice of paradigm is likely to be less than 
perfect and open to question because of the way in which it can 
restrict subsequent discussion. However, one that I find helpful in 
that for me at least it seems to bring out the main features of our 
use of words like 'reveal' is that of the kind of situation often 
portrayed in the closing scene of a murder mystery. 	 The scene in 
which 'all is revealed' typically shows the all-seeing, all-knowing 
good lady detective in the drawing-room surrounded by all the suspects 
who have survived to this point and by other interested participants, 
among whom the reader or viewer projects himself. 
The first feature of this situation of importance for our analysis is 
that the activity of the revealer is necessary if a revelation is to 
take place and, in relation to this activity, those to whom the 
revelation is given are relatively passive. 
	
The detective must act 
in order for a revelation to take place and the waiting group are just 
that - they are waiting for her to speak. 
	 They are not necessarily 
wholly passive because, as the details of the crime are being revealed 
to them, they may well be attempting to keep one step ahead or putting 
their own construction upon events. 
	 However, insofar as revelation 
- 74 - 
is to take place, something is being uncovered rather than discovered 
and, for the clever reader who has already worked out for himself all 
the details of how the butler did it there is no revelation of the 
details of the crime. 
Secondly, it is normally the case that the activity of the revealer is 
intentional, although, of course, it is possible that the butler might 
well in the course of the proceedings 'let slip' the accidental 
revelation of some detail that clinches the case against him. 
Thirdly, the object of this intentional activity - or the effect of 
the accidental revelation - is to bring about a learning experience, 
i.e., an experience of acquiring knowledge of something new or not 
already known. However, it may not be altogether unknown. It could 
be a matter of coming to see 'in a new light' or with a fresh 
significance facts already known or it could be a matter of coming to 
'face up to' something already known. In any case, there has to be 
some 'newness' about the knowledge revealed and this placing of the 
facts in a new light is fairly typical of what the detective does in 
the last chapter. It also seems unnecessary for revelation that the 
facts revealed could not have been otherwise known, say, by discovery 
on the part of the clever reader. 	 For such a person who had worked 
it out already there is no revelation but for the others who could 
have done so but did not there is the possibility of revelation. 
From this it would seem to follow that every revelatory experience is 
a learning experience although not every learning experience need be a 
revelation - and this at least partly because they are not brought 
about directly as a result of the activity of the revealer. 
What if nobody actually learned anything new from the activity of the 
detective? 	 Could the mere making available of the new knowledge in 
itself constitute a revelation? 	 It would seem not, for to reveal 
something is to make it seen or known rather than merely to make it 
visible or knowable. 	 So, fourthly, reveal is an achievement verb. 
Gilbert Ryle distinguished 'achievement verbs' from 'task verbs',2 and 
the essence of the distinction is that it is not enough for such verbs 
as 'cure', 'teach', '.remind', 'win' that certain tasks be performed 
but also that the goals of these tasks be achieved. 
	 For something to 
be revealed in the events of the last chapter of our novel, it is 
necessary that at least one person should come to know something that 
he did not know before or, at least, to come to see things in a light 
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in which he had not seen them before. 	 Until then, the detective's 
revelations may be potential but they are not actual. 
Fifthly, certain things follow from the nature of the goal that is 
achieved. 	 Assuming that what is acquired is knowledge, the 
conditions for knowledge must apply. 	 I shall take it that knowledge 
is at least justified true belief (although Gettier may have shown 
that something more may be required and others may argue that 
knowledge is something other than justified true belief). 	 If 
revelation brings about new knowledge or places what was already known 
in a new light then it is necessary that the person to whom it is 
revealed should believe what has been revealed to him. 	 It is also 
necessary that it be true - it does not make sense to say that it was 
revealed that the parlourmaid did the deed if, in fact, she did not do 
it. This is because it does not make sense, in these circumstances, 
to say that somebody knew that she did it. 
But is this all that is required for revelation - that a new belief is 
acquired as a result of the revelatory activity and that this belief 
is true? 	 I think not because if revelation must result in knowledge 
then something more than accidentally true belief is required and this 
something more must consist, at least in part, in that the person 
given the revelation is justified in believing that which has been 
imparted. 	 Further, it would seem necessary that the justification 
of the belief be a direct consequence of the revelation. 	 If it is 
the case that the detective revealed to me that the butler carried out 
the foul deed then I thereby know that he did it. My further 
consideration of the evidence might make me more certain that he did 
it but it would not affect the truth of the fact that I knew as a 
result of his revelation that he did it. In other words, although 
revelation may not be necessary for knowledge - I might have 
discovered it for myself - it is sufficient for knowledge if and when 
it takes place. If it is sufficient for knowledge then it is 
sufficient for justified belief. 
A sixth and final point I would make in this analysis of the concept 
of revelation is that revelation is an example of what is sometimes 
termed a polymorphous concept.3 	 It does not pick out a particular 
activity but it is rather something that is accomplished through a 
variety of activities such as speaking, writing, gesturing, miming, 
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etc. 	 Having said this, it remains the case that verbal communication 
must occupy a central place in revelatory activity. 	 Indeed, it might 
be argued that non-verbal communication is insufficient for revelation 
for, as Paul Helm says, "actions without propositions are dumb".4  
This question of actions and propositions is of particular relevance 
to recent theological discussions of revelation and one to which I 
shall return later. Also, there are certain kinds of activity 
through which revelation can hardly take place if it is to result in 
justified belief. 	 For example, it would seem strange to suggest that 
the detective made his revelation to us by means of a purely causal 
process, e.g., while we were under hypnosis or in the course of a 
brainwashing session. 
Revelation therefore takes place when one person imparts knowledge to 
another of something which is not already known by that person and 
which becomes known to him as a direct consequence of the activity of 
the revealer. This leaves somewhat hazy the line of demarcation 
between revealing and an activity like teaching which at first sight 
seems to meet all my conditions for revelation. 	 I would suggest that 
the two ideas overlap in the area of bringing about learning and that 
the distinction between them lies in the newness of the knowledge 
gained by revelation which is not so much to the fore in the idea of 
teaching. 	 Teaching could well be a confirming or reinforcing of 
something already known whereas revelation has a strong connotation of 
something new ("What a revelation!"), an element of surprise or 
unpredictability (which, perhaps sadly, is not necessary for 
teaching!). 
	 Surrounded by the bright-eyed and keen students of the 
Fourth Form group of my dreams, I might teach them the good old-
fashioned and, to them, partly familiar method of proving Pythagoras' 
Theorem or, instead, I might reveal to them the steps of a novel 
approach I read about in a recent issue of the 'Mathematical Gazette'. 
3.2 REVELATION AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE  
My discussion of the paradigm situation of the detective's revelations 
has at least one major limitation: it focuses fairly exclusively on 
revelation which leads to one kind of knowledge, that of facts. But 
there is not only knowing that such and such is the case but also 
knowing followed by a direct object. Similarly, we may use 'reveal' 
followed by a direct object as well as 'reveal that ...' statements.5  
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In particular, we may talk of self-knowledge and of knowing other 
people and of self-revelation that leads to others knowing us. 	 Here 
we are concerned with personal knowledge and the kinds of 
relationships between persons that bring it about, with coming to know 
the detective herself as a person in and through her words and 
actions. 
In fact, the distinction between personal and impersonal knowledge 
does not at all correspond to that between knowing followed by a 
direct object and 'knowing that ...'. 	 Impersonal knowledge is not 
coextensive with propositional knowledge. 	 In the first place, the 
direct object of knowing can be impersonal as well as personal. 
	
We 
may know Murphy and Flanagan but we may also know a town, a house, a 
horse or a rocking-chair. 	 In all these cases, knowing is relational 
in that 'Murphy knows Dublin' can be presented as 'MkD' whereas 
'Murphy knows that Dublin is a fair city' would be presented as 'Mkp'. 
Secondly, although knowing in this relational sense and especially 
when applied to persons cannot be reduced without remainder to a set 
of 'know that ...' statements, however large that set, some but not 
any particular propositional knowledge is necessary to relational 
knowledge. It would be odd if I could claim to know Murphy and not 
be able to state a single proposition about him beyond that but it 
would not be odd if the propositions I stated were not identical with 
those stated by Flanagan who also knows him. 
	
Thirdly, there is an 
appropriateness as well as a necessity about the relation between 
propositional knowledge and knowledge of persons and things in that, 
if it is the case that I do know Murphy or his rocking-chair, the more 
I know about him or it the better I know him or it.6 So relational 
knowing and propositional knowing cannot be sharply distinguished as 
mutually exclusive kinds of knowledge.? It follows that what I have 
said in the previous section about 'revealing that ...' is also of 
importance for revelation that leads to personal knowledge. 
Personal knowledge and impersonal knowledge are therefore both forms 
of relational knowledge and, as such, both involve propositional 
knowledge. If so; what more is there to personal relational 
knowledge than the knowledge of certain propositions that are true of 
the person who is the object of the relation? 
	 Whatever it is seems 
to make personal knowledge non-transferable. 
	 I may reveal everything 
I know about a friend to another person but this is not sufficient to 
-78- 
make it the case that this other person now knows my friend.8  
shall suggest that the extra that is required for personal knowledge 
is that at some time there must have been mutual immediate awareness 
between persons if they can claim to know one another. However, this 
raises questions about situations like that between penfriends who 
have never met or even spoken to one another on the telephone. Here 
the immediate awareness - if it can be called that - is certainly 
mediated, even through the miles that intervene. 	 This brings us to 
that paradoxical phrase used by several writers in relation to 
knowledge of persons - 'mediated immediacy' - which I referred to in 
the previous chapter9 and which I think may be helpful at this point. 
Awareness of persons is immediate in that it is psychologically direct 
and non-inferred but it is also mediated in that it comes to us 
through words and actions. 	 This is certainly paradoxical. 	 If I am 
only aware of another person in or through his bodily movements etc., 
surely I must be inferring his existence as a person and his 
attitudes, intentions and the like from these movements with the 
assistance of some kind of analogy with my own self-consciousness? 
And if the process is non-inferential, surely it must involve some 
extra sense or telepathic ability which enables me to bypass the media 
of actions and words to go directly to their source in the mind and 
its thoughts? 
It is not easy to resolve this paradox. 	 To take first the sense in 
which this awareness is 'mediated', I take it that what we observe 
through the use of our senses is the bodily movements and actions of 
another person but not his mental activities, his thoughts, feelings 
and intentions or his 'subject self'. 	 On the other hand, we would 
have no awareness of that which is mental apart from the physical and 
observable so, if we are to have such an awareness, it must come to us 
'through' the physical and observable. This is what I mean by saying 
it is 'mediated' and this seems to concur with what writers such as 
Owen have intended)° There seems no reason why this should not also 
include the second-order mediation of reflection in mirrors or 
transmission by radio, television or telephone. 
	 There would seem to 
be no great difference between the 'live' and the 'recorded' in this 
respect so that letters or video-recordings could also form part of 
the mediating process but, of course, this provides a knowledge of the 
person as he was at the time of writing or recording rather than as he 
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is at the time of reading or viewing. 	 Admittedly, when we move out 
into the area of reported speech or actions the position becomes less 
clear as far as knowledge is concerned but as regards revelation - my 
main concern in this chapter - it seems evident that we do not have a 
case of revelation or self-disclosure by the person whose speech or 
actions are reported. 
Turning from the mediateness of our awareness of other persons to its 
immediacy, it seems plausible to claim that we do not normally infer -
either formally or informally - the existence of another's person as a 
thinking, feeling, subject self, an 'I', from his observable actions 
and words. 	 We immediately experience others not just as objects or 
moving bodies but as selves. 	 It may well be the case that we have 
had to learn to experience them in this way but that does not make the 
present activity inferential any more than it does in the case of any 
other immediate awareness.11 It is the awareness of the other person 
as such or the other mind as mind that is immediate; it is the fact of 
his mental activity rather than its content that is immediate, albeit 
mediated through his words and actions. 	 The content of his mental 
activity seems more likely to be inferred from his words and actions. 
I am suggesting that it is by no means obviously wrong - indeed, can 
be quite plausibly maintained - that it is normally the case that we 
are as immediately aware of the self of the other person as we are of 
his body, his actions or his words, i.e., as of that in which the self 
is mediated. I say 'normally' because there may be circumstances in 
which, say, in a fog, we are unsure whether we see a man or a man-
shaped tree or, after an accident, we see a man or just his body. 
But, it may be objected, is not this knowledge of other selves based 
upon analogical reasoning from our knowledge of our own selves? 
	 If 
so, it cannot be immediate, can it? 	 But why should we assume that 
genetically this is how it has been in the growth of personal 
knowledge or how it has to be in any reasoning we engage in or ought 
to engage in about the objects of personal knowledge? Must we follow 
Descartes in beginning with ourselves? It is surely arguable that we 
could just as easily reason analogically from the existence of other 
minds to that of our own without assuming a logical priority of the 
latter. Perhaps there is no logical priority of either - perhaps 
they both grow together so that neither need be used to justify the 
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other. 	 Of course, this could be extended to include the knowledge of 
God. 	 From Calvin on there have been Reformed thinkers who have 
argued for such a relationship between self-knowledge and knowledge of 
God. 	 Thomas F. Torrance, for example, writes of "a profound 
mutuality" between them.12 	 Some talk of our awareness of other 
persons as being of that which is both 'other' and 'not-other'.13 	 It 
is not therefore obvious that we do infer knowledge of others from our 
self-knowledge. 	 And if an inferential process is not normally 
present in such situations of coming to be aware of another person as 
such, it would seem reasonable that it should not be required. 
Otherwise a lot of generally accepted beliefs are not justified. 
Personal knowledge is not a matter of being all the time immediately 
aware of the other person but, at some time, there has to be a 
'directness' about the relationship which is summed up in the element 
of immediacy in this idea of mediated immediacy. This mediated 
immediacy is necessary for there to be any awareness of the other 
person as a person. Knowledge of his thoughts, attitudes, 
intentions, character and the like are gained progressively in the 
relationship. 	 And for this knowledge of another self we are 
dependent upon his self-revealing activity. 
	 To a great extent - 
apart from resort to hypnosis or torture or such like - we cannot know 
the other against his will. 
	 As far as knowledge of his thoughts is 
concerned we have to submit to his authority. 
	 Granted, inference 
from involuntary actions and also inferential building upon what he 
chooses to reveal of himself can help to build up the picture, but, in 
the final analysis, there is a sense in which the knower is dependent 
upon the to-be-known for so much that cannot be inferred. 
	 There may 
be knowledge of him available to be discovered - a 'general 
revelation' of him - but for much that matters there has to be the 
'special revelation' given in the other's activity and, especially, in 
his words. 	 It is this that makes the concept of revelation so 
appropriate to persons rather than things or events. 
	 The observer is 
not confined to conjectures based on what he observes in a passive 
object but the object is active and capable of engaging in dialogue, 
enabling us even to make some checks on the accuracy of our 
apprehensions. 
The striking disjunction is not between personal knowledge and 
propositional knowledge but between personal knowledge and knowledge 
-81- 
of things. 	 The person can normally by means of language enable 
another to become acquainted with or better acquainted with him by 
revealing himself and his thoughts and feelings, especially by the use 
of propositions. Of course, it is true that the propositions can 
never fully describe but this does not mean that the person cannot be 
truly known at all. Even the simplest object in the natural world 
can perhaps never be exhaustively known but it seems counter-intuitive 
to take this to mean that there could be no knowledge of it at all. 
3.3 THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVINE REVELATION 
Assuming that the foregoing analysis of the idea of revelation and of 
its application to our knowledge of persons is on the right lines, I 
turn now to its application to divine revelation and man's knowledge 
of God. 	 If it can be so applied so that it is possible to speak of 
God revealing himself and revealing truths expressed in propositions 
to people, and that this is such that they can be immediately 
justified in believing that God is speaking to them, then the whole 
view of the proper basicality of belief in God is radically 
transformed. 	 It is this that makes the content of the previous 
chapter incomplete in itself, dealing as it did with religious 
experience in a way that tended to treat God as a passive object in 
relation to the activity of man's perceiving of him. Persons are not 
appropriately dealt with in this way and if God is personal - as is 
assumed in this study - then it would seem just as inappropriate in 
relation to him. 	 It would seem particularly inappropriate if it were 
the case that, as George Mavrodes puts it, "every experience of God is 
a revelation"14 and even more so if it were the case, as at least 
some Reformed writers seem to hold, that every human experience is 
revelatory of God. However, it is not necessary to make such claims 
to establish the possibility of divine revelation. 
I have talked of revelation taking place through a person's actions 
and especially his words. Against the application of this account to 
divine revelation, it is sometimes argued that God cannot be detected 
by the senses and so cannot be experienced or that he does not have a 
body and so he cannot act in the world and speak to people. 
	 These 
arguments raise quite a number of theological and philosophical issues 
about the meaningfulness of saying that God is personal, the nature of 
divine action and speech, the nature of divine inspiration and other 
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related issues. 	 Most of these are beyond the scope of this present 
study so I shall merely point towards how a response might be made to 
the particular arguments mentioned, some of which has been touched 
upon already in the previous chapter. 
For a start, it is possible to question whether allowing that God 
cannot be seen or directly detected by any of the other senses does 
indeed rule out detection of his presence by the senses. 
	 It would 
seem quite conceivable that there should be beings who cannot be 
perceived by the senses but who possess a power to produce effects 
which can be detected by the senses and which indicate that these 
beings are present. Robert Oakes suggests that there might be such 
beings whose presence has an invariant effect of generating a very 
strong magnetic field so that they attract all light-weight objects 
within a radius of about fifteen feet.15 In a similar way, Basil 
Mitchell responds to arguments about action requiring a body with his 
development of Wisdom's Parable of the Invisible Gardener. He 
writes:- 
"... we could make sense of the notion of his doing things in 
the garden even though we could not trace the 'actions' to any 
bodily behaviour on his part, so long as there were unexpected 
alterations in the appearance of the garden as only a gardener 
would intend to produce. To infer a particular gardener, we 
should only need to have some idea of the sort of effects he as 
an individual generally sought to produce."16  
In such situations, observers could see that a being was present or 
had done something in spite of their inability to see the being in 
question. 	 This is not to suggest that God's presence creates a 
magnetic field but simply that it is possible in principle that there 
occur cases in which the presence of God is detected by the senses and 
that, if God exists, he has the power to bring about whatever it is 
possible in principle for him to bring about and that he can do this 
when and where he wishes to. 
At this point it might be objected that, not having a body, God is as 
incapable of direct verbal communication as he is of body-language. 
Obviously, God's speaking cannot be a matter of producing sounds by 
expelling air through.vocal cords but I see no problem in suggesting 
that God may 'speak' by causing the person addressed to have an exper-
ience of the kind he would have if a human being were speaking to him 
or even by bringing about some kind of direct telepathic 
communication.17 	 I am not sure that it matters very much precisely 
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what vehicle or vehicles God may use to speak to men as long as there 
is no reason why it should be held to be impossible that theie should 
be anything analogous to human speaking in the way he communicates 
with human persons. In addition, it could be pointed out that God, 
being incarnate in Christ, does have a body in which "the Word became 
flesh"18 - a full audio-visual presentation of God - and that he is 
also claimed to have appeared in human form in the Old Testament 
theophanies. 
It is sometimes objected that the idea of revealed truths is of some-
thing timeless, abstract or static as against that which would be more 
appropriate to the dynamic, concrete and ever-changing nature of 
personal relationships. But it is difficult to see why talk of 
divinely revealed truths should be rejected on such grounds unless we 
also jettison talk of any person revealing a true proposition to 
another. Such activity may well include assertions of 
generalisations and abstractions but this does not necessarily make 
the encounter less personal. 
	 Indeed, as Paul Helm points out in one 
of his responses19 to this kind of argument against propositional 
revelation, not only are statements like 'God is good' timelessly true 
but so also are dated historical statements like 'God led the 
Israelites out of Egypt at 1280 B.C.'. If they are true, they are 
true at all times, and if true they are truths about God and can 
therefore be revelatory of him. 
	 If the essence of this kind of 
objection is, as seems to have been intended by Bultmann for 
example," that to know God is not a theoretical matter and that 
revelation is response-demanding, then again it is not clear that this 
rules out the idea of propositional revelation. Indeed, as Helm 
says, 
ft 
 ... there is good reason to think that in many if not all 
cases, for a sentence to be 'response-demanding' it must have a 
truth-value."21 
Helm gives the example of the statement 'There is a bull in the next 
field' which could in certain circumstances be regarded 'neutrally' 
but not if the person given the information intended to cross the 
field. 
The foregoing is a very brief account of some objections to the idea 
of God acting and speaking to reveal himself to people but I hope that 
I have at least indicated ways in which they might be met. This may 
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do a little to establish the possibility of divine revelation but it 
says nothing about how it might be known or, rather, 	 justifiably 
believed to be actual. 	 To this issue I now turn. 
3.4 THE AUTHENTICATION OF DIVINE REVELATION  
In this section, as indicated earlier, I shall be concerned mainly 
with what might be required of a set of propositions if they are to be 
held to be a self-authenticating revelation of God. 	 As I said 
earlier, I think it is characteristic of Reformed epistemologists to 
hold that all divine revelation is self-authenticating and that they 
do not limit divine revelation to the propositions of the Christian 
scriptures. But since the idea of propositional revelation seems to 
be a central ingredient of this theme, the main focus of what follows 
will be upon this aspect. 
The idea of propositional revelation has not been at all popular with 
many theologians of the present century. 	 The claim has been made by 
a number of them that God reveals himself not propositions. This has 
been in part a reaction to the sort of emphasis that talked of 
revelation as being essentially propositional and which, allied to a 
crude dictation theory of inspiration, tended to give the impression 
of an impersonal transmission of information and orders as, say, in an 
official handbook. 	 But to say that divine revelation is essentially 
personal is not to say that it is not propositional. 	 Indeed, on the 
basis of the earlier analysis of the idea of revelation and of how it 
can give knowledge of persons, it would seem surprising that personal 
revelation to any significant extent could take place without 
propositions. 	 It is therefore a false antithesis to oppose personal 
revelation to propositional revelation.22 	 They are not mutually 
exclusive, for a person may and, indeed, normally does reveal himself 
by means of propositions expressed in words. 
	 In a sense, the 
propositions are not the revelation for they point to the reality 
beyond of the person's thoughts, intentions, feelings, etc. - as Owen, 
borrowing scholastic terms, puts it, they are "the 'objecta quibus', 
not the 'objecta quaet of faith".23  
We are concerned now with the justification of the belief that the 
Christian scriptures are a divine revelation. Possible approaches 
can be classified according to whether its justification is taken to 
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be mediate or immediate, i.e., according to whether the belief is 
justified inferentially or non-inferentially. 
	 This is a matter of 
the way in which the belief is grounded. 
	 There is also another way 
of classifying approaches and this is a matter of where the grounds 
are to be found - whether they are internal to the scriptures or 
external to them. 	 From this it can be seen that talk of self- 
authentication in relation to the scriptures is ambiguous. 
	 It can 
be understood as requiring that the belief that the scriptures are the 
Word of God be immediately justified and this is clearly what 
Wolterstorff and some other contemporary Reformed writers understand 
by 'self-authenticating' in this context. 
	 In other words, it is the 
belief that is immediately justified. 
	 But the scriptures can also be 
seen as self-authenticating in the sense that the evidence for their 
being the Word of God is internal to them. It is then the scriptures  
that are self-authenticating in that they provide their own evidence  
of their being a divine revelation. This latter seems to be the kind 
of approach taken by Paul Helm in a couple of recent attempts to set 
forth what he terms "an internal pattern of justification".24 
These two independent ways of classifying approaches provide between 
them for four different types of approach. 
	 They are as follows:- 
Type 1 (immediate-internal): the grounds for the immediately 
justified belief (that the scriptures are the Word of God) are 
internal to the scriptures, e.g., where the subject is 
immediately aware that God is speaking to him through the words 
of scripture. 
Type 2 (mediate-internal): the evidence for the mediately 
justified belief is internal to the scriptures, e.g., when it is 
found in the characteristics of the scriptures and their effect 
upon the subject of the belief. 
Type 3 (immediate-external): the grounds for the immediately 
justified belief are external to the scriptures, e.g., where the 
subject is immediately aware of God speaking to him through 
something external to the scriptures and telling him that the 
scriptures are the word of God. 
Type 4 (mediate-external): the evidence for the mediately 
justified belief is external to the scripture, e.g., when it is 
found in independent historical corroboration of events recorded 
in scripture. 
The distinction here between grounds and evidence is not co-extensive 
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with that between experiences and beliefs since, as we saw in the last 
chapter, experiences may function either as evidence or non-
inferential grounding for a belief. 
	 Wolterstorff's definition of the 
theme of the self-authentication of revelation places it in Type 1 and 
probably also in Type 3. 
	 Helm's approach seems to be an example of 
Type 2. 	 Type 4 cannot be termed 'self-authenticating' in any sense 
of the term. 
3.4.1 DIVINE REVELATION AND EVIDENCE 
Helm contrasts what he terms "an internal pattern of justification" 
with the "externalism" of such as. John Locke, William Paley and 
Archibald Alexander. 
	 Helm's 'internal pattern' corresponds more or 
less to my Type 2 above and his 'externalism' to my Type 4. 
	 He says 
that the internal pattern takes the Bible to be the Word of God for 
chiefly religious reasons, i.e. reasons relating to a person's duty to 
God, and on the basis of chiefly internal evidence, whereas 
externalism accepts the Bible as divine revelation if and only if it 
meets certain criteria which are established independently of it.25  
Externalism typically assumes the success of the efforts of natural 
theology to establish the (at least probable) existence of God without 
making use of the data of special revelation and then seeks to 
ascertain whether the Bible is likely to have been revealed by him. 
The conclusion is that it is probable that the Bible is God's Word if 
it meets criteria like consistency with what is known independently of 
it, historical reliability, and accompanying signs, e.g., miracles 
and fulfilled prophecies. 
	 Helm argues that the main defect of this 
pattern of justification is that it supposes that there is some a 
priori standard of reasonableness that the Bible must meet if it is 
the Word of God but if, as is usually also assumed, there is no other 
special revelation from God of which we have prior experience, any 
criterion proposed is bound to be Procrustean.26  
In his accounts of the internal pattern of justification, Helm 
mentions several different kinds of internal evidence (internal 
coherence, moral character, and what the scriptures say about 
themselves). These seem to be kinds of evidence which one may 
examine and consider and find to be evidence to a degree - even good 
evidence - of the divine origin of the scriptures.27 	 Helm then goes 
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on to look at further evidence for the scriptures being the revelation 
of God and this is not simply in that they 	 that they are so but in 
that they function as the Word of God. 
	 This Helm takes to be "the 
chief sort of (internal) evidence" for the divine authority of the 
scriptures.28  
Helm says that the Bible does not merely provide information to its 
reader but that its "basic stance" is "that of a document that, on the 
basis of the information that it provides, makes claims on and offers 
invitations to its readers". 
	 Helm goes on to try to break this down 
into a number of different elements and he writes:- 
"One element is the idea that the Bible purports to give an 
analysis or diagnosis of the reader. 
	 The Scriptures offer this 
diagnosis as the truth about the reader. Now if the Scriptures 
are what they claim to be, the Word of God, then one would 
expect that careful examination and self-scrutiny would reveal 
that the diagnosis 'holds good' in the life of the reader. 
Connected with this is the power of the Scriptures to raise and 
satisfy certain distinctive needs in the reader, particularly 
the recognition of his sin before God and the enjoyment of 
forgiveness and reconciliation to God through Christ. 
Connected with this is the displaying in Scripture of excellent 
moral standards that focus and integrate the life of the 
reconciled person. And connected with this is the provigion of 
new motivation to reach out for the newly set standards."49  
It is not therefore a matter of what the Bible says but what it says 
to the reader and what it says may be confirmed to him in his 
experience of how it functions in his life. 
Helm's emphasis throughout is on evidence for the divine origin and 
authority of the scriptures. It would therefore appear that he is 
concerned with mediate justification of these beliefs concerning the 
scriptures and this comes out clearly in the following extract:- 
"The data of Scripture, in which the divine authority of 
Scripture is grounded and which provide evidence for the Bible 
being the Word of God, are known a posteriori. Fundamental, 
therefore, to accepting the Bible as the Word of God is 
considering the relevant evidence for that claim honestly and 
seriously. 
	 This point cannot be overstressed, for it is common 
to find on both sides of this debate those who tell us what the 
Scriptures must be like without stowing to look and see if the 
Scriptures are actually like this." t' 
The consideration of evidence is of central importance but this is not 
a matter of a detached rational observer weighing up evidence which is 
external to him because Helm ascribes a large role in this process to 
experience. He talks of an experience which is neither a revelation 
additional to that contained in the scriptures nor a different sort of 
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evidence for the claim that the Bible is the Word of God. 
	 Rather it 
is "the discovery that the claims of Scripture bear the weight of 
experience". Helm links this with the theological doctrine of the 
internal testimony of the Holy Spirit which he regards as a different 
way of talking about the power of the scriptures to do the things he 
has described. 
	 He continues:- 
"The internal testimony of the Spirit is not to be thought of as 
in some way short-circuiting the objective evidence or making up 
for the deficiencies in external scriptural evidence, nor as 
providing additional evidence, nor as merely acting as a 
mechanical stimulus, but as making the mind capable of the 
proper appreciation of the evidence, seeing it for what it is 
and in particular heightening the mind's awareness of the marks 
of divinity present in the text in such a way as to produce the 
conviction that this text is indeed the prRduct of the divine 
mind and therefore to be relied on utterly." 
Elsewhere, he talks of this internal testimony of the Spirit as func-
tioning "like a telescope or a new perspective".32  
It would appear, in the light of this, that the involvement of the 
Holy Spirit in this process and the role given to insight does not 
make it any less a matter of coming to have a justified belief on the 
basis of the consideration of evidence. 
	 What the Holy Spirit does is 
to bring it about that the evidence can be seen for what it is and it 
is this seeing of the evidence that results in the justified belief 
that the Bible is the Word of God. 
	 Why he thinks this activity 
should be necessary Helm does not say but that it is necessary seems 
to be strongly implied. 
Notwithstanding the central role of the experience of coming to see 
the evidence, Helm is insistent that this account is not subjectivist. 
There is an objective side in that there is something external to the 
believer and his experience - the text and its meaning - which is, as 
he says, "something public and verifiable".33 But the subjective 
element means the believer is not in a position to bring about in 
another by rational argument a belief that the Bible is the Word of 
God. The other person has to investigate the promises and claims of 
the scriptures for himself so that he may find them confirmed in a 
similar way in his own- experience.34  
Further, the justification which is given under these circumstances to 
the belief that the Bible is the Word of God is prima facie. The 
belief is not unchallengeable and this is where such issues as the 
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historical reliability and internal coherence of the scriptures come 
into the picture. 	 They do not establish that the Bible is the Word 
of God but contradiction of historical claims of the scriptures by 
overwhelming independent evidence or the existence of absolute self-
contradiction within the scriptures could overthrow its divine 
authority.35 
Helm's account seems to be clearly an example of what I have termed a 
Type 2 account. 	 My definition of that category is wide enough to 
provide also for a coldly rationalistic account. 	 This would be one 
in which the detached observer weighs up the evidence of coherence and 
other characteristics of the scriptures and comes to his conclusion 
without being involved or 'engaged' with the claims and promises of 
the Bible. He might consider its literary qualities or even - in the 
manner of the author of a book I have come across with the sub-title 
"An Unanswerable Challenge to an Unbelieving World"! - make much of 
what are, on the face of it, some quite remarkable facts about the 
patterns apparently discernible in the Bible when numeric values are 
assigned to the Hebrew and Greek letters used.36 In this form, the 
only difference between this approach and the mediate-external kind of 
approach is in where the evidence is found, whether within or without 
the scriptures. 	 Evidence of fulfilled prophecies or of an ancient 
date for the Turin Shroud and or of Bible numerics seem, in a way, all 
of a piece and may constitute evidence that the Bible is a remarkable 
book or even a degree of evidence for its divine authority. 	 Helm's 
account of the internal testimony of the Spirit - with its'emphasis 
on the involvement of the reader with its claims - is not detached in 
this way but, in the last analysis, it too is a matter of the 
consideration of evidence. 
3.4.2 DIVINE REVELATION AND IMMEDIATE AWARENESS  
Having looked briefly at both kinds of mediate approach, we come now 
to approaches of Types #1  and 40 	 These have in common that 
justification is held to be immediate. 
	 The belief that the biblical 
propositions are the Word of God is not arrived at as a result of a 
process of considering evidence of any kind, whether internal or 
external to the Bible. It is not based on other beliefs but it is 
grounded, not groundless. 
-90- 
The distinction between internal and external types of approach can, I 
think, still be made. 	 It is a matter of whether the authentication 
comes through the propositions of the scriptures or is somehow given 
in a way that is appropriately described as being apart from things 
the Bible says. 	 An external pattern here could give immediately the 
belief that the Bible is the Word of God. 
	 I do not intend to develop 
this - partly for considerations of space and partly because I do not 
think it is what the Reformed writers we have looked at had in mind -
but I shall indicate a possible direction in which it might be 
developed. 	 The charismatic movement is quite influential on the 
contemporary Christian church scene (although not generally so in 
churches of a more Reformed outlook) and I think it is quite easy to 
conceive of a claim to this kind of immediately justified belief being 
made in such circles. 
	 For example, use of glossolalia is quite 
common in such circles and I can readily conceive of the possibility 
of somebody being 'given' a message in tongues which he takes to be 
God telling him that the Bible is his Word. If he takes this as 
basic and in need of no further support, then he is claiming to be 
immediately justified in his belief in a way that is external to the 
actual propositions of the Bible. 
	 Whether or not he would be 
justified in this claim is another matter. 
	 Some would raise a 
theological objection on the grounds of the doctrine of the 
sufficiency of the scriptures as special revelation. 
	 A possible 
philosophical objection could be raised against the necessity of this 
kind of external authentication on the grounds that it would seem to 
suggest that a claim to revelation requires a further revelation for 
its validation so it may in its turn require yet a further revelation 
for its validation and so on ad infinitum. 
	 It is on such grounds 
that Helm argues that the testimony of the Holy Spirit cannot be a 
further revelation37 and similar considerations would seem to apply 
here. 
Leaving Type 3 justification to one side, I shall seek to outline a 
possible version of a Type 1 approach. In some respects it is quite 
similar to Helm's internal pattern but it differs from it fairly 
fundamentally as well. In fact, an earlier account by Helm of what 
he termed at the time "self-authentication"38 provides a very good 
starting point. In that account, Helm took the positions of Calvin 
and the Puritan theologian John Owen as illustrating a distinctive 
model of religious belief which he summed up as follows: 
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"A religiously believes p if A assents firmly to p (where p is 
taken to be revealed proposition) because A intuits, in grasping 
the meaning of p, that it is revealed by God."39  
Helm is quite deliberate in this appeal to intuition and he relates it 
to Anthony Quinton's logically intuitive beliefs. 
	 As we saw 
earlier,40 
 these are beliefs which do not require other beliefs to 
support them or to make them worthy of acceptance. The intuition in 
question is not therefore that of either Quinton's vernacular 
intuition or simply his psychological intuition. 
	 Helm also 
differentiates it from that of knowledge of analytic truths and from 
that of anything known universally or as a result of some Cartesian 
'natural light'. 
Quinton's logically intuitive beliefs do not need support from other 
beliefs but they are not necessarily excluded from such support. On 
this point, Helm points to John Owen's distinction between external  
and internal reasons for believing. 
	 External reasons for believing 
biblical propositions include such as "the fact that the Bible was an 
ancient book, wonderfully preserved, coherent and so on"41 but 
although they may have "apologetic value (to rebut certain 
objections)", they do not provide the grounds for religious belief.42 
These grounds are only in "reasons that are internal to the teaching 
of the Bible".43  
Does this appeal to internal reasons mean that biblical propositions 
have the property of being self-evidently true? Not so, says Helm, 
or, at least, not in the same sense as that in which analytic truths 
are self-evidently true. 
	 Simple mathematical truths and tautologies 
are such that to understand their meaning is sufficient for the 
justified belief that they are true but, although Helm says in his 
definition that the intuition in question comes with "grasping the 
meaning of" the propositions, it is important to note that what is 
intuited is that the propositions are revealed by God. 
	 The intuition 
is not of their truth but of their revealedness. 
	 Of course, if a 
proposition is asserted by God then it follows from his omniscience 
and the impossibility that he should lie that it is true. This would 
not be so of all biblical propositions, e.g., the words of "the fool" 
quoted in the Psalms ("There is no God").44 It is therefore the 
revealedness of biblical propositions that is intuited and is the 
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evidence that they should be believed.45 	 This is not at all how it 
is with simple mathematical truths and tautologies. 
Helm also says that, on this model of belief, the propositions 
believed are certain because they are regarded as being the assertions 
of God. Because the evidence for their truth is their revealedness, 
they are not held to be probably true or even very probably true - as 
they would be if inferred from 'external reasons' obtained from 
historical evidence and the like.46 	 Of course, it does not follow 
that the belief that they are the assertions of God is itself 
incorrigible or even psychologically certain. Insofar as the 
scriptures authenticate themselves as divine revelation to a person, 
he is certain of the propositions believed but, since this is partly a 
matter of his condition and disposition which may change with time, 
the firmness of his belief is a matter of degree. As Helm puts it, 
it is only in the case of "full-formed religious belief"47 that the 
believer is certain that the proposition believed is certainly true. 
What is it then to grasp the meaning of a biblical proposition? 
Surely many who read the Bible and agree totally with believers on the 
meaning of some of its propositions and even, possibly, on their truth 
are very far from being convinced that they are revealed by God. 
	 The 
subject of meaning and understanding is a major theme of Helm's study 
and he makes the point more than once that there is a distinction 
between, on the one hand, meaning as sense and reference and, on the 
other, meaning as point, function or meaningfulness.48 Of the 
Calvin-Owen model Helm writes:- 
"Coming to believe in the testimony of God revealed in the Bible 
is like becoming aware of a complicated 'gestalt' ... it is an 
awareness 9f the point or meaningfulness of certain pro-
positions."49  
It is in this sense of seeing the point of biblical propositions 
rather than merely understanding their reference that their 
revealedness may be intuited. 
But how do some come to see the point in this way? 
	 Helm finds in 
Owen and Calvin the -idea of "the power" of such propositions "to 
arouse and satisfy distinctive religious needs" in the life of the 
believer. 
	 He also writes of the need to become "engaged" so that 
certain promises in the Bible, e.g., promises of forgiveness, come to 
be seen not merely as reports of promises to certain individuals in 
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history but as promises to the reader in that he regards them as 
relevant because he finds himself in need of forgiveness." 	 Here 
Helm's account clearly begins to overlap with his more recent outline 
of the internal pattern of justification but they differ fairly 
markedly in that the earlier account contains the clearly 
foundationalist emphasis on intuiting the revealedness of the biblical 
propositions as against that on the consideration of evidence of the 
more recent account. 
It is this emphasis on logical intuition that moves this Calvin-Owen 
model clearly into my Type 1 category. 	 Although Helm talks of 
internal reasons, it does seem that the intuition of the point of the 
biblical propositions is not the basis of an argument from reasons or 
evidence to the belief that they are the Word of God, for Helm says: 
"this intuition or illumination is not the grounds for the believer 
believing what he does" but "the means or 'power' by which what is 
present in the Bible is believed".51 It seems from what he says that 
it is in having this experience of grasping their point, that the 
revealedness of the biblical propositions is also grasped. Their 
point is that they apply personally to the present-day reader and are 
not just a record of words from God to readers or hearers of Old or 
New Testament times. 	 This entails that they are the Word of God. 
However, there is, I think, another way of accounting for this 
intuition of revealedness which is rather more in line with what I 
take to be entailed by talk of personal revelation and which brings in 
the idea of an immediate awareness of God. 	 Borrowing Buber's 
terminology, I think it moves the discussion from talking in terms of 
an 'I-it' relationship to that of an 'I-Thou' relationship or, perhaps 
more accurately, a combination of both kinds of relationship. Rather 
than it being the case that the reader of the Bible comes to an 
awareness that the biblical propositions were written for him - an 
awareness of a fact about a person - it could be that he becomes aware 
of God actually speaking to him in the present moment and addressing 
him with the propositions of the Bible. 
	 This is to move from an 
account which seems •to focus fairly exclusively on propositional 
revelation to that which is more clearly both propositional and 
personal. 
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It seems to me that both Helm's internal pattern of justification and 
his Calvin-Owen model lack an emphasis upon the idea of God speaking  
through the Scriptures. 	 Although he does talk of "God's personal 
address to people ... that calls for a response"52 and, as we have 
seen, of the importance of the Scriptures 'engaging' in the life and 
experience of the reader or hearer, he seems to regard this as being 
to do with what makes the Scriptures the revelation of God rather than 
with the justification of the belief that they are so. The effect of 
his insistence upon a process of considering the internal evidence of 
the Scriptures is that a person can never be justified in believing 
that God is speaking to him now. 
	 Even in the Calvin-Owen model with 
its element of intuition, it seems to more a matter of God speaking to 
the prophets and other biblical writers so that what we have is a 
record of his revealing activity, albeit intended by him to be for us 
now a means of our coming to know his will for us. 
But when somebody speaks to me, I do not normally engage in a process 
of inductive verification or of grasping the point of the words spoken 
before I form the belief that somebody is speaking to me. 
	 In other 
words, there is normally an immediacy of awareness of the other person 
- in the sense of psychological directness - about such situations. 
If this is the case with ordinary human relationships, why should it 
not be so if a person is addressed by God? 
	 And why should the 
immediate justification of the belief that God is speaking to me not 
be grounded in this immediate awareness of him mediated through the 
words of the biblical propositions? 
Of course, one will not be able to see God but that is hardly 
surprising and should not therefore provide a reason for doubting that 
one is being addressed by him. It would seem perfectly possible for 
him to cause us to have an experience of being spoken to by him but 
this is not at all the same thing as causing us to believe that we are 
being spoken to by him. At least, it is not so in any sense that is 
any more objectionable than, say, in the situation where I call out to 
someone unaware of my presence and thereby cause him to become aware 
of me. 	 Helm is concerned to repudiate any suggestion that the 
internal testimony of the Holy Spirit is a case of indoctrinating or 
brain-washing into the belief that the Bible is God's Word as, for 
example, when he writes:- 
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"The internal testimony of the Spirit is not to be 
... as merely acting as a mechanical stimulus. 	 ... 
or propositions of the revelation are not the cause 
of the experience; rather, they engender it through 
of the propositions and their force (as commands, 




the meaning  
questions, 
"This interpretation rules out another, that the internal 
testimony has a causal role, simply causing the mind to have the 
conviction that the Bible is God's special revelation. But 
this would make conviction unrelated to evidence of 
5
au kind, 
and the work of the Spirit would be like brainwashing."" 
But it is only if the possibility of immediate justification grounded 
in some form of immediate awareness is ruled out that consideration of 
reasons/evidence and brainwashing-type processes can be taken as 
exhaustive of the possibilities. 	 It is not that a process is causal 
but that it is merely causal that renders it liable to be termed a 
case of brainwashing or the like. A conviction grounded in an immed-
iate awareness of being addressed by somebody cannot therefore be on 
that account a case of such unacceptable practice on the part of the 
person doing the addressing. 
Nor, if we talk in terms of immediate awareness, is this to be con-
sidered as something apart from the meaning of the words of Scripture 
any more than internal justification is on Helm's account. 	 For 
something to be a case of one person speaking to another it is 
necessary that intelligible language be used and normally it will be 
intelligible to both addressor and addressee. 	 Our understanding of 
the words being used, our knowledge of the existence of these words in 
written form and the like are conditions for the truth of the claim 
that God is speaking to us through the words of Scripture but this 
does not necessarily make the justification of the claim a matter of 
these facts or any other facts providing evidence or reasons why we 
should believe it. The awareness that God is speaking to a person is 
in grasping the meaning of the propositions being used rather than 
because the believer grasps their meaning. 
	 And this grasping of the 
meaning of the words is a realisation not only that they are 
meaningful but also a grasping of their point as part of God's present 
personal address to the reader or hearer. 
Thus modified by a greater emphasis upon the immediacy of being now 
personally addressed by God, it seems to me that Helm's Calvin-Owen 
model becomes more adequate. It takes on board the directness of 
accounts that put their stress upon experience of personal revelation 
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but without their mysticism and subjectivism. 	 It provides for the 
possibility of a personal God speaking to persons in propositions 
which are identifiable independently of the experience of being spoken 
to. It does not insist upon incorrigibility and can therefore be 
fitted into the more moderate foundationalist framework for which I 
argued in the last section. 	 It provides for the possibility of 
defeaters and defeater-defeaters. 	 As in the case of alternative 
conceptual schemes in the last chapter, the fact of the existence of 
alternative purported divine revelations does not, in itself, defeat 
the prima facie justified belief that the Bible is God's Word. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have argued that revelation through personal 
communication involves the intentional activity of the revealer, 
activity that can take many forms but centrally that of verbal 
communication, and which leads to belief that is prima facie justified 
and which has some newness of content. 	 Revelation that involves 
coming to know another person involves propositional knowledge of him 
but is non-transferable because of the element of an immediate 
awareness of him albeit mediated through his words or actions. 
also argued that the fact that God cannot be seen does not mean that 
divine propositional revelation is impossible. 
I outlined four types of approach to the authentication of divine 
revelation in scriptural propositions. One of these was a mediate 
approach arguing from evidence internal to the scriptures and 
therefore an example of self-authentication in a sense. 	 To find an 
approach more in line with this theme of Reformed epistemology, I went 
on to consider an approach that involved intuiting the point of the 
scriptural propositions but I amplified this by incorporating 
reference to immediate awareness of God speaking through these 
propositions. In this way, I attempted to develop an account which 
incorporated the features of personal revelation already outlined. 
In this chapter, the focus was shifted from that on a person 
experiencing God to God's revealing himself to the person. I turn 
now to the implications for all this of the third characteristic theme 
- that of the noetic effects of sin. 
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4 
SIN HAS POETIC EFFECTS 
According to the third of the characteristic themes of Reformed 
epistemology identified by Wolterstorff and Plantinga, sin has had an 
important effect on our intellectual or noetic condition.' 
Among the effects mentioned by Kuyper, Van Til, Plantinga and other 
Reformed epistemologists are falsehood, confusion, unintentional 
mistakes, self-delusion and self-deception. 
	 Plantinga says that the 
results of sin include "all the epistemic ills to which humanity is 
heir"2 and he goes on to add a suggestion that is rather startling, 
at least on first sight, as he points to the possibility that the 
classical foundationalist view of knowledge might very well be 
appropriate to an unfallen world. He writes:- 
"It is the existence of sin in the world that, for many, inter- 
feres with belief in God. Were it not for the existence of 
sin, we should all believe in God with the same natural and 
wholehearted spontaneity with which we believe in other persons, 
the past and the external world. ... If there were no sin in 
the world, then perhaps there wouldn't be any irresolvable dis-
putes or fundamental disagreements or deeply different ways of 
looking at the world. ... If there were no sin in the world, 
the classical foundationalist picture of knowledge as what can 
be proved from common ground - ground common to all human beings 
- might very well be correct. 
	 It is certainly natural to think 
that in the absence of sin I would be able to prove whatever I 
know to anyone else. From this perspective, then, the classical 
foundationalist way of looking at knowledge is considerably out 
of date - not merely antediluvian but positively prelapsarian!"3  
Wolterstorff writes of how sin has "darkened our capacities" for 
acquiring justified beliefs and attaining knowledge4 and he suggests 
that the effects of sin also involve the sinner's resistance to the 
workings of a natural disposition to believe in God, a resistance that 
may become so habitual that "he may feel little or no impulse anymore 
to believe that God exists".5  
The picture seems to be of a cosmos which is the theatre for the 
divine revelation of truth not only about God himself but about 
everything of which humankind should spontaneously 
	 advance in 
knowledge. 
	 Because of sin, the capacity to see is 'darkened' and 
people are turned from creaturely submission to the Creator's 
authoritative revelation to find something other than God to which 
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they can cling by faith, a faith or 'unfaith' which finds expression 
in all aspects of life including the intellectual. The effects of 
sin pervade all knowing, albeit in some areas more than others. 
It is impossible in the present study to attempt to go into the nature 
of sin or even to begin to trace out how precisely it could lead to 
any one of these so many and so varied effects. But there is one 
aspect of this subject which stands out and could serve to focus our 
thinking. 	 It is strongly present in Van Til's writings with, as we 
have seen,6 their recurrent theme of how man takes either God or 
himself as "the final point of reference in all human affairs".7 The 
claim is that a significant way in which sin affects the intellectual 
life is in a tendency to assume some unacceptable - unacceptable from 
the point of view of faith in God - form of autonomy of reason. This 
theme is also discernible in Kuyper's writings and in some of the 
things that Plantinga and other modern Reformed writers say about the 
effects of sin.8 	 Even Alston, who is certainly not given to making 
excessive or unwarranted claims, talks of "an illegitimate inflation" 
of the rightful function of human reason so that "rationalistic 
imperialism" seeks to bring even our cognitive faculties before the 
bar of human reason, all at once, and to accept only that which passes 
the test. 	 He adds:- 
"It is not unduly fanciful to see in this demand an analogue, 
and more than an analogue, of the basic human sin of seeking 
absolute control, seeking to install man in the place of God and 
to sit in judgement over all things."9  
Not only is this a recurrent theme in what a number of Reformed 
epistemologists have to say about the noetic effects of sin (with the 
suggestion that it is a basic sin) but it may also have important 
implications for what they say about belief in God being properly 
basic and divine revelation being self-authenticating. As we have 
seen, the position taken in relation to these two issues seems to lead 
to the possibility of fundamental disagreement for which there seems 
no prospect of resolution through argument. On the one side, there 
may be - and are - those who claim that they need no reasons or 
evidence for their belief that God exists or that he speaks to them 
through the biblical propositions. On the other side, there may be 
those who insist that such beliefs should not be accepted in the 
absence of good reason or adequate evidence. In this way, a form of 
commitment to God or what he is believed to say may be fundamentally 
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opposed to a form of commitment to reason. 	 It is not that all 
commitment to God is opposed to all commitment to reason but that in 
some forms of both these commitments the disagreement may be basic. 
This kind of basic disagreement is a form of what William Warren 
Bartley has termed 'the dilemma of ultimate commitment' and for which 
he has proposed a resolution in a particular form of rationalism.1°  
In his discussion of this, Bartley states his opposition to the 
commitment of several Reformed writers but his epistemological 
position is not one that we have yet, in this study, related to 
Reformed epistemology. 
For these reasons it seems important to take up these related issues 
now. 
	
But there is another reason for doing so and this is that the 
whole matter also has potentially great significance for education. 
Not only is it the case that rational autonomy is a widely accepted 
aim in education and, in the light of the foregoing, some forms of it 
may be unacceptable from the standpoint of Reformed epistemology, but 
it is also the case that some philosophers of education have linked 
their proposals concerning rational autonomy with Bartley's 
rationalism. 
So it would seem that these related issues are of central importance 
for the whole subject of Reformed epistemology and its significance 
for education. 	 In this present chapter, I shall therefore attempt to 
outline what might be meant by talk of rational autonomy and how it 
might be at odds with the themes of Reformed epistemology. I shall 
go on to look at Bartley's rationalism and the way in which it deals 
with the problem of conflicting ultimate commitments. I shall 
finally attempt to show how the Reformed epistemologist might respond 
to all this. 
	 This chapter is not therefore an outline of all the 
ways in which sin might be said to have noetic effects but rather of 
the implications of one important alleged effect for the discussion of 
the two themes of Reformed epistemology already met and of how that 
discussion might proceed in the light of this. 
4.1 AUTONOMY 
It may not seem obvious how there could be a link between sin and 
autonomy but to attempt a thorough philosophical analysis of the 
theological concept of sin as well as of the idea of autonomy would 
seem to be altogether too much to take on within the limits of this 
already fairly wide-ranging study. 
	 So instead of going into such an 
exhaustive analysis, I shall suggest that it is initially plausible to 
take a certain kind of independent-mindedness to be opposed to the 
kind of trusting submission to the authority of God that seems to 
characterise (at least some) Reformed views of faith. 
	 But, it may be 
asked, is all independent-mindedness sinful and is mindless obedience 
necessarily the will of God? The answer is surely 'no' to both these 
questions so it is necessary to spell out in some detail just what 
kind of personal autonomy could be taken to be sinful. 
It is not at all easy to get clear on what might be meant by the use 
of the term 'autonomy'.11 This is partly because of its relative 
absence from 'ordinary language' and partly because of the variety of 
technical usages it has in political theory, psychology, sociology and 
theology as well as in philosophy.12 Even in philosophy there is a 
fairly wide variety of usages of the term but common to most of them 
are, I think, these two central components of the idea of autonomy: 
authenticity and rational reflection. 
	 An autonomous person is 
governed in what he thinks and does by his own reasoned judgements and 
these must be both his own in a significant sense of ownership -
rather than merely his - and reasoned rather than matters of pure 
fancy, obsession or the like. In other words, the 'nomos' must be 
both authentically his own ('autos') rather than that of another 
('heteros') and rational rather than, say, purely emotional or 
voluntary. 	 Autonomy is therefore opposed both to heteronomy and to 
anomie, i.e., both the condition where there is a 'nomos' but it is 
that of another and the 
	 condition of not being governed by any 
'nomos'. Perhaps the most obvious reason for the variation in 
accounts of autonomy has to do with the degree of relative emphasis 
given to these two components. The more existentialist accounts 
tend to emphasise authenticity while the more rationalist make more of 
the rationality component. 
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There are at least two other candidates for inclusion in a list of 
conditions for the exercise of personal autonomy. One of these is 
strength of will and this operates at the frontier between what a 
person thinks and what he does. Another which is often suggested is 
self-knowledge or self-awareness although this could be taken to be 
necessary for or even partly constitutive of authenticity.13  
What, then, is it that makes autonomy suspect from the point of view 
of faith or faith from that of autonomy? 	 I do not think that it is 
likely to be a matter of the presence or absence of strength of will. 
Although the believer may often acknowledge an inability to do what he 
believes he should do, he is likely to regard this as a defect and 
autonomy in this sense as something desirable rather than sinful or 
opposed to faith. Consistency of belief and action is at least as 
much a virtue to the believer as to anyone who holds personal autonomy 
as an ideal. 
Self-knowledge also seems to pose no particular problem to the 
believer and personal autonomy, insofar as it is taken to consist in 
such a quality, is also likely to be regarded by him as desirable. 
Indeed, as we have seen,14 Calvin and other Reformed theologians have 
held that self-knowledge and knowledge of God are intimately related 
so that if the latter is taken to be something to be aimed at then, 
presumably, so also is the former. 	 Although there may well be 
disagreement on the conditions for its existence and the reasons why 
it should be valued, that self-knowledge is to be valued does not seem 
likely to be an issue between the Reformed epistemologist and others. 
Of the two central components of personal autonomy, authenticity also 
seems likely to be valued by the believer rather than regarded as 
sinful. 	 Although there is a sense in which all our thoughts and 
actions are our own, the idea of authenticity seems to require a 
narrower and more significant sense of ownership which would exclude 
that which is not genuinely self-originated, e.g., the effects of 
drugs, hypnosis, brainwashing or other effects artificially created by 
other people.15 	 Authenticity in this sense seems to be obviously a 
virtue rather than a defect and, as we saw earlier, even Van Til would 
appear to value this component of autonomy.16 
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So, lastly, we come to the rationality component and if autonomy - in 
at least some forms - is sinful, it would appear that it is in the 
area of this component that the problem lies. It is upon this 
component that most of the fire of Reformed writers has been directed 
and it is this that I shall seek to analyse in this chapter. 
4.2 THREE KINDS OF RATIONALISM 
The rationality requirement in the ideal of personal autonomy is 
defined differently by different writers. 	 I shall classify these 
with reference to a framework of three kinds of rationalism, within 
which they can be understood more clearly and within which it should 
also be possible to see more clearly how they might be opposed to the 
conception of faith as involving a properly basic belief in God or a 
believing response to a self-authenticating divine revelation. The 
third of these is Bartley's approach mentioned earlier. 
For the first of the three I shall adopt the label used by Karl Popper 
and some of his followers: traditional rationalism. Here 
'rationalism' is understood as including both classical rationalism 
and empiricism . It is justificationist rather than fallibilist. 
It includes both the *holistic justificationism of (at least some 
forms of) coherentism and the more linear approach of classical 
foundationalism. At its heart lies what Popper terms "the doctrine 
that truth is manifest" and he continues:- 
"Truth may perhaps be veiled. 	 But it may reveal itself. 	 And 
if it does not reveal itself, it may be revealed by us. 
Removing the veil may not be easy. But once the naked truth 
stands revealed before our eyes, we have the power to see it, to 
distinguish it from falsehood, and to know that is truth."' 
As Popper describes him, the traditional rationalist assumes that by 
the exercise of reason and use of sense observation, he will come to 
know what is true and that all rational people will agree that it is 
true. Where there are disagreements, then further exercise of reason 
and use of the senses should eventually dissolve them. But these are 
not things that can themselves be justified by reason or through the 
evidence of the senses so the traditional rationalist's optimism 
depends on a faith in human intellectual powers - whether he be 
substantively foundationalist or coherentist in his view of the nature 
of justification. In other words, it can be claimed that traditional 
rationalism is fideist albeit not self-consciously so. 
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On the conception of rationality that this involves, a person is 
rationally autonomous to the degree that his important beliefs are 
based on reasons and evidence upon which, ideally and all other things 
being equal, all rational people would agree. 
	 Intuition may be 
permissible on this kind of account but only insofar as the intuitions 
are shared by all rational people as, for example, those of 
mathematical or logical laws or of the principle of induction. 
Now, as we have seen, Reformed epistemology has much in common with 
traditional rationalism. 	 It shares its justificationism and it too 
is optimistic in its belief that there is truth to be apprehended by 
man and it also rests on a faith in reason. 
	 However, its optimism is 
qualified by the belief that it is God who manifests truth to man and 
that the veil may be due to man's sinfulness including his refusal to 
accept that which does not depend on reason. 
	 Its faith in reason has 
a 'deeper' basis in a faith in a Creator. 
	 In its claim that belief 
in God may not necessarily be properly basic for all or that an 
immediate awareness of God may not be universal, Reformed epistemology 
distances itself from traditional rationalism in a way that may be 
regarded from the latter perspective as irrationalist, dogmatic and 
the like. 
	 And although some idea of divine revelation may be 
acceptable to the traditional rationalist, it is only so if its 
acceptance can be rationally justified or if it authenticates itself 
to all rational people. 
	 The traditional rationalist cannot allow 
that there can be the epistemological chasm between the believer and 
the unbeliever that seems inevitable from the perspective of the 
Reformed epistemologist. 
The second kind of rationalism is exemplified by Popper's own account. 
He regards it as being in the spirit of the Socratic tradition and as 
being approached by Kant in the field of ethics with his principle of 
moral autonomy. 
	 Popper calls his position 'critical rationalism' and 
he argues that the traditional rationalist's questions - 'How do we 
know?', 'How can we prove?' and the like - are misconceived because 
they are "clearly authoritarian in spirit".18 	 Like the traditional 
question of political. theory - 'Who should rule?' - they assume the 
answer should be authoritarian. He proposes the replacement of such 
questions in epistemology by the like of 'How can we hope to detect 
and eliminate error?' to which he believes the proper answer to be 'By 
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criticising the theories and guesses of others and - if we can train 
ourselves to do so - by criticising our own theories and guesses'.19  
It is of interest to note that Popper links his position with the 
implications of Kantian moral autonomy for religious authority. He 
writes:- 
"This principle (of autonomy) expresses his (Kant's) realization 
that we must not accept the command of an authority, however 
exalted, as the basis of ethics. 	 For whenever we are faced 
with a command by an authority, it is for us to judge, 
critically, whether it is moral or immoral to obey. ... Kant 
boldly carried this idea into the field of religion: '... in 
whatever way', he writes, 'the Deity should be made known to 
you, and even ... if He should reveal Himself to you: it is you 
... who must judge whether you are permitted to believe in Him, 
and to worship Him. ru20 
Notwithstanding this important shift from rational justification to 
rational criticism, critical rationalism is evidently no less opposed 
than its predecessor to the idea of an authoritative divine 
revelation. 	 But it has been itself criticised for retaining an 
irrational commitment to reason. 	 Bartley claims to find evidence of 
this - he terms it "a fideism without glee"21 - in the critical 
rationalism of Ayer's 'The Problem of Knowledge'22 no less than in the 
traditional rationalism of his earlier 'Language, Truth and Logic'23  
and in such writers as Morton White, Hilary Putnam, Robert Nozick, W.V 
Quine and the later Wittgenstein. 	 Of course, these writers differ 
greatly in the detail of their views of rationality but they have in 
common a recognition of logical limitations on rationality - that, for 
example, not everything can be rationally justified - and, in general, 
they take the task of the philosopher to be to describe, rather than 
justify, rationality's frameworks, presuppositions and the like. 
	 Not 
all of them embrace the shift from justification to criticism as 
wholeheartedly as Popper but Bartley finds unacceptable elements of 
justificationism and fideism in some of Popper's own writings as well. 
The clearest example of this is in the following from an early edition 
of his 'The Open Society and its Enemies' (he modified it in later 
editions apparently as a result of discussion with Bartley24):- 
"Whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has 
adopted, consciously or unconsciously, some proposal, or 
decision, or belief, or behaviour; an adoption which may be 
called 'irrational'. Whether this adoption is tentative or 
leads to a settled habit, we may describe it as an irrational 
faith in reason. 	 So rationalism is necessarily far from comp- 
rehensive or self-contained. 
	 ... Then why not adopt irration- 
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alism? 
	 ... But such panic action is entirely uncalled for. 
... For there are other tenable attitudes, notably that of 
critical rationalism which recognises the fact that the 
fundamentalist rationalist attitude results from an (at least 
tentative) act of faith - from faith in reason. We may choose 
some form of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive 
form. 	 But we are also free to choose a critical form of 
rationalism, one which frankly admits its origin in an irration-
al decision (and which, to that extent, admits a certain 
priority of irrationalism)1125 
Recent discussions of rational autonomy and notably those which 
advocate its adoption as an educational ideal are, I believe, firmly 
rooted in the critical rationalist tradition. This is certainly the 
case with Dearden's accounts as, for example, when he writes:- 
"'Rationality' is being understood here in terms of always being 
open to criticism, rather than in terms of having an ultimate 
justification. ... Everything can consistently be held open to 
criticip, though one cannot, of course, criticise everything at 
,0 once."2 
 
"All criteria may be questioned, but not all at once, if 
intelligibility is to be preserved. ... Autonomy neither does 
nor could require the stepping outside of all criteria to engage 
in some supposedly criterionless choosing."2 
 
The following quotations from Richard Peters and Paul Hirst respect-
ively also show the influence of this kind of approach:- 
"The liberal ideal of autonomy is to be understood in contrast 
to unthinking conformity and rigid adherence to dogma. It does 
not demand making explicit everything which has been picked up 
from various sources and subjecting it all to constant critic- 
ism. What it does require is a willingness to learn and to 
revise opinions and assumptions when confronted with situations 
that challenge them. 
	 Logically speaking, too, criticism must 
take certain presuppositions for granted. 
	 Not everything can 
be questioned at once."" 
"It is not the case that the rationally autonomous person must 
himself work out every judgement on every action he undertakes, 
questioning things even to fundamental principles. He does in 
fact think things out to the extent that he has the necessary 
knowledge and abilities."29  
In fact, although I have linked these quotations with critical 
rationalism, there is evidence that a more radical and thoroughgoing 
kind of approach has influenced recent accounts of rational autonomy. 
This is Bartley's own approach in which he claims to have carried 
through Popper's critical rationalism to its logical conclusion. It 
is called 'comprehensively critical rationalism' or, more recently, 
'pancritical rationalism'. 
	 Indeed, Dearden acknowledges the 
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influence of Bartley's account30 and John White, in a paper on 
indoctrination, suggests that the principle 'You ought to critically 
examine all your beliefs' should be taught in a way that leads the 
pupil to apply it to itself.31 In the light of the volume of complex 
philosophical discussion that Bartley's account has generated, it 
would seem unlikely that many pupils would ever achieve the degree of 
sophistication required to critically examine such a principle but to 
hold it as a theoretical ideal that they should is certainly in line 
with this third kind of approach to rationality. 
From the point of view of the pancritical rationalist, both 
traditional rationalism and critical rationalism may be seen to 
evidence a fideist commitment to reason. 
	 From that of the Reformed 
epistemologist, if this commitment is not grounded on some deeper 
commitment to a God who made man with his rational powers, it may 
appear as an alternative to and exclusive of trusting obedience to a 
self-authenticating divine revelation. 
	 The difficulty for the 
rationalist of either kind is that he can offer no reason why his 
faith is to be preferred to faith in God or, for that matter, to any 
other kind of commitment however irrational. This poses for him what 
Bartley terms "the dilemma of ultimate commitment" because it is open 
to those who espouse any alternative to rationalism and who find 
themselves under attack from the rationalist to employ "a 'tu quoque' 
or boomerang argument" in response by reminding him that he too has 
made a commitment beyond the logical limits of rationality.32 
This argument for faith in God - or, rather, counter to arguments 
against it - is essentially the same as the "Parity Argument" which 
Terence Penelhum has recently claimed to recognise in what he terms 
the "Evangelical Fideism" of Kierkegaard and the more modern versions 
of it adduced by, he says, Norman Malcolm and Plantinga.33 It is to 
provide an effective response to this kind of argument and what he 
sees as a 'retreat to commitment' on the part of many recent 
Protestant theologians who have no time for traditional natural 
theology that Bartley puts forward his pancritical rationalism. Not 
that Bartley himself would have any time for what he would see as the 
traditional rationalism of the natural theologian. 
	 His own position 
entails a complete abandonment of justification in favour of holding 
all positions open to criticism includin& that position itself. 
Bartley writes:- 
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"While agreeing with Wittgenstein that principles and standards 
of rationality, or frameworks and ways of life, cannot be 
justified rationally, we regard this as a triviality and not as 
an indication of the limitations of rationality. 	 For we don't 
think that anything at all can be justified rationally. 
	 Not 
only do we not attempt to justify the standards; we do not  
attempt to justify anything else in terms of the standards. We 
do not think that there is any such thing as 'well-founded 
belief' anywhere in the system. 
	 Rather, we locate rationality 
in criticism. 	 A rationalist is, for us, one who holds all his 
positions - including standards, goals, criteria, authorities, 
decisions, and especially his framework or way of life - open to 
criticism. 	 He withholds nothing from examination and review. 
... We believe that the framework, or language-game, can be held 
reasonably or rationally only to the extent that it is subjected 
to and survives criticism. Thus we wish to enhance the role of 
'reflective acceptance' of frameworks, not deny it."34  
Evidently, if the Reformed epistemologist is indeed guilty of such a 
retreat to irrational commitment and if Bartley's rationalism is an 
effective response then the whole enterprise of Reformed epistemology 
up to the present is a failure. Bartley would then seem to have made 
room for an unlimited rational autonomy which would be exclusive of 
faith in God and untroubled by any ascription of autonomy to the 
noetic effects of sin. 
This is why I have focussed upon rational autonomy and upon this 
particular account of what it is to be rational. The apparent 
fideism of both traditional and critical rationalism assumes that 
there are logical limits to rationality and to the attainment of 
rational autonomy. In the terms used by D.C. Phillips,35 it is 
logically impossible to attain to 'autonomy 1', i.e., to rationally 
challenge the framework of beliefs and practices of one's society or, 
at least, of one's own beliefs and practices. 
	 If so, the most that 
can be attained is 'autonomy 2', that of accepting a framework 
uncritically but, like Kuhn's 'normal scientists', working 
autonomously within it. 
This latter kind of autonomy is not a threat to faith in God and, 
indeed, seems quite acceptable and even desirable to the Reformed 
epistemologist. 	 But.to aspire to rationally justify the framework 
	 of 
obedient commitment to God is not acceptable to him. 
	 It is not 	 in 
the finitude of reason that its corruption consists but, at least 
partly, in what the Reformed epistemologist may see as its arrogant 
refusal to admit its finitude or, if it does admit it, in going on to 
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think and act inconsistently with this admission. 
	 The dilemma of 
ultimate commitment for the rationalist is the dilemma of the seeming 
unattainability of 'autonomy 1' and yet, in his hostility to the idea 
of a self-authenticating divine revelation that calls for obedience, 
he must assume that it is attainable in calling upon the Christian to 
justify his framework beliefs. However, if Bartley's pancritical 
rationalism can be held to solve or dissolve the dilemma, then the way 
is open to a form of 'autonomy 1' and the commitment of faith must 
give way to openness to rational criticism. The autonomous man would 
then seem to have the last word. 
There are, I think, at least two ways in which the Reformed 
epistemologist can respond to Bartley's criticism of his basic 
commitment to God. 
	 One is to reply to the charge that he is 
irrationalist in his commitment. 
	 The other is to criticise Bartley's 
position on its own terms. 
	 It is the possibilities in the first of 
these that I shall now investigate. 
4.3 REASON AND COMMITMENT 
How can the Reformed epistemologist respond to the charge that the 
commitment of basic belief in God or response to a self-authenticating 
revelation which he cannot show to be self-authenticating is not an 
example of irrationalism? He could, for a start, question Bartley's 
(and Popper's) assumption that rationalism and irrationalism are not 
only mutually exclusive but also exhaustive of the possible kinds of 
position available. It is only if there are no logical limits to 
rationality that the rationalist can rationally adopt the position 
that all alternatives to rationalism are, in the final analysis, 
irrational, i.e. contrary to reason. 
	 So if Bartley is correct about 
the limits to rationality, then he can go on to talk, as of course he 
does, of the exhaustiveness of rationalism and irrationalism. 
However, if there are logical limits to rationality, then a non-
rational or, perhaps more accurately, a supra-rational commitment is 
possible. 
	 This would be a commitment which is beyond reason rather 
than contrary to it. 
	 Some have termed it 'transrationalist'.36 	 But 
then there would appear to be a dilemma for all - not only for the 
rationalist but also for the Reformed epistemologist - in that there 
would seem to be nothing to choose (rationally) between any of the 
alternatives. 
	 The transrationalist's commitment may not be 
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irrational but then it is not rational either! 
	 And, as objectors to 
Plantinga's proper 4basicality of belief in God have not been slow to 
point out, there is no reason why a person may not disbelieve in God. 
Sinful unbelief would appear to be excusable after all and the 'tu 
quoque' argument to be something of a double-edged sword. 
	 I shall 
return to this question of an excuse for unbelief shortly but before 
that there are, I think, other things the Reformed epistemologist can 
say in response to the charge that he is irrationalist. 
For a start, the Reformed epistemologist can point to how he values 
reason and, in a qualified sense, autonomy. 
	 His is not an anarchic 
epistemology where 'anything goes'. 
	 Indeed, Bartley speaks very 
highly of the reasoned approach of Karl Barth whom he regards as a 
leading example of one who retreats to ultimate commitment. 
	 He 
describes him as "far from being dogmatic in the ordinary sense of 
that word, ... remarkably flexible, a most rational irrationalist".37  
Plantinga probably ranks as one of the foremost philosophers of 
religion of our day and could probably be spoken of in similar terms. 
Secondly, contrary to the impression Bartley sometimes gives38 and the 
charges of 'epistemological behaviourism' that have been brought 
against Plantinga's position,39 the use of the 'tu quoque' argument by 
somebody does not necessarily mean that he is committed to a 
relativistic stance. 
	 The kind of Reformed epistemology which 
Plantinga and others advocate is an example of theological realism. 
Their claim is that it is true in a straightforward sense that God 
exists notwithstanding their acknowledgement that this is not 
something that they can demonstrate to the non-believer. It is not a 
case of saying that it is 'true for me' and something else may be 
'true for you'. The point of the use of the 'tu quoque' argument can 
simply be to show that rational demonstration has limits which apply 
to the positions of all parties in the dispute. 
	 So if the Reformed 
epistemologist is irrational, it is not because he is guilty of the 
standard kind of self-refuting claim of which the relativist is 
commonly accused. 
Thirdly, although he may believe that he cannot argue the non-believer 
into faith by means of appeal to reasons and evidence, the Reformed 
epistemologist may nevertheless engage in reasoning with the non- 
believer. 	 He may attempt to demonstrate the coherence of his 
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position and this could include an explanation of the apparent non-
universality of his beliefs and even of the limitations a limited 
rationality and the nature of faith may impose upon his ability to 
argue somebody into believing. 
	 Since coherence is not sufficient for 
truth, leaving as it does the problem of how to choice between two 
mutually exclusive but equally coherent stances, this is more a matter 
of removing obstacles to faith rather than providing arguments for it. 
The Reformed epistemologist may also engage in reasoning through 
attempts to show internal problems in alternative stances. Bartley 
says that anybody who uses the 'tu quoque' argument may not criticise 
the commitments of others40 but use of the 'tu quoque' is not 
inconsistent with criticism of the positions of others. 
	 If both as 
part of their commitment agree on the value of rationality and 
internal consistency, then one may legitimately point out to the other 
respects in which he believes that the other's position lacks internal 
coherence. To do so would not be irrational and if these lacks could 
be shown to be irremediable unless basic assumptions are amended or 
abandoned then this fact would constitute an argument against that 
particular stance. 
So, although he may not be able to provide arguments for faith, the 
believer may respond rationally to arguments against faith and provide 
arguments against unbelief - at least in particular forms. He does 
not therefore have to resort to force - brainwashing or whatever - as 
an alternative to argument. Nor could he do so consistently with the 
Christian values of respect for persods, truth and rationality. The 
use of such methods could lead at most to inauthentic outward 
conformity to a way of life but this is not at all the same as a 
response in faith to a self-authenticating divine revelation. 
	 It 
would therefore not be consistent with the content of Christian faith 
to resort to such methods - although it must be granted that church 
history contains rather too many examples of such inconsistency (and 
that some of the techniques used in modern evangelism may also display 
it). Again, this is another respect in which the approach of the 
Reformed epistemologist need not be subject to the charge of 
irrationalism. 
Fourthly, the Reformed epistemologist can point out that he is not 
taking belief in God to be groundless. 
	 He holds that his position is 
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indeed justified since it is immediately justified. 
	
To insist that 
justification is necessarily a matter of appealing to reasons or 
evidence is to deny the possibility of a self-authenticating divine 
revelation. 	 To do so requires the support of argument to show that 
such revelation is impossible. 	 The Reformed epistemologist holds 
that he is being rational as far as it is possible to be rational but 
because his commitment is not a matter of considering reasons or 
evidence it is not, ipso facto, nonjustificationist and, in this 
sense, not irrational. He has not retreated beyond justification but 
rather he has gone to the logical limits of the justification of this 
particular kind of belief. 
	 To be entitled to label this irrational, 
Bartley would have to show the unacceptability of an appeal to, say, 
immediate awareness of God mediated through the words of the Bible. 
It may be unacceptable as the starting-point for a rational 
demonstration to another person but this does not make it unacceptable 
as the grounding of the person's own belief. 
Admittedly, immediate justification is not to the level of an 
absolute guarantee - and Bartley does seem to be assuming that 
justification must be absolute.41 	 But lack of absolute guarantee 
does not require the abandonment of all talk of epistemic 
justification and its total replacement by talk of criticism. Why 
should justification have to provide an absolute guarantee before it 
can be regarded as real epistemic justification? 
	 The Reformed 
epistemologist attempts to give an account of justification which does 
not have such stringent requirements and which overcomes some of the 
difficulties that have been found to undermine classical 
foundationalism. To the extent that he is successful in this he is 
not irrational nor is his basic stance irrationalist. 
Fifthly, we come to the objection mentioned at the beginning of this 
section that making use of a 'tu quoque' or Parity Argument provides 
an excuse for unbelief. 
	 The objection could be along the lines that 
if there is nothing to choose, from the point of view of rationality, 
between the alternatives of faith in God or unbelief, the unbeliever 
cannot be held to be. responsible for his choice of unbelief and so 
unbelief cannot be held to be sinful. 
	 To this there are, I think, 
some responses available to the Reformed epistemologist. 
	 Following 
on from the points just made about immediate justification, he can 
claim that faith in God may be both rational - in a sense - and supra- 
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rational. 	 The parity exists in the inability of either believer or 
non-believer to argue the other around to his position and not in ad 
equal resort to unjustified beliefs or, in that sense, a retreat to 
commitment. 	 From the inside of the Reformed position, it is not a 
matter of choice between equally unjustified beliefs - there is every-
thing to choose between them but argument into faith may not be an 
available option. 
The Reformed epistemologist may argue further that there is room for 
the possibility of religious rebellion in his account. This is the 
possibility of willing not to believe - where belief is understood in 
the sense of trusting obedience - 	 even 	 when 	 the 	 revelation 
authenticates itself to one. (Indeed, as we saw earlier,42 Kuyper 
and Van Til, at least, portray the whole human race as being in a 
state of religious rebellion in the face of divine revelation in 
nature.) And if the ideal of rational autonomy is indeed exclusive 
of faith as trusting obedience, then this willing not to believe could 
find cognitive expression in the assumption of such autonomy. 
However, there may be a price to pay for this turning aside of the 
objection in question. It seems to ascribe a centrality to the will 
so that if it is possible to will not to believe, it would seem 
possible also to will to believe or even to will to suspend judgement 
altogether. 	 This lands us back with the ultimate commitment of a 
choice which begins to look suspiciously criterionless, a veritable 
leap of faith. But it may not be inevitable that we end up with this 
kind of commitment. 
For a start, it does not follow that here the will to believe and the 
will not to believe differ only in content. It is possible to make a 
distinction between what might be termed 'responsive freedom' and 
'wilful freedom'.43 Responsive freedom is the kind of freedom we 
exercise in our response to overwhelming reasons or evidence for the 
truth of a claim when we freely accept that it is true. In a sense, 
it is a coerced freedom but, as is often pointed out,44 intellectual 
coercion is not inconsistent with the voluntariness of belief. On 
the other hand, wilful freedom is what we must exercise when we have 
to 'make up our minds' upon inconclusive grounds or when we believe 
'against the evidence'. 
	 This latter is at least possible in that we 
have indirect control over our believing because we can choose to 
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engage in activities that influence the conditions under which beliefs 
are formed and maintained.45 It is also possible to act in ways that 
are inconsistent with our beliefs and this could be another form of 
wilful freedom. 
The exercise of wilful freedom against divine revelation could 
therefore be seen as religious rebellion but it does not follow that 
responding to the revelation in trusting obedience is also wilful in 
this way. 	 On the contrary, it would seem more appropriate to the 
kind of account of revelation that I have given that the revealer be 
taken to be the active one and the person to whom the revelation comes 
to be seen as more passively responsive. 
	 Belief in God is therefore 
not necessarily a case of a leap beyond reasons or evidence as it is 
sometimes portrayed and unbelief as wilful rejection of revelation can 
be sinful after all. 
Sixthly, there is the question of whether a commitment of faith must 
be absolute. The assumption that it must seems to be one of 
Bartley's main targets in his advocacy of a position that holds all 
beliefs open to rational criticism. He seems to link the guarantees 
that he thinks are necessary for knowing - if knowing were possible - 
with the absoluteness of ultimate commitment. This leads him to 
distinguish 'conviction' from commitment as when he writes:- 
"We can assume or be convinced of the truth of something without 
being committed to its truth. 
	 As conceived here, a rationalist 
can, while eschewing intellectual commitments, retain both the 
courage of his convictions and the courage to go on attacking 
his commitments - the courage to think and go on thinking. The 
word 'courage' is appropriate here. 
	 The submission of one's 
peripheral and unimportant beliefs to criticism requires no 
courage, but the willingness to subject to the risks of 
criticism the beliefs and attitudes one values most does require 
From this and in the light of his rejection of justification, it would 
seem that 'conviction' should be taken as strong or firmly held belief 
but it cannot be knowledge nor can it be justified belief. It would 
also seem to follow that it must be a matter of believing that 
something is true rather than that we may justifiably believe it to be 
true. 	 What then is •it to be 'committed' to the truth of something? 
Bartley does not provide us with a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for commitment but from what he does say, it would seem 
that he takes it to be a matter of an irrational or dogmatic 
assumption in holding that some, but not all, beliefs are immune to 
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the demand for rational justification. 	 Commitment is therefore a 
matter of believing in a certain way, a way that does not hold the 
belief open • to criticism and even shields it from criticism. 
Conviction may be firm but its firmness is qualified by an openness to 
criticism. 
However, if commitment is seen as closely allied to - if not identical 
with - trust, then a different picture of the situation may emerge. 
It is not simply a matter of being committed to the truth of something 
but also of acting in certain ways or, at least, of being disposed to 
act in those ways. 
	 Trust will rest upon beliefs concerning the 
rightness of the action or the trust-worthiness of a person but it is 
more than the totality of those beliefs. In other words, faith is 
not merely assent to certain propositions but it does involve assent 
to them. 
The problem that Bartley's challenge poses for the believer is whether 
the core beliefs of a commitment have to be certain if the commitment 
is to be absolute or unconditional. 
	 Basil Mitchell meets this 
problem as he seeks to reconcile the probably true beliefs that rest 
on his cumulative case for Christianity with the unconditional faith 
which is characteristically held by the Christian to be the ideal, 
although maybe not the actual attainment of many. His response is to 
distinguish between the believer's trust in God and his system of 
belief. He suggests that the former is unconditional but it does not 
follow that the latter - "the entire system of belief, including the 
belief that there is a God' and that he is trustworthy" - could not 
turn out to be false in the end.47 	 However, this solution seems to 
take the system of beliefs to be all of a piece and fails to 
distinguish between its core beliefs and those which are more 
peripheral. 	 One may accept the possibility of a fairly radical 
revision of one's system of beliefs but can one trust unconditionally 
in a God whose existence is taken to be probable rather than certain? 
Some may talk of 'fluid axioms'48 but the Reformed epistemologist may 
well ask whether all one's axioms can be as fluid as this? 
The Reformed epistemologist could, instead, point again to the nature 
of immediate justification. 
	 To hold that a belief is immediately 
justified is to hold that it is immune from the demand for rational 
justification. 
	 It is not necessary to produce any reasons or 
-115- 
evidence in its support. But it does not follow that it is immune to 
rational criticism. 	 After all, it is a case of prima facie 
justification. 	 This means both that the belief is justified and that 
it is open to criticism. 	 Immediate justification does not make a 
belief certain in the sense that it is infallible, logically 
indubitable, irrefutable or incorrigible. If it is grounded in some 
form of immediate awareness, then it is psychologically direct and so 
gives psychological certainty. If so, it would seem plausible to 
suggest that a combination of this psychological certainty with the 
immunity that the belief does possess - that from demands for rational 
justification - is sufficient for absolute commitment. 	 That he 
allows the logical possibility that he is mistaken in his belief does 
not mean that the believer has (justified or unjustified) doubts or 
that he cannot have unconditional faith. 	 Reformed epistemology can 
therefore be seen to differ greatly from Bartley's pancritical 
rationalism. 	 It provides for the possibility of a justified belief 
being held open to criticism whereas for Bartley no belief is ever 
justified. 	 For Bartley, commitment is not required but for the 
Reformed epistemologist, although it is required, it is not a problem. 
Insofar as these responses to the charge of irrationalism are 
adequate, Reformed epistemology cannot be easily dismissed on these 
grounds. He does not necessarily assert anything which is contrary  
to reason and may indeed be thoroughly rational in many ways and to 
the limits of rationality. 	 But, as we have seen, Bartley claims that 
there are no limits to rationality. 	 So the second way in which a 
Reformed epistemologist can meet the challenge of Bartley's arguments 
is to turn to criticise it on its own terms. 
4.4 SOME PROBLEMS IN PANCRITICAL RATIONALISM 
Most of the discussion that has arisen in relation to Bartley's 
proposals has been centred on problems concerning their self-reference 
and on whether these are such as to render them unacceptable.49 	 But 
there are other criticisms the Reformed epistemologist can make of 
Bartley's account and• I shall seek to outline these before taking up 
the matter of self-reference. 
4.4.1 ARGUN:ENT WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION?  
I think the Reformed epistemologist can point to the difficulty of 
getting clear on precisely what Bartley sees himself to be doing in 
setting forth his proposals for a pancritical rationalism. 
	 It would 
seem that he ought to deny both that he is arguing for anything and 
that he could be successful. 	 To be consistent with his own 
proposals, he has to avoid the use of justificationist terms like 
verify, confirm, validate, defend, show to be acceptable and many 
more, for, as he says, "Nothing gets justified; everything gets 
criticised".50 
However, reading through his book, it is at times difficult to avoid 
the impression that he is proclaiming a gospel hidden for ages but now 
revealed. 	 Indeed, he talks of the "almost revelatory character" of 
an observation by Popper in his 1960 address before the British 
Academy, an observation that "throws a very different light on the 
history and problems of philosophy" - the observation that the 
questions asked in all the philosophies of the past "beg authoritarian 
answers” .51 
	 Perhaps to suggest that Bartley presents himself as the 
evangelist of a new gospel is rather ad hominem but it is certainly 
difficult to work out exactly what he sees himself to be doing. 
	 He 
says that he wants to "argue" that rationality is unlimited52 and to 
attempt to "succeed" in resolving the dilemma of ultimate 
commitment.53 	 This he sees as the fundamental problem of modern 
philosophy and he defines it as the problem of how to defeat the to 
quoque argument by "showing" that it is possible to choose in a 
nonarbitrary way among competing ways of life.54 	 This is the 
language of success and it is present elsewhere too as, for example, 
when he says of his book (in the introduction to the second edition):-
"It delineates how it differs from earlier answers to the 
problems of criticism and of rationality, and it explains why 
such attempts failed, and how it succeeds where they failed."55  
Again, he says that if his argument is correct, he succeeds in 
refuting the to quoque argument and in solving the problem of 
rationality in which it is rooted.56 	 Indeed, he thinks that his 
theory of rationality "satisfactorily" solves the problem.57 	 All of 
this sounds like the language of a justificationist and the Reformed 
epistemologist may well point out that this is only to be expected 
since it is difficult to see how one can argue without justifying what 
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one says. 	 Even though Bartley says it is inappropriate to ask or 
answer questions like 'How do you know?', what he is doing sounds very 
like giving answers to that kind of question. Could it be 
otherwise? 
Admittedly, in his abandonment of what he terms "the old aim of estab-
lishing our views", he does maintain that it is impossible to 
"decisively refute" theories.58 	 So perhaps a solution or a 
refutation can be 'satisfactory' without being 'decisive' but then 
this does not sound all that different from what one would expect from 
somebody who fuses justification and criticism in the critical 
rationalist approach that Bartley rejects.59  
Perhaps Bartley is simply being inconsistent and by changing the tone 
of some of his remarks he could end up with something more true to the 
spirit of his openness to criticism. 	 In other words, he has not 
carried out completely what he terms his "diacritical analysis" of 
language - his attempt "to eliminate from it (ordinary language) an 
ordinary assumption about rationality which prevented the solution of 
the problem that accounts of rationality were intended to solve" 60 
This may be possible but the Reformed epistemologist may well still 
find it difficult to see how a process of argument can exist without 
attempts to justify statements. 
4.4.2 COMMITMENT AND METACOBTEXTS  
A second line of argument that the Reformed epistemologist could take 
is to attempt to show that Bartley is himself committed 
notwithstanding his rejection of commitment in favour of having 
convictions. Indeed, Bartley does allow at least one "absolute 
presupposition" and this is the presupposition of logic "to which we 
are committed not as human beings, because of our biology, psychology 
or sociology, but as arguers about the world". Bartley says that 
logic can be held open to revision and criticism and he continues:- 
"To be sure, to abandon logic is to abandon rationality as 
surely as to abandon Christ is to abandon Christianity. 
	 The 
two positions differ, however, in that the rationalist can, from 
his own rationalist point of view, consider and be moved by 
criticisms of logic and of rationalism, whereas the Christian 
cannot, from his own Christian point of view, cpnsider and be 
moved by criticisms of his Christian commitment."'" 
But the Reformed epistemologist can well respond to this that the 
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Christian may well be moved by criticism to revise the content of his 
Christian beliefs. After all, this is part of the dialogical 
situation of a personal relationship that he may hold to be central to 
an adequate notion of revelation.62 He may also argue, as W.D. 
Hudson and others have done, that it is inconceivable that a person be 
argued out of the very practice of argument.63 	 The main examples 
that Bartley gives of being argued out of the practice of using logic 
are of being argued into relativism, fideism, scepticism or 
determinism but to be argued into what he terms an irrationalist 
position is hardly the same as being argued altogether out of the 
practice of argument. 
The Reformed epistemologist may also claim that there is another 
commitment underlying Bartley's writings, a commitment that has to do 
with truth rather than logic. It would seem that Bartley is 
committed to the pursuit of truth and even, judging by the volume and 
depth of his writings, passionately committed to it. He talks 
enthusiastically of the "goals of eliminating error and enhancing the 
advance of knowledge" as he elucidates the broad outlines of his 
evolutionary epistemology.64 	 It is not that truth can ever be 
finally attained but that one may get closer to it. 
	 Bartley's 
approach can therefore, I think, be properly regarded as an example of 
what Agassi terms a 'bootstrap theory of rationality', i.e., one which 
embraces a historical relativism of rationality but rejects a 
historical relativism of truth.65 
Bartley may object that this is not a matter of commitment to certain 
beliefs but rather to aims or goals but the Reformed epistemologist 
can plausibly urge in reply that commitment has a cognitive core and 
that the cognitive core here is the belief that one should seek to get 
nearer to truth. This core does not include the belief that openness 
to criticism is the best way of doing this because, according to 
Bartley, this position is itself held open to criticism. 
This suggestion of overarching goals and beliefs brings in Bartley's 
notion of 'metacontexts'. In his first appendix to the second 
edition of his book, Bartley introduces a new line of thought which, 
he says, takes the argument of the book to "a new dimension". He 
goes on to make a distinction between positions, contexts and 
metacontexts. 
	 Positions can be expressed in statements describing 
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the environment or recommending ways of behaving in it. 
	 Positions 
are embedded in the contexts of belief-systems, ideologies and 
traditions which are not just the sums of positions held but are also 
their frameworks. 
	 A person's real allegiance is to a context rather 
than a position. 	 Metacontexts are the contexts of contexts and 
Bartley says there are only three of them: justification philosophy, 
oriental nonattachment and pancritical rationalism. 
	 He also says 
that people hold conflicting positions in conflicting contexts and in 
terms of conflicting metacontexts but that criticism is possible and, 
presumably, desirable at all three levels." 
Bartley distinguishes the pancritical rationalist metacontext from 
that of justificationism but the Reformed epistemologist can argue 
that the differences are not as great as all that and that both fuse 
justification and criticism. Both are committed to the pursuit of 
truth through rational means and, if so, it would seem plausible to 
suggest that both have an underlying faith in the power of human 
reason to get closer to truth (if not to see it). Perhaps this opens 
up the possibility of going to the level of meta-metacontexts where 
the meta-contexts of both justificationism and pancritical rationalism 
have a common context of, say, truth-orientation through reason. But 
then the Reformed epistemologist could just as easily propose the 
alternative of, say, an intuitionist divine-revelation-based meta- 
metacontext. To this the pancritical rationalist might object that 
this classification merely reflects the Reformed epistemologist's own 
context to which the short response is 'Tu quoque?'! 
If the pancritical rationalist must exhibit these kinds of commitment 
then it would seem that he has not solved the dilemma of ultimate 
commitment nor has he come up with an adequate response to the to 
quoque argument. Nor has he shown that rationality does not have 
logical limits. 
4.4.3 THE ANTHROPOCENTRICISM OF BARTLEY'S ACCOUNT 
The Reformed epistemologist has yet another line of objection to 
Bartley's pancritical rationalism and to accounts of autonomy as an 
aim in life or an aim in education that are founded in it. 
	 From the 
perspective of the believer for whom belief in God is properly basic 
and divine revelation is self-authenticating, the major limitation in 
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Bartley's account is that it tacitly assumes that knowledge is a 
purely human product, i.e., that Popper was right when, towards the 
end of the lecture referred to earlier, he said:- 
"What we should do, I suggest, is to give up the idea of 
ultimate sources of knowledge, and admit that all knowledge is 
human; that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our 
dreams, and our hopes; that all we cAn do is to grope for truth 
even though it be beyond our reach."u" 
Popper explicitly includes supernatural sources of knowledge among 
those he rejects and at the same time he also dismisses the view that 
error may be due to human corruption. 
Most of his lecture consists of description and recommendation and I 
can find only three reasons that he gives for this rejection, all of 
them rather briefly stated. 	 First, against the "doctrine" that truth 
is manifest he argues that history shows us the "the simple truth is 
that truth is often hard to come by, and that once found it may easily 
be lost again".68 But the Reformed epistemologist need not be at all 
moved by this observation since it is entirely provided for on the 
kind of account he is proposing with its emphasis on the noetic 
effects of sin. Secondly, as a counter to the theory of the ultimate 
sources of our knowledge, Popper appeals to the genetic fallacy and 
the need to distinguish questions of origin from questions of 
validity." 	 But the Reformed epistemologist may well respond that 
this assumes that the giving of reasons is necessary for all epistemic 
justification and that it is impossible that men believe with 
justification - albeit not on the basis of reasons or evidence - that 
God is speaking to them. 
	 Popper finally appeals to consequences in 
his suggestion that the conclusion that there are super-human sources 
of knowledge "tends to encourage self-righteousness and the use of 
force against those who refuse to see the divine truth".70 The 
Reformed epistemologist may allow that this can happen but deny that 
it necessarily does so. 
	 It would seem that Popper's arguments are 
not unanswerable. 
	 But perhaps, anyway, he does not intend to justify  
his rejection of super-human sources and he means what he says when he 
includes this statement: "I propose to assume, instead, that no such 
ideal sources exist".71 	 If it is assumed rather than argued for that 
supernatural sources of knowledge are impossible, then it is simply 
the case that the Reformed epistemologist makes no such assumption and 
has been presented with no reason why he should make it. 
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Bartley, I think, assumes that Popper has shown that divine revelation 
is an epistemological non-starter - if, again, it is possible from 
their standpoint to show that anything is the case! 	 In an appendix 
on Fries's dilemma, he does very briefly mention the possibility of 
justifying a proposition "non-propositionally" but only to dismiss it 
immediately and summarily as either "psychologism" or a matter of 
appeal to a decision.72 	 Apart from this, he seems to assume that, 
for the justificationist, 	 the only alternative to the infinite 
regress of justification is "arbitrary dogmatic commitment". 
This assumption means that the Reformed epistemologist can validly 
claim that there is an implicit anthropocentricism in Bartley's 
account. 	 He may have much to say that is relevant to philosophy of 
religion but religion is viewed as a purely human phenomenon. 
Bartley's denial of the possibility of an authoritative source of 
knowledge rules out from the start the theocentric alternative of 
self-authenticating divine revelation to which the appropriate 
response is trust, obedience and commitment. 
4.4.4 SELF-REFERENTIAL INCOHERENCE IN BARTLEY'S ACCOUNT  
The issue of self-reference and paradox has received a fair amount of 
attention in the discussions there have been of pancritical 
rationalism.73 The Reformed epistemologist may well feel he has 
sufficient reason to reject Bartley's position - especially on the 
issue of anthropocentricism - without going into this. And he may 
not gain much by going into it because the presence of paradox in an 
account does not mean that it is incoherent.74 	 Bartley allows that 
paradox is virtually inevitable in an account like his but he goes on 
to point out that the mere possibility of a solution to these 
paradoxes is sufficient to show that his position can itself be held 
open to criticism. In order to show that Bartley's position is 
uncriticisable, his critics would have to demonstrate that all 
attempts to solve such paradoxes have failed and that they could not 
succeed.75 	 This would seem a major task for the Reformed 
epistemologist even to embark upon and considerations of space in the 
present study make it impossible for me to do so even assuming that 
there could be a lot to be gained thereby, which I doubt. 
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There is a separate issue which has arisen in the literature in the 
course of the discussion on paradox and this has to do with whether 
criticisability and survival of criticism are necessary or sufficient 
conditions of rationality. In the appendix to the second edition of 
his book, Bartley states that "nonjustificational criticizability" is 
a sufficient condition for rationality.76 	 This would seem to expose 
his position to a criticism that he may not be able, with consistency, 
to refute and this is related to a comment made by Agassi, Jarvie and 
Settle early on in the debate about paradox:- 
"Bartley does not specify sufficient conditions for holding 
beliefs rationally - sufficient conditions would be specific-
ations for justification and thus for victory - Bartley rather 
specifies as far as he can some necessary conditions - which (in 
the event of their being unfulfilled) are specifications for 
defeat".77 
So if Bartley does provide sufficient conditions as he now says he 
does, then upon fulfilment of such conditions he can with justif- 
ication say that he is being rational. This again casts doubt upon 
the possibility of completely unfusing justification and criticism. 
4.5 SUMMARY AND SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In this chapter, I have focussed upon the suggestion that the 
assumption of rational autonomy, in some of its forms, is a noetic 
effect of sin. It is suggested that it manifests an unwarranted 
imperialism of reason and is opposed to the notion of a self- 
authenticating authoritative divine revelation. A revelation cannot 
be accepted as coming with divine authority in the absence of adequate 
reasons and evidence or so, it seems, the proponent of some forms of 
the autonomy ideal maintain. But the Reformed epistemologist holds 
that he need not adduce or possess any reasons or evidence for his 
belief. 
I have looked at this fundamental disagreement with reference to the 
Popperian framework of different kinds of rationalism. 
	 Traditional 
rationalism with its insistence upon the rational justification of all 
beliefs apparently cannot meet its own standards and, failing to 
recognise that its rationality is necessarily limited, rests on what 
is by its own standards an irrational faith in the powers of unaided 
human reason to decide upon truth and falsity. Critical rationalism 
recognises that justification must come to an end and, contenting 
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itself with the description of its framework beliefs, presuppositions 
and the like, acknowledges its basic reliance upon the competence of 
human reason to get closer to truth if not to reach it. 
	 On both of 
these positions human reason is therefore held to be autonomous and 
claims to divine revelation must be judged at its bar. 
	 Faith as a 
trusting submission to an authoritative self-authenticating revelation 
from God is held to be unacceptable because it fails to satisfy the 
demand for rational justification. 
The remaining account of rationality considered has been that of pan-
critical rationalism. 
	 It makes an attempt to completely replace 
justification by criticism in a position that insists that all 
positions including that of pancritical rationalism itself can be held 
open to rational criticism. 
	 This is held to solve the problem of a 
retreat to commitment discerned by Bartley in both its predecessors as 
accounts of rationality and, if it does so, this kind of rationality 
is unlimited, rational autonomy can be reinstated as an ideal without 
theoretical limits and commitments of all kinds are rightly regarded 
as irrational. 	 But I have suggested that there is reason to believe 
that Bartley, as the leading proponent of this version of rationalism, 
does not succeed in completely unfusing justification and criticism or 
in altogether avoiding commitment to reason as a means of getting 
closer to truth. 	 It would seem that such a reliance upon unaided 
human reason means that the position is anthropocentric and that it 
therefore assumes from the outset the impossibility of the kind of 
self-revealing activity of God referred to above. 
Against this ideal of unlimited rational autonomy the Reformed 
epistemologist posits the alternative of trusting response to the 
self-revealing activity of God. A convenient label for this notion 
is the term theonomy.78 The nomos is that of another rather than one 
that originates in the self but the other is unique in being God 
rather than man. Man being finite and sinful cannot ultimately rely 
on his own powers nor can he find in other finite and sinful beings 
appropriate objects for complete trust or obedience. So, from the 
standpoint of faith in God, neither autonomy nor heteronomy is 
acceptable. 
	 But if there is an infinite Creator who is altogether 
good, he is uniquely worthy of such reliance and obedience and, 
indeed, of worship.79 To this it may be objected that even if it be 
allowed that God is necessarily infinite and good, man cannot evade 
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his responsibility to decide for himself that this God is speaking to 
him and, a fortiori, that he exists.80 	 But this objection assumes 
the impossibility of a self-authenticating divine revelation. 
	 On the 
basis of an account in terms of responsive freedom, it is not a matter 
of deciding in the sense of weighing up reasons and evidences and then 
coming to a decision. A person may be convinced that God is speaking 
to him and may be immediately justified in this belief. 
	 Of course, 
it is another matter to work out what God is saying to him and how it 
applies to the circumstances of his life. 
	 That a revelation is self- 
authenticating does not mean that there are no hermeneutical problems. 
And it is here that the exercise of reason may be of central signif-
icance as a person wrestles with complex problems of biblical inter-
pretation and with real moral dilemmas - to say nothing of such noetic 
effects of sin as self-deception - in the application of biblical 
principles to life. 
The whole issue seems to depend on the starting-point of the discuss- 
ion. 	 From the perspective of the assumption of unlimited rational 
autonomy, faith in the sense that I have taken it is not an option. 
From the perspective that allows the possibility of God speaking to 
man in a way that does not require rational reflection for justified 
belief, the assumption of autonomy is unacceptable and, since it is 
exclusive of faith, it is a manifestation of human sinfulness. 
	 These 
starting-points are mutually exclusive. 
	 They may also be ultimately 
exhaustive but I cannot attempt to show here that this is so. 
	 The 
choice between them is not a matter of arbitrary commitment because 
the believer may find himself confronted with a self-authenticating 
revelation to which he freely responds or else he wilfully rejects. 
It is no more arbitrary or dogmatic than belief in tables and chairs. 
However, it is likely to appear dogmatic to the non-believer who does 
not find himself with such beliefs. The believer can attempt to show 
the coherence of his own perspective on the basis of - for this 
purpose - a hypothetical assumption of his starting-point. 
	 He may 
also attempt to show incoherence in the autonomy-based perspective. 
For some this may be necessary for faith but it cannot be sufficient 
for it. 
5 
WORLDVIEWS AND THEORY CONSTRUCTION 
Moving into the three chapters of Part Two of this thesis, we step 
back from the three themes of Reformed epistemology and the focus of 
the study moves to the significance ofall this for the theory of 
education. 	 Immediately, the subject of the relationship between a 
Reformed Christian (or any other) worldview and the construction of 
theories in education (or in any other area of knowledge or life) 
comes to the fore. 
In fact, the relationship between Christian commitment and theory 
construction is of threefold relevance to this thesis. First, it has 
to do with the whole enterprise of describing a particular approach to 
knowledge as 'Reformed epistemology'. 	 A common objection to doing 
this is to the effect that epistemology is epistemology and it does 
not make sense to talk of it as Reformed or Christian or Humanist or 
Marxist or whatever. 	 Secondly, this thesis is concerned with the 
educational implications of Reformed epistemology and therefore, 
presumably, with some notion of Reformed Christian education. 
	 But, 
again, for many, not only is it the case that epistemology is 
epistemology but also that education is education and there is no such 
thing as a distinctively Christian view of education. So to talk of 
the educational significance or implications of Reformed epistemology 
also brings to the fore the question of the relationship between 
Christian commitment and theory construction. 
	 And a third way in 
which it is relevant is in that education theory is not only itself 
theoretical but also a theory of theories in the sense that it has to 
provide for the teaching of the theories of the different disciplines 
in the curriculum. So it would seem that to talk of Christian 
education or of Reformed education could involve a distinctive view of 
the content of education in the various disciplines. 
	 And here again, 
for many, talk of Christian or Reformed Christian mathematics, 
physics, geography, economics, art or the like is just as mistaken as 
talk of Reformed epistemology or of Christian education. 
In view of this, it is important to get clear on what exactly is being 
proposed about the nature of this relationship between Christian 
commitment and theory construction so that we can ascertain whether it 
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is meaningful to talk of Reformed epistemology or of the educational 
significance of Reformed epistemology. 
	
It is one thing to put 
forward an approach to epistemology or education on a school subject 
and give it a label like Christian or Reformed but it is another to 
show that the particular view is logically linked with the particular 
Christian or Reformed Christian commitment of the person putting 
forward such an approach rather than simply being a view which 
happens to be held by some Christians. 
I shall attempt to outline the main details of a spectrum of views on 
this subject along with what I take to be their strengths and 
weaknesses. 	 I shall then take the one I find the most adequate and 
outline how it can make sense of the ideas of Christian education and 
Reformed epistemology. 	 And to get into this project I shall start 
with a particularly forcefully put example of an argument which 
attacks the notion of 'Christian education' as being a kind of 
nonsense. This is the argument Paul Hirst presents in his paper 
'Christian Education: A Contradiction in Terms?'.1  
5.1 COMPLEMENTARITY 
Hirst claims that the idea that there is a distinctively Christian 
form of education is just as much a mistake as the idea that there is 
a distinctively Christian form of mathematics, of engineering or of 
farming. He maintains that in all these pursuits it is now thought 
possible to attain knowledge on "autonomous, independent, rational 
grounds" rather than by appeal to Christian scriptures or Christian 
tradition.2 The principles that govern matters in all these areas 
are "neither Christian nor non-Christian, neither for Christianity nor 
against Christianity".3  
Hirst describes what he terms a "primitive concept of education" 
whereby "whatever is held by the group to be true and valuable, simply 
because it is held to be true and valuable, is what is passed on so 
that it comes to be held as true and valuable by others in their 
turn".4 	 He contrasts this with a "second, sophisticated view of 
education" which is concerned with passing on beliefs and practices 
"according to, and together with, their objective status".5 	 He 
continues:- 
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"On this second view the character of education is not settled 
by any appeal to Christian, Humanist or Buddhist beliefs. 
	 Such 
an appeal is illegitimate, for the basis is logically more 
fundamental, being found in the canons of objectivity and 
reason, canons against which Christian, Humanist and Buddhist 
beliefs must, in their turn and in the appropriate way, be 
assessed. 	 When the domain of religious beliefs is so 
manifestly one in which there are at present no clearly 
recognisable objective grounds for judging claims, to base 
education on any such claims would be to forsake the pursuit of 
objectivity, however firm our commitment might be to any one set 
of such beliefs. Indeed an education based on a concern for 
objectivity and reason, far from allying itself with any 
specific religious claims, must involve teaching the radically 
controversial character of all such claims. 	 An understanding 
of religious claims it can perfectly well aim at, but commitment 
to any one set, inzthe interests of objectivity it cannot either 
assume or pursue." 
 
0  
Hirst's argument is two-fold. He holds that the controversial nature 
of religious claims renders them unacceptable as a basis for a 
rational and objective theory of education. 	 An adequate basis for a 
theory of education would, it seems, have to be in a concern for 
objectivity and reason which is - or ought to be - fundamental to 
religious claims as well. 	 Not that the canons of reason are 
applicable to both education and religion in the same ways for Hirst 
goes on to say that his whole argument is based on "the autonomy 
thesis ... that there exist vast areas of knowledge and understanding 
using concepts and canons of thought, objective in character and in no 
way connected with religious beliefs".7 
So it is not simply that religious beliefs are less objective or more 
controversial but - and this seems to be the real thrust of Hirst's 
argument - that they belong to a logically distinct area of 
understanding with its own concepts and canons of reason even though 
these latter may not yet be clearly established. 
	 Education is, for 
Hirst, directed to the development of reason in all its forms and 
these include mathematics, science, history and the like and the 
autonomy of these forms is such that they are necessarily free of 
religious presuppositions. 
	 It is not that education is itself a form 
of knowledge or understanding but that education is education in the 
various forms of knoiledge. Education in religion can only be in 
religion insofar as religion is rational for, as Hirst says:- 
II ... in education in this sense, no commitment or belief or 
faith is sought beyond the grounds or reasons or objective basis 
for the claims concerned. Faith can thus be rational but it 
can also be a-rational, non-rational, irrational, anti-rational, 
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unreasonable. 	 Only the first of these has a part in 
'education'. 	 In so far as objective grounds for Christian 
beliefs, or any other religious beliefs, can be given, such 
beliefs have a place in 'education'. 	 It seems to me that at 
this moment we have to accept that such grounds do not exist. 
If that is so, Christian beliefs must at present be regarded as 
a matter of faith that is not objectively defensible, and 
commitment to it cannot therefore at present properly figure in 
education in the sense I am defending. That does not mean that 
Christian beliefs necessarily run counter to anything that is 
rationally defensible, for they may consistently complement what 
is rationally known. But that provides no objective ground for 
their truth a§ religious claims, for other systems of belief 
also do that."°  
Again, the two issues of the autonomous forms of knowledge and of the 
rationality and objectivity of religious beliefs are woven together 
and this is accomplished by Hirst's linking of his concept of 
education as the development of reason with the idea that reason takes 
several different autonomous forms. 	 I propose to separate these two 
ideas because neither logically requires the other. The issue of the 
rationality of religious belief is one that has been to the fore in 
Part One of this thesis and to which I shall return in the next 
chapter in considering the subject of indoctrination. 
	 That of the 
autonomy of forms of understanding in relation to religious belief is 
the issue that concerns us here. 
In the last extract quoted above, Hirst suggests that religious 
beliefs may complement beliefs in other areas of understanding. 
	 The 
complementarity of beliefs in different areas is an idea that has 
received considerable attention in recent decades and which can take 
various forms in the hands of different writers. And even where the 
idea of complementarity takes the same form, religious belief may be 
given different status by different writers. 
	 Some, like Hirst, seem 
uncertain whether religion can even be accorded a place among the 
forms since they take them to be forms of knowledge and they are 
reluctant to allow that religious propositions can be known to be 
true. 	 Others put religious beliefs on all fours with beliefs in 
other autonomous areas. 
	 And still others give religious beliefs - or 
certain religious beliefs - a more basic role without thereby 
infringing the relative autonomy of other areas in relation to one 
another. 
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One way to subdivide complementarist positions is according to whether 
they see different areas of understanding as dealing with different 
parts of reality or different aspects of reality. These two kinds of 
position could be termed 'regionalist' and 'perspectivalist'.9  
A classic example of regionalism is the mind-body dualism of 
Descartes. 	 He saw the person as being composed of two completely 
different substances - 'res extensa' and 'res cogitans'. 
	 The former 
belongs to the material realm where mechanistic explanations are 
appropriate and potentially complete whereas in the case of the latter 
such forms of explanation are totally inappropriate, the mind being 
spiritual rather than material. 	 Difficulties in accounting for the 
interaction of these two kinds of substance have made this form of 
dualism rather less popular in the present century than formerly 
although it does still have its contemporary advocates.10 Another form 
of dualism assumes a dichotomy between a supernatural realm of 
spiritual forces and miraculous acts of God and a natural realm of 
cause and effect which apply equally to mental events as to physical 
events. 
	 Some phenomena, on this account, cannot be naturally 
explained since they are caused supernaturally. 
	 Everything that 
happens is either an act of God or a natural occurrence and nothing 
that happens is both. 
	 This kind of dualism tends to restrict God to 
the gaps in human knowledge. 
	 There are also difficulties in 
accounting for the relationship between these two realms or regions of 
reality, e.g., in the case of a miracle, between supernatural causes 
and natural effects. 	 These problems with the definition of 
interrelationships do not in themselves show that dualism must be 
mistaken but they do produce a sense of unsatisfactoriness about this 
kind of account.11 
The perspectivalism of such as Donald MacKay12 sees forms of under-
standing as being concerned not with different parts of reality but 
with different aspects of it. Whereas the Cartesian dualist insists 
that physical science is competent only to study certain regions of 
reality, the perspectivalist allows it to deal with the whole of 
reality but only with certain aspects of that whole. The 
perspectivalist says that physical science tells us only one of 
several complementary 'stories'. 
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MacKay illustrates the notion of complementarity by an example of the 
use of lamps to signal from ships at sea where, in one sense, all that 
is coming from the ship is a series of flashes of light but the 
trained observer sees a message being sent ashore. 	 The message is 
related to the flashing of light, not as an effect is to a cause, but 
rather as one aspect of a complex unity is related to another 
aspect.13 Here the illustration is of a complementarity between the 
physical and the non-physical or, at least, the non-purely-physical. 
Another oft-quoted illustration of the idea of complementarity comes 
from within physics itself in the practice of taking the wave and 
particle models of the behaviour of light as being complementary 
rather than contradictory. 	 A similar thing can happen within 
mathematics where, for example, two definitions of probability which 
are not equivalent may nevertheless give the same results in 
situations where they both apply. 
This idea of complementary perspectives can be used in an attempt to 
resolve the mind-brain debate without appeal to dualism and without 
falling back on the reductionist alternative which MacKay terms the 
'the fallacy of nothing-buttery'.14 Different aspects of the same 
events can be described in complementary ways in personal terms (the 
'I-story') and in neurophysiological terms (the 'brain-story'). The 
former is human and indeterministic whereas the latter is mechanistic 
and deterministic but there is no contradiction. As one writer who 
adopts this kind of approach puts it:- 
"With respect to the question of freedom, it is important to 
distinguish between people and brains, because it is people - 
not brains - who are free. Conversely, it is brains - not 
people - which may be machines."15  
This resonates with the distinction made by many philosophers between 
reasons (for actions) and causes (of events). 
	 It also echoes 
something of the context of Gilbert Ryle's discussion of the idea of a 
'category mistake'.16 Such a mistake results from attempting to 
combine more than one of a set of complementary perspectives in a 
single description of some phenomenon or, in Wittgensteinian terms, 
using more than one 'language-game' at one time. For the kind of 
complementarist in question, to speak of people - rather than their 
brains - as machines is to make just such a mistake. 
	 In a similar 
way, it can be argued that it is a category error to talk of conflict 
between the assured results of psychological research into religious 
experience and religious or theological accounts of such experience.17  
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The complementarist picture is of different language domains with 
different contexts which bring with them different purposes in the use 
of language. 	 To oppose them is to commit a category error and it is, 
I think, such an error that Hirst sees in talk of Christian education. 
And D. Z. Phillips sees a category error in the whole idea of Reformed 
epistemology. 	 He suggests that it takes place in an apologetic 
context when, as he says, it should rather be that the philosopher is 
"the guardian of grammar" while the theologian is "the guardian of the 
Faith". 	 He takes this to be a conception of philosophy and 
epistemology which is neither for or against religion and to 
understand which is to see why attempting to establish a Reformed 
epistemology is "still to remain captive to an apologetic conception 
of epistemology".18 A similar kind of argument from different 
contexts and purposes is brought by opponents of what has come to be 
called 'creation-science' when it is claimed that the Bible tells us 
who made the universe and why he made it but not how or when he made 
it. 
Complementarism has much to commend it and not least, in relation to 
the nature of man, in its stress on the holism of the person in all 
his aspects. Against materialistic reductionism, it asserts that man 
is more than a mechanistic brain and, against dualism in at least some 
of its forms, man is not a mysterious conjunction of different 
substances, a soul temporarily housed in a body. 
	 All aspects of the 
person - spiritual, psychological, biological and the like - are given 
their places in the differing perspectives that can be taken of the 
single reality which is the human being. 
But, at the same time, this approach is not without its problems. 
Perhaps the chief of these is similar to that which is perceived as a 
major weakness of dualism: how to relate together the different 
aspects or perspectives. This is of particular importance in cases 
where it is not clear whether two accounts of the same phenomenon are 
complementary or contradictory. 
	 If they are complementary then 
contradictions are apparent rather than real. 
	 It may be quite clear, 
for example, that there is no real contradiction between the 
descriptions of ship-to-shore signalling as flashes of light and as 
messages. 
	 But it is by no means as clear that the deterministic 
brain story and the indeterministic mind story are not incompatible. 
To appeal to the notion of complementary perspectives in such a case 
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may be merely to assert that they are compatible. 
	 William Hasker 
says that some complementarists take the problem of apparent conflict, 
add the word 'complementarity' as "a verbal embellishment" and then 
present the problem over again as its own solution.19 To be fair to 
MacKay, he gives much space in his writings to attempts to show that 
the contradiction between mechanistic and teleological accounts is not 
real. 	 Nevertheless, some respondents feel that his position is still 
basically determinist and that he may be reinterpreting the mind story 
in order to bring it more into conformity with the mechanistic brain 
story.20 So it can at least be argued that it is not obvious that 
there is no conflict between the two accounts which are proposed as 
complementary. 	 And in such situations it seems that there may be a 
tendency for one perspective to become dominant at the expense of 
another. 
5.2 A HIERARCHY OF PERSPECTIVES?  
A possible view of the relationship between complementary perspectives 
is that they are held to be so completely autonomous in relation to 
one another that they are strictly incommensurable. 
	 It is not a 
matter of a statement being true simpliciter but of a statement being 
true in science or true in religion or true in some other form of 
human understanding. If a statement is true in religion then it is 
neither true nor false but meaningless in other forms of 
understanding. 'The Resurrection has occurred' is either true or 
false in religion but being a religious statement - a statement of 
theological truth or falsity - it cannot be regarded as either true or 
false in history. 
	 If it is true, it is a spiritual truth and not a 
historical truth. 	 On the other hand, 'the empty tomb has occurred' 
is not a religious statement but a statement which is either true or 
false in history and neither true nor false in religion. 
According to this way of thinking, there is strict incommensurability 
between religious statements and statements about the past. 
	 This 
seems to be part of what is entailed by saying that religious language 
is "logically odd". •I. T. Ramsey suggests that it belongs to its own 
domain and has its own logic so that it is possible to assert that the 
empty tomb occurred and deny that the Resurrection did and even to 
assert the latter and deny the former.21 This means that it is 
possible that the bones of Jesus of Nazareth could be mouldering away 
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in a middle eastern tomb and that it be nevertheless true that the 
Resurrection has taken place. 
But all this seems very strange. 
	 The statement 'The Resurrection has 
occurred' certainly seems to be a statement about the past. 	 Granted 
it means more than that certain historical events have taken place -
the tomb is empty, Jesus of Nazareth has returned to life from death, 
and the like - but it does not follow from this that we can go on to 
say that it means other than that they have taken place. The problem 
here is that both historical and theological statements seem to be 
about a single reality viewed from different perspectives rather than 
a dualism of realities.22 They may indeed be made from different 
perspectives and they are certainly not equivalent in meaning to one 
another but it scarcely follows from this that there is no 
relationship between the truth of one and that of the other. 	 The 
same could be said of neurophysiological accounts of the brain and 
teleological accounts of human action so that it may be that if a 
certain event has not taken place then a certain action has not been 
carried out either. 
Indeed, to separate differing perspectives in the way that strict 
incommensurability would seem to require is something that is not pre- 
supposed in much of our use of language. Statements in physics, for 
example, make frequent use of mathematical concepts and rules without 
being guilty of any kind of category mistake. 
The way in which one form of understanding makes use of ideas and 
rules from another suggests the possibility of a hierarchy of levels 
of description. What is written on this page could be described from 
a number of perspectives each with its own level in a hierarchy. It 
could be described in terms of marks transferred from carbon film to 
paper. 	 It could be viewed as letters of the English alphabet 
together with spaces and punctuation marks. 
	 At a higher level, it 
could be viewed as sentences using the words and rules of the English 
language and making grammatical sense as does, say, the sentence 
'colourless green ideas sleep furiously by my book for eating apples 
every other Christmas Eve'. A higher level would be that of making 
semantic sense and beyond that there is the level of making logical 
sense as an attempt at a philosophical argument. Other possible 
points of view include that of literary style, that of the psychology 
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of the writer and that of personal significance to the writer or, 
were it addressed to him in particular, the reader. It could also be 
viewed as an attempt to do something which is morally good or as an 
attempt to serve God. 	 And doubtless there are other possible 
perspectives as well. 	 For example, if it were hand-written, the 
graphologist might well view the shapes of the letters and other such 
features as expressions of the unique personality of the writer.23  
But if it is right to suggest that there are higher and lower levels 
in a hierarchy like this then it is of interest to look for some 
principles of ordering. 	 Lower level descriptions are presupposed by 
higher levels. 
	
Description of what is written on this page as 
letters of the alphabet, spaces and punctuation marks presupposes that 
there are marks of some kind on the paper - although not necessarily 
transferred from carbon film by the printer of a word-processor. It 
is the particular kind of marks that are made that makes it possible 
to describe them as letters and the like rather than blobs, drawings, 
doodles or something else. This means that the higher level 
description is more comprehensive. 
Comprehensiveness is one of two criteria proposed by Stephen Evans for 
what he terms 'metaphysical ultimacy'. 	 The other is uniqueness and 
he sets the two side by side with reference to the example of a 
written poem:- 
"That perspective in which the poem is seen as a poem, a 
literary creation, is most comprehensive. 	 It incorporates all 
the other perspectives by presupposing them and going beyond 
them. 	 The perspective in which the poem is experienced as a 
poem also scores highest on the uniqueness criterion. 	 There 
are molecules which do not form ink marks, there are ink marks 
which do not form letters, there are letters which do not form 
words, and there are words which do not form poems. Only when 
a poem is read or heard as a poem does its uniqueness - its 
character as a poem - stand out clearly."24  
Evans goes on to suggest that the personalistic perspective upon human 
beings is more comprehensive than, say, a materialistic account and 
that it shows the uniqueness of human beings. Here again he sets the 
two criteria side by side but it seems to me that there is really here 
but one basic criterion - that of comprehensiveness. 	 If an account 
or perspective is more comprehensive than its alternatives it follows 
that it does more justice to the uniqueness of that of which it is an 
account or upon which it is a perspective. 
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An example of a very detailed account of aspects related together in a 
hierarchy of perspectives is found in the modal theory of the 
Ruyperian philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd.25 	 He enumerated fifteen 
distinct modes or aspects of reality moving from the simple to the 
more complicated. 	 These modes are distinct and irreducible aspects 
of reality but as aspects of the same reality they exist in what 
Dooyeweerdian philosophers often term 'a coherence of irreducibles'.26  
A particular aspect is abstracted from this integrated whole by the 
process of scientific thought. 	 Each mode is characterised by its 
own laws, e.g., the laws of motion or the laws of organic growth, and 
by its central ideas or its indefinable 'modal kernels' or 'nuclear 
moments' which Dooyeweerd suggested are indefinable and directly known 
by intuition, e.g., the ideas of harmony in the aesthetic mode and of 
life in the biotic mode. 
With these modes are linked the 'modal sciences': mathematics 
(combining the numerical and the spatial), physics/chemistry (covering 
the kinematic and energetic), biology, psychology, logic, history, 
linguistics, sociology, economics, aesthetics, jurisprudence, ethics 
and theology. 	 Dooyeweerd distinguished these modal sciences from 
individuality sciences. 	 Whereas modal sciences are concerned with 
the study of particular modes, individuality sciences study specific 
kinds of phenomena. Astronomy is an individuality science related to 
the modal science of physics and applies the theories of physics to 
the particular phenomenon of the stars. 
Higher modes have in their foundations increasing numbers of lower 
modes so that, for example, the existence of an object in the physical 
mode, say, a stone, presupposes number, space and motion for it can 
move and it occupies space and consists of a number of particles in 
motion. 	 Its existence in the physical mode does not presuppose other 
higher modes, e.g., that of organic life. 
It seems to me that an account of the relationships between forms of 
knowledge in terms of a hierarchy of perspectives is more adequate 
than the alternatives of other kinds of complementarism and strict 
incommensurability. 	 However, this still does not show how it might 
be meaningful to talk of Reformed epistemology or Christian education. 
The higher modes may presuppose those at lower levels but since, under 
schemes like Evans' and Dooyeweerd's, that which is of central concern 
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to Christians - the theological mode - is at or near the top of the 
hierarchy it is by no means apparent how theological beliefs can 
affect those in lower modal spheres. 	 Reformed writers like 
Dooyeweerd, Van Til, Ruyper and some of the more recent American 
writers tend to speak of the influence of their Christian 
'presuppositions' or 'perspectives' upon theory formation in other 
areas of study and hence of a downward flow of influence if we adopt 
the kind of hierarchy being proposed here. But, so far, it is 
beliefs at the lower levels that are being 'presupposed' as we go 
higher up the ladder. 
	 In other words, the autonomy of, say, physics 
or political science in relation to religious belief seems to be 
preserved under such an approach - unless there are presuppositions of 
a different kind which influence matters downward rather than upwards. 
All this seems to call for study of what might be meant by the use of 
terms like 'presupposition'. 
5.3 PRESUPPOSITIONS  
Under 'presupposition', the Concise Oxford Dictionary gives "thing 
assumed beforehand as basis of argument etc.". For our purposes, the 
main kind of 'thing' that can be presupposed is a proposition. 
	 The 
dictionary definition suggests that the proposition need not be 
believed by the person who presupposes it but merely taken to be true 
for the purposes of an argument or discussion. A presupposition does 
not have to be true nor can it be shown to be true by the argument or 
discussion in which it is presupposed nor does it follow that if the 
conclusion of the argument is true, its presuppositions must also be 
true. But a set of presuppositions may be sufficient for the truth 
of the conclusion without being necessary for it. 
However, there is another sense of 'presupposition' which is sig-
nificant for the present discussion - that of a proposition which is a 
necessary condition not simply of the truth of a statement but of its 
truth or falsity. 
	 This is a sense identified by Peter Strawson (and 
mentioned earlier27) when he points out that statements made by 
sentences beginning with such phrases as 'All ...', 'All the ...', 
'Some ...', 'Some of the ...', 'At least one ...', 'At least one of 
the ...', 'No ...' or 'None of the ...' presuppose the existence of 
members of the subject-class although they do not assert their 
existence. 	 If I say 'Some of the books on the top shelf of my 
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bookcase have green covers' then this statement presupposes that there 
are books on the top shelf as does the statement 'None of the books on 
the top shelf of my bookcase have green covers'. 
In both senses, a presupposition is assumed at the outset of an 
argument or discussion. 	 In neither sense, therefore, can its truth 
be proved by that argument or discussion, being itself a basis or 
foundation for the argument. 	 But in the second sense and not the 
first, the truth of the conclusion, if independently established, 
would establish the truth of the presupposition. 	 It may be possible 
to use a transcendental argument to identify presuppositions and 
demonstrate that they are actually being assumed in a particular 
argument or by a particular kind of practice or activity.28 	 But 
transcendental deduction of this kind in itself does not show that the 
presupposed proposition is necessarily true. A presupposition may be 
necessarily presupposed (second sense) without being true and it may 
be a presupposition (first sense) without being necessarily 
presupposed. 	 The practice of scientific study may presuppose (second 
sense) order in the world but it is arguable whether that in turn 
presupposes (first sense) an Orderer - although many people do assume 
or presuppose (first sense) that there is one. 
The second sense of necessary condition of truth or falsity suggests a 
way in which one level in a hierarchy of perspectives may 'presuppose' 
another. 	 Consider statements like 'Some of the marks on the page 
before me are words' or 'Some of the objects on the table are 
flowers'. These statements presuppose the truth of certain physical-
object statements although they themselves involve higher-level 
descriptions. 	 This accounts for the 'bottom-upwards' relationship 
among the perspectives. 
	 But there is a 'top-downwards' relationship 
as well for if it is true that there are flowers on the table or words 
on the page before me then certain object-language statements are also 
true. 	 And this takes us back to the first sense of 'presupposition'. 
This could suggest that the higher-level descriptions are 'optional 
extras' to those at lower levels leaving the way open for the 
reductionist to have his 'nothing-buttery'. But as I sit looking at 
the marks on the paper or the objects on the table, I may find myself 
compelled to wonder why there is anything at all. I am not concerned 
about whether there are words or flowers before me but with 'ultimate' 
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or 'fundamental' questions. 	 I find myself assuming the necessity of 
higher levels of description and explanation and, upon further 
analysis of my beliefs, I may even find that I am making tacit 
substantive assumptions at these levels. Even my anti-metaphysical 
reductionist friend could be said to be making certain negative 
assumptions at this level in his exclusion of explanations of this 
kind. 	 This gives a further sense to 'necessary presupposition' - 
that of the necessity of making some, but not any particular, 
assumptions at the higher levels in the hierarchy of perspectives. 
And these assumptions at the higher, more comprehensive levels are 
presuppositions in the first sense and may influence beliefs at lower 
levels. 
For present purposes, what is of interest is the kind of higher-level 
description or proposition that can be presupposed within whole areas 
of knowledge or understanding or by particular approaches to whole 
areas of knowledge and understanding and how such propositions affect 
the content of beliefs in these areas. As presuppositions, they will 
be assumed to be true within the area or within a particular approach 
to the area and so cannot be shown to be true from within the area or 
approach. This does not mean that they cannot be argued about but 
simply that such argument must take place outside the area of 
knowledge and understanding in which they are presupposed. 
Some of these presuppositions will be substantive assumptions about 
the nature of the subject matter of the area of knowledge, e.g., a 
psychologist may assume that mind is not reducible to matter. These 
are about the nature of the reality with which the area of knowledge 
is concerned and are therefore ontological. 
	 They include 
presuppositions concerning the categories into which the different 
kinds of subject matter may be sorted although they could be regarded 
as sufficiently significant and distinct to merit separating out on 
their own. 
	 These categorial presuppositions were highlighted by 
Stephan Korner in his 
	 'Categorial Frameworks' in which he drew 
attention to the most basic distinctions to be made in reality and the 
relations which hold among the phenomena thereby distinguished.29 	 A 
second class of presuppositions will be assumptions about the 
methodology that is appropriate to the study of this subject matter 
from the perspective of the area of knowledge in question and these 
are epistemological, e.g., the assumption that the tests for 
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scientific claims are ultimately matters of sense perception. 
	
A 
third kind of presupposition is axiological, having to do with the 
values, purposes and goals involved in the study of the subject 
matter. 
As we saw earlier,30 some Reformed writers have posited the logical 
priority of ontology/metaphysics over epistemology. 	 This seems quite 
sensible since it is evident that methodology must be appropriate to 
subject matter and so we must make assumptions about the reality that 
we are studying before we can decide how we go about studying it. If 
reality and our theories about it are separated in this way then 
ontology is not reduced to epistemology.31 A similar distinction 
should be maintained between what is of value and how we know what is 
of value. 
Of course, many of these basic ontological, axiological and 
epistemological presuppositions are very controversial and very far 
from being universally held. Indeed, even the thesis that we can 
talk about ontology separately from epistemology is itself 
controversial as is that of the logical priority of ontology over 
epistemology. But their controversial nature does not mean that we 
can avoid making any assumptions of these kinds. 
If presuppositions are ontological, then the reality of God is surely 
likely to occupy a fairly central role in the believer's conceptual 
scheme. 	 If they concern categorial distinctions, then that between a 
Creator and his creation must be fairly significant. 
	 If they have to 
do with values and goals, then the believer's aim to glorify God and 
the value put on the human person by being regarded as made in the 
image of God must dramatically affect his set of values. 
	 If 
presuppositions are about how we can come to know things, then the 
belief that our knowing faculties themselves and the objects of our 
knowledge of things are created by God must also be of fairly major 
significance for a theory of knowledge. 
	 Van Til refers to God as 
'the final point of reference in all human affairs'. 
	 By their very 
nature, basic religious beliefs seem likely to be central to the 
believer's worldview and interwoven among his basic presuppositions in 
a way that makes the distinction between the philosophical and the 
theological very difficult to define. 
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But how precisely and to what extent can these central philosophico-
theological beliefs affect the content of beliefs and the construction 
of theories at lower levels in the hierarchy of areas of knowledge? 
It is not enough to assert that they do so - some account of how they 
do it is required. 	 Various Christian scholars have made attempts at 
the integration of their Christian faith with their learning in 
different areas of scholarship so I shall look at some of these to see 
what difference, if any, these central Christian beliefs can make. 
5.3.1 APPROACHES TO THE INTEGRATION OF FAITH AND LEARNING 
I shall examine three main types of approach used by these scholars in 
their attempts to integrate their Christian beliefs with their areas 
of study. Doubtless there are other possibilities and actual 
examples of some of them but these three are the most popular and they 
serve to highlight the issues involved. I shall label them 
'compatibilist', 'soft-presuppositionalist' and 'hard-presupposition-
alist'. 
The compatibilist maintains the strict autonomy of the forms of human 
knowledge and understanding so that Christian presuppositions will not 
have any implications within non-theological areas but he nevertheless 
sets the different areas of knowledge in a larger context wherein he 
claims that the basic assumptions of the different areas should be 
compatible with his basic Christian beliefs. 
An example of this kind of strategy would be in Gareth Jones' approach 
to the biology of the human brain.32 	 After outlining the structure 
and functions of the brain and the personality and character changes 
that brain damage can cause, he argues that every person is "a unity, 
describable as a biological-spiritual being, as a body-soul, or as a 
material-immaterial entity". He maintains that the two complementary 
descriptions of a human being whereby for certain purposes he can be 
compared to a machine and is at the same time and equally a person 
created by God are "intimately interwoven aspects of what being human 
is all about".33 	 He concludes by insisting that the brain has to be 
seen within the context of the human being as a whole, a context 
within which "Christianity affirms the significance of human beings 
and the meaning of human existence" and "in so doing, it affirms the 
value of the human brain".34 Setting the results of biological study 
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of the brain in such a Christian context contributes to a total view 
of the person but it does not effect any changes within the biological 
account of the brain. 
Compatibilism does not comport well with the view of the relationships 
between the different aspects of reality that I find most adequate - 
that of a hierarchy of perspectives. 	 I think that Paul Hirst's 
approach is basically compatibilist. As we have seen, he regards his 
sophisticated concept of education to be something that is neither 
Christian nor anti-Christian. 
An example of the second type of strategy - that of what I have termed 
'soft-presuppositionalism' - is given by James Martin's attempt to 
change some of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
psychology.34 	 Martin is a professor of psychology at Pennsylvania 
State University but he is critical of the dominant paradigms in 
contemporary psychology for their exclusion of personal knowledge. 
Since psychology has to account for the knowledge of persons as well 
as of physical objects, personal knowledge is, he maintains, the 
central issue for psychology. 
	 He claims that an adequate 
psychological epistemology has to account for both the otherness and 
the not-otherness of the to-be-known, both its opacity and its intell-
igibility, that it is both a mystery and a self-revelation and he 
argues that it is in the notion of the person that this happens. He 
claims that this has radical implications for psychology and he 
writes:- 
"If I am correct, psychology cannot, insofar as it deals with 
persons, be construed only as a science. 
	 I take it as a 
distinctive characteristic of science that it involves a 
comprehension of a determined world through concepts. On my 
account, it is not through the determinate concept alone, but 
through the imagination that we apprehend persons. ... An 
epistemology which makes room for persons - for self-revelation 
and love - is long overdue. 
	 Without such a positive found- 
ation, the future of psychological investigation will be a 
continuation of the past - a series of retreats from a series of 
increasingly barbaric and sophisticated renderings of the thesis 
that a human is a piece of meat. 
	 Clearly, we need another 
metaphor. The Bible gives us one. Humanity is the image of 
God - God who both hides and reveals himself."35  
Martin's proposal is for a fairly radical transformation of psychology 
by bringing in among its ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions the Biblical concepts of the person and of personal 
knowledge. 
	 He builds his case from within psychology as it is at 
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present by discussing its deficiencies in a way that is aimed at 
convincing his fellow-psychologists as such of the need of a new 
metaphor and then he attempts to show the adequacy of the . metaphor 
that is available in the biblical view of personal knowledge. 	 His 
concern is to transform the discipline from within by the introduction 
of ideas from without to meet needs perceived from within. 	 These 
ideas are derived from the Christian faith. 	 In this way, his 
Christian presuppositions are brought into relationship with those 
which are not distinctively Christian and which he shares with his 
non-Christian colleagues. 
Another two interesting examples of soft presuppositionalism are 
provided by Stephen Evans and Malcolm Reid in their discussion of some 
Christian answers to the question 'why be moral?'.36 Evans presents 
the following argument for giving divine rewards as an answer to the 
question:- 
"1. Rewards which are intrinsic to an activity provide a reason 
to perform that activity which in no way despoils the character 
of the activity. 
2. If heaven is understood as the enjoyment of the presence of 
God (both in this life and afterward), and God is understood as 
the ontological realization of that love which is the heart of 
moral striving, then heaven provides a reason to be moral. 
3. If God has created every human being with a nee4 for himself, 
then every human being has a reason to be moral."3' 
Evans is here working within a particular tradition in philosophical 
ethics - that which puts the emphasis upon moral duty - but he seeks 
to transform it by the adduction of his own theistic ontological and 
axiological presuppositions. 	 Again the change is from within by the 
introduction into the tradition of theological presuppositions from 
without. 
It is interesting to compare this with Reid's alternative. 
	 He has a 
different interpretation of what it is to be moral and sees it in 
terms of being a good person rather than of doing one's duty. He 
therefore places himself within a particular philosophical tradition 
but not the one that Evans chooses. He also brings into the 
tradition a set of religious presuppositions in an attempt to 
transform it but his presuppositions are distinctively Christian 
rather than, as those of Evans', broadly theistic. 
	 His claim is that 
what Christians receive in the revelation of Jesus Christ "is not in 
the first instance a fundamental moral principle or new rules but 
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moral goodness personified and exemplified in the story of a life that 
moves from birth to transfiguration, crucifixion, resurrection, 
ascension, and Pentecost ... the life of a distinct human personality 
with characteristic virtues: reverence, faith, hope, self-giving love, 
forgiveness, thanksgiving, joy, and peace."38 	 He concludes that the 
Christian realisation of his redemption in Christ is at the same time 
an acknowledgement "that knowing what it is to be moral and becoming a 
morally worthy person are inseparable from a personal trust in Jesus 
Christ".39 His set of presuppositions is rather wider than those of 
Evans and their effect is a rather more radical transformation of the 
ethical tradition. Both Evans and Reid employ a soft 
presuppositionalist approach although it could be argued that Reid's 
comes rather nearer to the category of hard presuppositionalism. 
Hard presuppositionalism claims that there is total antithesis between 
Christian presuppositions and those of all alternative worldviews. 
It asserts that the forms of knowledge must be totally reconstructed 
on exclusively biblical assumptions and that these are sufficient on 
their own for such reconstruction. 	 A well-known and influential 
example of this kind of approach is in the most thorough-going 
versions of what has come to be known as 'scientific creationism'. 
One version of this is to be found in 'The Genesis Flood' by Henry 
Morris and John Whitcomb.40 The professor of geology who writes the 
foreword to the book significantly expresses his hope that some other 
means of harmonization of religion and geology could be found, one 
which would retain "the essential structure of modern historical 
geology".41 This is clearly not the effect of Morris and Whitcomb's 
thesis that the 'uniformitarianism' and 'evolutionism' which are 
controlling principles for the interpretation of geological data 
should be replaced by those of 'biblical catastrophism'. 	 They claim 
that there are really only two basic philosophies, one "oriented 
primarily with respect to God" and the other appearing in a great 
variety of forms all alike "oriented primarily with respect to man" 42 
They see uniformitarianism and evolutionism as outworkings in geology 
of this second basic philosophy. 	 Uniformitarianism is defined as 
"the belief that existing physical processes, acting essentially as at 
present, are sufficient to account for all past changes and for the 
present state of the astronomic, geologic and biologic universe" 
whereas biblical catastrophism is "the doctrine that, at least on the 
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occasions mentioned in Scripture, God has directly intervened in the 
normal physical processes of the universe, causing significant changes 
therein for a time".43 	 Morris and Whitcomb start with study of the 
Scriptures which they interpret as teaching that a universal deluge 
with catastrophic effects was a historical event and they go on to 
interpret the data of geology and other relevant sciences in the light 
of this framework. 	 They allow that their presuppositions are 
dogmatic and incapable of scientific proof but no more so than those 
of the alternative interpretative frameworks and they believe that 
their system will be found ultimately to be "much more satisfying than 
any other, in its power to correlate scientific data and to resolve 
problems and apparent conflicts".44. 	 Whether the fairly impressive 
study that follows does show that they are correct in this is not 
important for present purposes but it does serve as an example of this 
type of approach to an area of study. 
I think it can be seen from the foregoing examples that the difference 
between soft- and hard-presuppositionalism is one of degree. This is 
why I am using the prefixes soft- and hard- rather than alternative 
ways of labelling them. Terms like 'transformationalist' and 'recon-
structionalist',45 which could be used instead, suggest that the 
former leaves the basic structure untouched whereas the latter 
produces a new structure from the same materials. There is much to 
commend their use but I am not sure that the distinction is as sharp 
and clear as this. Even the most thorough-going versions of the 
second kind of approach seem to have sufficient in common with the 
accounts they seek to replace to render them recognisable as geology, 
psychology, education or whatever. The difference is in the degree  
of influence of distinctively Christian or biblical presuppositions in 
relation to those which are not so. I doubt whether any account -
even in theology - can take all its basic presuppositions from the 
Bible. 
5.3.2 PRESUPPOSITIONALIST APPROACHES TO EDUCATION 
In turning to look at education, I am leaving compatibilism to one 
side since I am looking for evidence of how it can be meaningful to 
talk of 'Christian education' or 'Reformed Christian education'. 
Compatibilism - at least in a Hirstian form - will not provide such 
evidence since it takes it that such talk is a contradiction in terms. 
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I am also leaving it to one side because it does not account for the 
interrelationships between the areas of knowledge which, I have 
suggested, are best seen as a hierarchy of increasingly comprehensive 
perspectives. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff has developed a theory of Christian 'control 
beliefs?" which he has attempted to work out in relation to education 
theory.47 	 The result seems to me to be a fairly clear example of 
soft-presuppositionalism. Wolterstorff suggests that when we weigh a 
theory in an area of knowledge we come to it in a "cloak of belief" 
and this includes "beliefs as to what constitutes an acceptable sort 
of theory on the matter under consideration". He continues:- 
"They include beliefs about the requisite logical or aesthetic 
structure of a theory, beliefs about the entities to whose 
existence a theory may correctly commit us, and the like. Con-
trol beliefs function in two ways. Because we hold them we are 
led to reject certain sorts of theories - some because they are 
inconsistent with those beliefs; others because, though 
consistent with our control beliefs, they do not comport well 
with those beliefs. 	 On the other hand control beliefs also 
lead us to devise theories. 
	 We want theories that are 
consistent with our control beliefs. 	 Or, to put it more 
stringently, we want, theories that comport as well as possible 
with those beliefs."48  
Wolterstorff instances a number of examples of control beliefs 
including the following:- the Church's belief in the authoritative 
truth of their interpretation of the Scriptures leading to the 
rejection of Galileo's theories; 
	 the seventeenth century Cartesian 
scientist's belief that matter can only be moved by contiguous matter 
leading to the rejection of Newton's theories of gravity; 
	 Ernst 
Mach's insistence that natural science should contain only concepts 
connected with sensation leading to his rejection of contemporary 
atomic theory; 
	 and B. F. Skinner's refusal to admit as acceptable 
psychological theory any that made reference to mediating states of 
mind. 
In his work on education, Wolterstorff outlines the main elements of a 
philosophy of Christian education.49 	 He says that this should grow 
out of a Christian vision of life and reality and the main features of 
such a vision include beliefs about creation, the fall and redemption. 
The Christian believes that the world is created by God and that 
human beings are "the crown of the physical creation" because they 
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alone are responsible to God for acting in certain ways in respect to 
him, to themselves and their fellow human beings and to the physical 
creation around them. 	 The fall has to do with man's rebellious 
decision to act as if he were "self-normed" and this led to his 
becoming confused about his responsibilities and to his defection from 
them. 	 Redemption concerns God's action for the ultimate renewal of 
his creation and he calls upon people to repent, believe, follow his 
Son and become agents in this cause of renewal. 	 Those who accept 
this call are the new community of the church, an "alternative 
society" which has the Scriptures as authoritative guides for its 
thought and life. 	 On this matter of the central place of the Bible 
in relation to the Christian's apprehension of his responsibilities, 
Wolterstorff writes:- 
"For one thing, even though the Bible is not a political or 
economic or aesthetic or even moral handbook, it does contain a 
wealth of guidance, often quite specific, not only about what 
God asks of his redeemed people, but also about what he asks of 
his human creatures generally. But secondly, the Bible serves 
to open our eyes to creation and its normative structure - to 
what God asks of us by virtue of our status as created human 
beings - so that we can go on to inquire on our own. 
	 Where 
once we may have thought of aesthetic values and artistic goals 
along Platonic or Romantic-humanist or Marxist lines, the Bible 
opens our eyes to how those are distorted visions of God's will 
for art in human life. 	 From there on we act like grown-up 
human beings, thinking things through for ourselves, not 
demanding A biblical word on all the details of human respon-
sibility."'0  
Although the Bible has this central 'eye-opening' role, Wolterstorff 
makes it clear that Christians have a lot of work to do in thinking 
things out for themselves and in applying what they discover in the 
Bible to concrete situations. 
	 Also, he is quick to allow, it is not 
only Christians who can discern human responsibilities and he points 
out that many cultures have a fundamental moral principle which 
approximates to the biblical principle to love one's neighbour as 
oneself. 
Against this background, Wolterstorff says that it is the ultimate 
goal of all education - as Christians see it - "that those who are 
taught shall live in such a way as to carry out their responsibilities 
to God and find joy and delight in doing so".51 A Christian 
philosophy of education is therefore a responsibility theory of 
education but, as such, it is not unique: Jews and Muslims, for 
example, might well also adopt the same ultimate goal but they might 
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disagree with Christians about the details of human responsibilities 
because their world and life view would not have the same emphasis 
upon God's redemptive activity. 
As a responsibility theory, a Christian philosophy of education will 
aim at imparting knowledge and understanding of how things are since 
this is required for responsible action in relation to how they are. 
Responsible action requires abilities as well as knowledge, abilities 
to acquire knowledge in a number of areas and to discern what we ought 
to do in various situations. 	 But, as Wolterstorff puts it, 
"knowledge and abilities are not yet performance"52 and so responsible 
action also requires that which he goes on to make the main focus of 
his book - tendency learning. 
Most of the rest of Wolterstorff's study is concerned with identifying 
the best strategies for cultivating the tendency to act in accord with 
the moral law and, in doing so, he makes extensive use of contemporary 
psychological evidence and theories, e.g., those of Kohlberg. 
	 This 
evidence comes from experiments conducted from within a number of 
different psychological orientations but Wolterstorff seeks to make 
use of his Christian theological/philosophical image of man together 
with his understanding of the nature of the moral agent to set much of 
the evidence in quite a different light and to produce "an array of 
strategies which fit together".53 	 For example, contra Kohlberg, 
Wolterstorff claims that a programme of Christian moral education must 
concern itself with more than the form of children's reasoning. 
	 The 
effects of the fall mean that the content cannot be left entirely to 
their judgement and that the Bible should be used as the source of 
authoritative moral principles.54  
From this it can be seen that Wolterstorff's approach is 
presuppositionalist rather than compatibilist. He is working within 
a particular tradition in philosophy of education - that of 'respon-
sibility theory' - but he seeks to transform it in the light of his 
Christian presuppositions. He also makes use of the results of 
contemporary psychological theory but within a different framework 
from those adopted by the psychologists in question. It is soft-
rather than hard-presuppositionalist since his foundations are not 
exclusively biblical. 
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A middle-of-the-road approach like Wolterstorff's is likely to come 
under fire from both sides. On the one hand, those who want a harder 
line may say that he should not make use of elements that are not 
distinctively Christian. 	 But this charge fails to realise that 
something may be Christian without being distinctively Christian. 
Why should there not be overlap between different worldviews or 
approaches to a social science or view of education? After all, even 
one of those who argues most strongly for a distinctively Christian 
view of knowledge - Van Til - allows for this possibility in his 
notion of 'borrowed capital'. 	 He says that the non-Christian may 
well know things which he would not be entitled to claim to know if he 
followed through his non-Christian assumptions to their logical 
conclusions.55  
On the other hand, from the other side can come the objection that it 
is difficult to work out this approach across the board. 
	 George 
Mavrodes reports on a study made of Wolterstorff's thesis of Christian 
control beliefs by a group of Christian professors from various fields 
of knowledge and he writes:- 
"We could not think of, nor does Wolterstorff supply, plausible 
examples of (say) mathematical conjectures or chemical theories 
which we might reject because of our Christian commitment, nor 
of new researcA experiments in astronomy which that commitment 
may suggest.” 5 0 
 
Mavrodes acknowledges that this evidence does not show that the 
project is impossible and he leaves the door open for further 
developments. Others are not prepared to leave the door open in this 
way.57 But I think it may be significant that these areas so quickly 
seized upon and held as allegedly clearly autonomous are at or near 
the bottom level of the hierarchy of perspectives that I described 
earlier. 
	 In other words, they are the less comprehensive areas in 
that they presuppose only their own ontologies and those of lower 
levels. The higher up one goes through the modal levels the greater 
the number of ontological presuppositions one makes for the more 
inclusive perspectives one takes upon reality. These higher-level 
perspectives are also more personal and more significant for life; 
they come closer to what Brian Hill terms "the personal core of our 
living".58 If this is so, it is only to be expected that the 
implications of Christian beliefs, if any, should be rather more 
evident and easier to set forth at the higher levels than in 
mathematics or chemistry. 
	 It is by no means as controversial to 
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propose the possibility of, say, Christian ethics or of Christian 
political theory as to propose that of Christian mathematics. This 
is not to.say that the suggestion that ethics is not autonomous in 
relation to religious presuppositions is not controversial. 	 Nor is 
it to allow that Christian mathematics is impossible. 
	
The 
observation is simply that if there is an influence of Christian 
presuppositions in other areas of knowledge and if these areas can be 
arranged in the suggested kind of hierarchical order, then it seems 
plausible that this influence should spread down from the higher 
levels and have diminishing influence as we go down. 
Turning now to hard-presuppositionalism, Cornelius Van Til provides in 
his attempt to outline a Christian theory of education a fairly clear 
example of this. 	 He holds that the Reformed view of education is 
"based exclusively upon the Bible".59 	 A central issue in the way he 
develops this is the place of what he refers to as a "principle of 
unity" without which he claims there cannot be a fully intelligible 
philosophy of education. He argues that non-Reformed Christian views 
of education. lack such a principle because they are essentially 
Arminian and, as such, they "attribute to man, the creature, a measure 
of autonomy which belongs to God alone" and accept a "principle of 
interpretation for human life which comes in part from man himself";60 
 
In particular, he is critical of American Fundamentalism and its 
efforts to formulate a Christian philosophy of education and he 
writes:- 
"The pupil is asked to commit himself to Christ and to God. 
But when he is asked to do so, he is, as it were, told that in 
order to choose he must take his place above the two opposing 
positions of Christianity and non-Christianity. 
	 That pre- 
supposes that there is some place in the sky, abstracted from 
either system of education, whence man may have a neutral view 
of the systems that he passes in review. To say to him, as the 
Reformed person does, that man cannot make an intelligent choice 
between the two systems except it be from within the Christian 
system would, in the eyes of Fundamentalism, be to attack the 
legitimate autonomy of man. But the result of such an attempt 
at neutrality is to place the pupil in an educational void." °1  
In contrast to this he sets forth the Reformed view as "beginning with 
the presupposition of the absolute truth of the Christian position", 
on the basis of which, he says, the teacher should tell the pupil that 
both the goal of human life and the criterion by which man must live 
can only be found in the authoritative revelation of the Scriptures. 
The goal of human life - and therefore of education - is "to build the 
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kingdom of God" and the criterion of education is that "whatever is in 
accord with Scripture is educative; whatever is not in accord with it 
is miseducative".62  
As always with Van Til's writings, there is much that is not defined 
very precisely and much that remains very unclear but even these few 
brief comments and quotations give the impression of a completely 
uncompromising position which is, I think, worthy of being termed 
hard-presuppositionalist. The emphasis is upon an absolute 
antithesis between his Reformed Christian 'principle' and all other 
'principles' for the interpretation of human life. 	 Other non- 
Reformed views - including some which are avowedly evangelical 
Christian - are seen as examples of 'synthesis' between opposing and 
mutually exclusive principles. 
However, as we read on, we find Van Til qualifying this as Kuyper 
did63 in a way that again throws into question the distinction between 
the two kinds of presuppositionalism. He tells us that the absolute 
antithesis is "one of principle only". In this life it is not fully 
worked out in the thought of either the Christian or the non-Christian 
- otherwise we could not account for how the non-Christian "can know 
and teach much that is right and true".64 	 Because of sin, the 
Christian is not wholly consistent in his thinking with his Christian 
presuppositions and because of God's 'common grace' the non-Christian 
is not wholly consistent with his non-Christian presuppositions. 
Van Til does not go on to work out in detail what this means in 
relation to the various forms of knowledge or classroom teaching so we 
can only guess at its implications. 
	 He writes approvingly of the 
schools set up by the National Union of Christian schools which has 
since become Christian Schools International and which seems to have 
been strongly influenced by Van Til's approach - at least in its 
earlier days - and we can perhaps glean something from some of its 
publications which are rather more detailed on the outworking of such 
a perspective. 	 In one of its publications, a paper on 'Christian 
educational philosophy', it is claimed that knowledge of children 
comes from what God reveals about them in the Bible and through 
various sciences. 	 From the Bible, teachers obtain knowledge about 
children "as God's image-bearers, deserving everyone's respect, ... as 
fallen ... struggling with sin, needing compassionate discipline and 
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correction ... about children's uniqueness as persons, needing both 
the authority of law and the freedom of selfhood ... about young 
persons' great endowments as God's imagebearers for intellectual, 
moral and creative life in God's world".65 The writer goes on to say 
that a second kind of knowledge about children comes from such 
sciences as physiology, psychology and sociology and this is knowledge 
"derived from observing and studying children" and it includes 
knowledge about personality, motivation, developmental needs, effects 
of upbringing styles and the like. But for a third kind of knowledge 
teachers should turn again to the Bible and this is for knowledge 
which goes beyond biblical and scientific descriptions of what 
children are like to what they ought to be like. 
So it seems that it is thought that Christian insights should be 
combined with those from non-Christian sources for a total view of the 
child. 	 This combination also comes out in remarks in the same paper 
on the curriculum appropriate for a Christian school where, for 
example, in the natural sciences children are taught why nature should 
not be exploited, worshipped or feared and "they learn that the 
Christian way is to search out the earth's mysteries and laws, to 
share with their fellow imagebearers its wonders and benefits, to join 
with them in its care and preservation, and to support all good 
efforts to extend the knowledge, appreciation and use of it". They 
learn this "in laboratory, in field trips, and in books", we are told, 
and there is no suggestion that books written from non-Christian 
perspectives would not be used.66 	 Whether Van Til would approve of 
this as an outworking of his 'absolute antithesis in principle only' 
or whether he would regard it as unacceptable synthesis I cannot say. 
However, I do think that, if he had to work out the detail of his 
views for application in the classroom, it is likely that he would 
have ended up with something which is not so obviously based 
exclusively on the Bible. 
This is partly because, for all Van Til's talk of 'the Reformed view', 
there has been a recurring problem within Reformed approaches ever 
since Kuyper first put such stress on the antithesis with his talk of 
"two kinds of people, two kinds of science"67 and yet, at the same 
time, retained considerable emphasis on the implications of common 
grace for cooperation between Christians and non-Christians. This 
problem has been a certain tension between these two strands of 
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thought. 	 Indeed, there have been identifiable groupings of 
individuals and churches which some have termed 'Antitheticals' and 
'positive Calvinists' respectively. 68  It is this tension that leaves 
detailed approaches to education moving somewhat uncertainly between 
hard- and soft-presuppositionalism. The issue of how to resolve this 
tension within a Reformed approach to education is something I shall 
return to and attempt to deal with in the later chapter on pluralism 
in education. Of course, this kind of problem applies to any 
approach that stresses worldview differences and is an issue in 
contemporary multicultural Britain. 
There is a possible objection to this whole enterprise which arises 
from the disagreements we have just met - disagreements between the 
results of Christians who attempt to develop a Christian view of 
education or any other area of knowledge. 	 It is advanced by Paul 
Hirst in his attempted demolition of the notion of Christian education 
referred to earlier. 	 He writes:- 
"What one is offered under this label (Christian education) is 
often very dubious from both an educational and indeed from a 
Christian point of view. 	 Much of it is based on very general 
moral principles, backed by perhaps Scripture or Christian 
tradition, which, having little or no explicit educational 
content, are applied to educational problems in a highly 
debatable way. It is not uncommon to hear it argued that 
Christians, convinced of the value of personal relationships, 
must clearly object to any school of above 500 pupils. One is 
sometimes assured in the name of Christianity that 
comprehensivisation is a wicked thing, and that specialisation 
in the sixth form is equally deplorable. But clearly the 
general moral principles that people use to back up these 
beliefs about education do not alone determine any particular, 
practically relevant, educational principles. To get these one 
must consider equally important matters of psychological and 
sociological fact, the structure of our social institutions, the 
availability of money and manpower, and so on. 
	 ... none of 
these considerations has anything to do with Christian beliefs. 
What is more it seems to me that the general principles on which 
the whole exercise is based are usually not in any sense 
significantly Christian either, though people might appeal to 
Christian texts or Christian tradition in support of them."69 
 
Hirst goes on to argue that working from the other end - formulating 
educational principles from what the Bible actually says about 
educational matters such as punishment and discipline - does not get 
us any further. 	 Attempts to extract the principles lead to 
"inconclusive debate about Biblical interpretation" and attempts to 
apply any such principles do not produce any more agreement among 
Christians. 
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Apart from the question-begging assertion that psychology and 
sociology have nothing to do with Christian belief, Hirst's main 
argument here seems to be based on the lack of agreement among 
Christians. They disagree among themselves and take up the same sets 
of positions about practical educational matters as do those who are 
not attempting to develop a Christian view of education. Therefore, 
he seems to conclude, appeal to Christian beliefs is irrelevant to the 
task of formulating a practical educational theory. 	 But this very 
same argument could be used against those who profess to base their 
view of education on objective rational principles - a similar lack of 
agreement seems to characterise them but Hirst would hardly advocate 
the abandonment of such principles!. 	 Few thinking Christians would 
claim that the hermeneutical task is a simple one or that the 
application of general principles to particular situations is 
straightforward" but this hardly requires that either task should be 
abandoned as hopeless. 
Hirst argues that the Bible is insufficient in what it implies for 
education today but, of course, this does not mean that it is not 
necessary or that it has nothing to contribute. 
	 The main intent of 
the Bible is redemptive and it is clearly not a text-book of science, 
philosophy or education theory. 	 It does not follow that what it says 
has no implications whatever for science, philosophy or education 
theory or that redemption is to be taken to be simply about one's 
'soul' rather than one's mind or body or about the physical creation. 
After all, it is clearly not a text-book of history - since it gives 
great weight to certain events of comparative insignificance to the 
historian as such and not to others which are of major significance to 
him - but it does not follow that when it makes a historical statement 
this is of no interest to him as a historian. 
	 Indeed, if such a 
statement were shown to be false this would count against the Bible 
being taken as the Word of God. There seems no reason why this 
should not also apply to statements that are clearly moral, 
philosophical or educational. 
5.4 SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In this chapter, I have attempted to show why I think Christian 
beliefs can make a difference to beliefs in other areas of knowledge, 
especially those that are at higher levels in what I have taken to be 
a hierarchy of perspectives. 
	 Of the three possible approaches to the 
integration of faith and learning that I have outlined, that of 
presuppositionalism in a softer form seems to me to have the most 
going for it. 
I think that the way in which the characteristic themes of Reformed 
epistemology were developed in Part One of this study fits the pattern 
of soft-presuppositionalism. 
	 It worked within the overlap between 
several philosophical traditions - realism, foundationalism, 
internalism, intuitionism and the like - but introduced Christian 
presuppositions of the existence of a personal God who speaks to 
people. 
	 This had the effect of setting the assumptions of these 
philosophical traditions in a new light. 
	 It also set opposing 
positions in a new light by, for example, exposing some hidden 
assumptions which excluded the possibility of this form of Reformed 
epistemology from the outset and could not therefore be said to be 
'neutral' in relation to the conflict between these presuppositions. 
The antithesis between these mutually exclusive sets of 
presuppositions might seem to be such as to place this account within 
the hard-presuppositionalist camp. 
	 But then I am not sure that it is 
possible to construct an approach to any area of knowledge exclusively 
on Christian presuppositions - if by that term is meant 
presuppositions that are derived solely from the Christian scriptures. 
I shall now seek to apply this approach to two issues in education. 
This, of course, by no means constitutes a developed philosophy but 
merely an attempt to apply a philosophical position to two aspects.of 
education theory with which it resonates more clearly. 
6 
AIMS, METHODS ADD THE CRITIQUE OF AUTONOMY 
In this chapter, I shall seek to apply a soft-presuppositionalist 
approach to a particular controversy within education theory - that of 
the distinction between education and indoctrination. 
	 It would seem 
particularly relevant to do so since at least some of the content of 
the approaches to education outlined in the last chapter might well 
seem to some to be appropriately described as indoctrination rather 
than education. 
I shall seek to show that the presuppositions underlying some of the 
discussions of the concept of indoctrination are, not themselves 
neutral in relation to the basic beliefs that underlie a Reformed 
account of knowledge. 	 I shall also seek to show how the discussion 
is transformed if a different set of presuppositions is assumed. 
shall go on to attempt to argue for a particular kind of confessional 
approach to education. 
	 In this way, I hope that looking again at the 
subject of indoctrination that received so much attention in the 
sixties and seventies will not simply be a rehearsal of tired old 
arguments but rather that the whole matter may be put in a new light 
and that I can make some positive proposals as a result. 
The issue of indoctrination ranges across the whole field of 
educational theory including aims, content, method and evaluation. 
It is relevant to the subject of the kind of institution that is 
appropriate to education. 
	 Education can take place in the home as 
well as at school and so, presumably, can indoctrination. 
	 This issue 
is also relevant to education throughout the whole age-range and 
brings into focus the differences between stages of development of the 
pupil or student. And although it appears to be particularly 
relevant to certain curricular areas, e.g. religious, moral and 
political areas, it has implications for the whole curriculum. 
	 So, 
although it might seem somewhat negative to give space to what could 
be taken as mere defence of an approach to education against charges 
of indoctrination, to focus upon this aspect is to deal with a fairly 
central issue with implications for the whole of the educational 
process. 
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Much discussion of the issue of indoctrination in the past has centred 
on alternative proposals for necessary and/or sufficient criteria for 
application of the concept. 	 The main candidates have been the 
'method', 'content' and 'intention' criteria and I shall first examine 
the merits of each of these as they have been presented and as they 
could be seen in the light of the main themes of Reformed 
epistemology. 
6.1 INDOCTRINATION AND METHOD  
R. S. Peters and others have pointed out that 'education' is a term 
that can be applied to both tasks and achievements for, as he puts it, 
"educational practices are those in which people try to pass on what 
is worthwhile as well as those in which they actually succeed in doing 
so".1 	 The same seems to apply to 'teaching' and to 'indoctrination' 
but since 'success' in the achievement of indoctrination in the 
pejorative sense of the term is, unlike that in education or teaching, 
an undesirable outcome, I shall be more concerned with criteria for 
the task sense. That is, I shall be more concerned to ascertain what 
it is to indoctrinate a person than with what it is to have been 
indoctrinated. By their very nature, method criteria can apply to 
indoctrination only as a task and not as an achievement. 
It seems initially plausible to suggest that if a classroom activity 
is indoctrinatory, this is, at least in part, something to do with the 
kinds of methods that are being used. In other words, it would seem 
possible to recognise that indoctrination is taking place without 
being aware of the teacher's intentions and regardless of the content 
of the lesson. Having said this, it is not at all easy to come up 
with an adequate definition of indoctrinatory method. 
A version of a method criterion which provides a useful starting-point 
is the following suggested by Leslie Smith: 
/I 
... a person has been indoctrinated if, and only if, he has 
come to accept a belief in a non-rational way, if he is unable 
to assess the grounds on which that belief is based."2  
This purports to provide a condition which is both necessary and 
sufficient for indoctrination but for the present I shall only look 
into the question of the necessity of a method criterion since I do 
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not wish to rule out the possibility of other kinds of criterion at 
this stage. 
I do not think that the specification above is adequate. 
	
For a 
start, it is questionable whether it is properly termed a method 
criterion rather than, say, a form of evaluative criterion focussing 
on the achievement sense of indoctrination. This objection could be 
met by a rephrasing along the following lines:- 
X indoctrinates Y with a proposition p only if X teaches p to Y 
in a way that tends to bring about Y's non-rational belief that 
p, i.e., to bring it about that Y believes p but Y is unable to 
assess the grounds upon which his belief that p is based. 
This move into the active voice provides a condition for the task 
sense of indoctrination. 
A key phrase in this formulation is 'non-rational belief'. 
	 This is 
often used by those who put forward method criteria3 and sometimes 
used interchangeably with 'non-evidential belief' or a similar 
expression. 	 In Smith's formulation above, he expands upon what he 
means by 'non-rational' with his reference to the pupil's inability to 
assess the grounds on which the belief is based and I take it that he 
has in mind grounds which are reasons or evidence for and against the 
belief in question. Other writers also insist that the pupil should 
be put in a position to investigate relevant evidence for his beliefs 
or weigh relevant reasons. 
At this point, a common objection to method criteria of this kind is 
usually adduced: that non-rational methods have to be used in teaching 
young children who lack the intellectual capacity to assess the 
grounds for beliefs which are being imparted to them.4 	 If so, it is 
argued, then this cannot be a case of indoctrination - at least in the 
pejorative sense of the term - and so a method criterion cannot 
distinguish between indoctrination and that which is not 
indoctrinatory. However, this objection can be met simply by 
restricting the method criterion for indoctrination to the use of non-
rational methods "despite the availability of other, rational  
methods".5 This serves to render the methods used with very young 
children non-indoctrinatory since rational methods are not available. 
However, this highlights another problem and this is that the use of 
rational methods seems to be taken as an all-or-nothing matter but 
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this is clearly not the case. 
	 Ability to assess reasons or evidence 
is a matter of degree and this varies not only with age or maturity 
but also with intellectual capacity, knowledge and experience. Also, 
as far as the teacher is concerned there are the variables of his own 
competence and the time and energy he has available. It would hardly 
be reasonable to require of the teacher or the pupil/student more than 
that of which they are capable. In other words, the principle that 
'ought' implies 'can' should be applied to the moral acceptability of 
teaching methods as it is in other moral situations. 
	 After all, 
methods used in teaching some 'A' Level science pupils are likely to 
be less 'rational' than, say, those used with research scientists. 
The ability to question and assess evidence can be assumed to increase 
with experience and knowledge all the way through the educational 
process and this process may be life-long. Perhaps one of the most 
important features of indoctrination is that it tends to impair the 
pupil's capacity to develop such abilities. 
Further, use of the term 'indoctrination' seems to presuppose some 
understanding on the part of the taught. 
	 A good example of this is 
in that form of indoctrination that 'inoculates' a person against a 
change in his beliefs by exposing him to weakened forms of counter-
arguments to his belief and thereby apparently builds up resistance to 
change more effectively than does the supply of supportive arguments.6  
Other forms of indoctrination also seem to require some understanding 
of reasons and arguments so it would seem that it can never be a 
matter of using strictly non-rational methods. They would take us 
entirely outside the sphere of beliefs based on reasons or evidence to 
the purely causal processes of hypnosis, conditioning, brain-washing 
and the like. 
	 These processes are to be sharply distinguished from 
indoctrination although they share with it the possibility of being 
morally acceptable in certain circumstances, e.g., with very young 
children. For example, it is arguable that conditioning and the like 
are acceptable in the very early years of childhood in order to 
establish the preconditions for education and indoctrination to become 
real alternatives. A definition of indoctrination therefore needs to 
be narrow enough to exclude such purely causal processes. 
All this is incorporated in a third version of the method criterion 
which I would put as follows:- 
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X indoctrinates Y with a proposition p only if, given the 
capacities of both X and Y, X teaches p to Y in a way that is 
less rational than it could be in that it tends to restrict the 
development of Y's ability to assess the grounds upon which his 
belief that p is based. 
By 'development' here, I do not mean any purely 'natural' process but 
rather that which could be produced by educational processes. 
There is, however, a further objection to with all three versions of 
the method criterion considered so far and this is that they can all 
apply only to beliefs rather than, say, to attitudes. I think that 
this objection ignores the fairly plausible suggestion that attitudes 
have cognitive cores so that, in at least some minimal sense, they can 
be expressed in propositional beliefs. 	 Hugo Meynell, for example, 
instances the possibility of bringing up a child in such a way that he 
unthinkingly treats women as inferior to men without actually 
assenting to the proposition that women are inferior to men and he 
suggests that this is an even more thoroughgoing form of 
indoctrination.7 	 It seems to me that such a person does hold the 
belief in question although it may be tacitly held and never actually 
articulated even to himself. 
	
If this is not so, then I think the 
discussion moves away from indoctrination to conditioning or some 
other purely causal process. 	 Nevertheless, this matter of attitudes 
and the possibility of a tacit dimension to indoctrination is of 
importance - especially in relation to the issue of content and 
doctrines, ideologies and the like which we shall meet later. 
Assuming that indoctrination is centrally concerned with beliefs 
rather than with non-propositional attitudes, there is a further 
objection to the method criteria I have formulated. 
	 This is that 
they all apply only to beliefs which are based on reasons and 
evidence, i.e., only to beliefs that are inferentially justified. 
This means that they do not apply to beliefs that are immediately 
justified. 	 Indeed some say that indoctrination cannot apply to such 
beliefs. 	 Kingsley Price, for example, writes:- 
"Beliefs that do not admit of evidence are neither reasonable 
nor unreasonable. 
	 I cannot reason myself into the belief that 
I feel warm; and since I cannot, no procedure that brings me to 
it can be unreasonable." 
Price's example is of a belief that is minimally dispositional and has 
minimal ramifications.9 	 However, the properly basic beliefs of 
Plantinga and other Reformed epistemologists have fairly maximal 
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ramifications, notably the belief that God exists and the related 
thesis that divine revelation may be self-authenticating. 
	
Can it be 
that no procedure that brings me to these beliefs can be unreasonable 
or that they cannot be the subject of an indoctrinatory method? This 
would seem a strange conclusion since many writers use just such 
beliefs in their paradigm examples of indoctrination. I shall 
suggest shortly that a content criterion cannot be sufficient for 
indoctrination and that an intention criterion is not necessary. So 
if the paradigm cases involving such beliefs really are cases of 
indoctrination, it must be (partly) a matter of method and yet the 
method criteria on offer do not apply to properly basic beliefs. So 
it must be a matter of method and yet it cannot be! 
I shall return to the question of indoctrinatory method later in this 
chapter but, before going on to the other possible kinds of criteria, 
there is an important point that emerges from this. 
	 This is that it 
suggests that the whole discussion of method criteria for indoc-
trination takes place against an epistemological background that, 
apart from the brief quotation above, tends to exclude from consider- 
ation the possibility of there being any properly basic beliefs. Its 
underlying assumptions therefore exclude from the outset the 
possibility of belief in God being properly basic or divine revelation 
being self-authenticating. 
	 Repeated references to assessment of 
reasons and evidence for belief suggest that the framework being 
generally taken for granted is probably justificationist of a fairly 
strongly internalist kind, if not actually classical foundationalist. 
It assumes the value of autonomous rationality and tacitly excludes a 
theonomous alternative. 
6.2 INDOCTRINATION AND CONTENT 
Since it seems very plausible to suggest that any content whatsoever 
can be handled in an educational process at an appropriate level, it 
follows that any content whatsoever can be handled in a way that is 
morally acceptable and therefore not indoctrinatory. But if this is 
correct it does not follow that indoctrination is not at all a matter 
of content even though certain methods may be necessary for it to 
occur. 	 It could be that indoctrination takes place 
	 only when 
certain beliefs are taught in certain ways. And at least some 
purported examples of indoctrination do combine content and method, 
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for example, teaching false beliefs as if they were true or teaching 
beliefs not known to be true as if they were known to be true. To 
show that content is irrelevant, it would be necessary to show that 
any content whatsoever could be taught by an indoctrinatory method. 
Turning first to the more obvious candidates for indoctrinatory 
content, some writers have stressed the link in meaning between 
'indoctrination' and 'doctrine'. 	 For example, Peters writes:- 
II ... whatever else 'indoctrination' may mean it obviously has 
something to do with doctrines, which are a species of 
beliefs."10  
This seems very sensible but at least two questions arise: what is it 
that marks doctrines off from other beliefs and how is indoctrination 
linked with them? 	 Perhaps, in relation to the second of these 
questions, not only doctrines can be indoctrinated but also beliefs 
which tacitly presuppose doctrines without being themselves strictly 
doctrinal. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 'doctrine' as 'what is taught, 
body of instruction; religious, political, scientific, etc., belief, 
dogma or tenet'. 	 However, the first alternative in this definition 
would make all teaching indoctrinatory and it therefore fails to 
demarcate indoctrination (in its pejorative sense) from education. 
So if it is to be helpful to say that indoctrination can only be of 
doctrines, we need a narrower sense of the latter term than 'what is 
taught'. 	 The following is a definition proposed by Woods and 
Barrow:- 
"A doctrinal system of belief ... consists of an inter-related 
set of ideas, based upon certain propositions or postulates that 
cannot be demonstrated to be unquestionably true, which taken 
together have repercussions for the way in which the beliffer 
views the world and for the way in which he lives his life."' 
Basic beliefs of all kinds are such that they cannot be shown to be 
true although it does not follow - or so Reformed epistemologists 
claim - that they cannot be known to be true. 	 Whether or not the 
basic axioms of a mathematical or logical system would fall into this 
category I am not sure but the second element of the above definition 
draws attention to the purported worldview-ish and practical 
implications of a doctrinal system and this would seem to apply rather 
more to the higher and more comprehensive levels of the hierarchy of 
forms of knowledge than to mathematics and logic. Metaphysical, 
religious, moral and political basic beliefs would be rather more 
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obviously doctrinal. 	 The basic beliefs of systems like naturalism, 
materialism and the like would also be doctrinal. But the definition 
given above does not require that doctrinal beliefs have to be basic: 
rather, it suggests that they are integral to systems of beliefs which 
have both undemonstrable bases and pervasive consequences for a 
person's total outlook and way of life. 
This points to an important way in which basic beliefs may be 
imparted. Since they are presupposed by other beliefs in a doctrinal 
system, they can be taken for granted in setting the framework for a 
lesson or discussion. 	 For example, a lesson which starts from 
examination of the question of whether God only works through 
'natural' means or intervenes supernaturally in nature presupposes the 
existence of God. And, as I have suggested, even a discussion of the 
question of indoctrination will take for granted some basic beliefs 
about persons, rationality and the like. 	 Gregory and Wood display 
some concern on this kind of possibility as they write:- 
"Is it not possible to unearth a number of doctrinal pro- 
positions that provide the rationale for our own paper? Thus, 
'it is impossible to reach true conclusions as far as doctrines 
are concerned', or, 'The rational way is the only way to get at 
the truth'. ... There remains unease on our part that we may 
be half-way towards being characterised as indoctrinators our-
selves, on our own criteria at any rate."12  
Whether or not their unease on this point is justified depends upon 
what are acceptable ways to deal with such basic beliefs. We shall 
return to this shortly in an attempt to bring together some of the 
criteria. 
I think that doctrines defined in terms such as the above are the 
classic content of indoctrination and cover the usual paradigm 
examples. 	 This, of course, does not establish the necessity of a 
content criterion because it is still possible that any belief 
whatsoever may be indoctrinated. Those who argue that indoctrination 
is not restricted to any particular kind of content or, at least, that 
it is not restricted to doctrines have produced various counter- 
examples. John White, for example, suggests that a teacher might 
want to get a boy to hold unshakably the belief that Melbourne is the 
capital of Australia, just to show that it can be done.13 	 White 
allows that we may generally use the word 'indoctrination' only in 
relation to the teaching of beliefs that form part of an ideological 
system but insists that his hypothetical example is sufficiently like 
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the more usual cases of ideological indoctrination to justify the 
teacher in question in calling it indoctrination. 
	 I am not sure that 
White is correct in setting aside general linguistic usage in seeking 
to analyse concepts or in concluding that the connection between 
'indoctrination' and 'ideology' is contingent rather than necessary. 
What other source do we have for analysis of concepts but general 
linguistic usage? The problem here is that general usage has changed 
somewhat from that which covers teaching of all kinds of knowledge to 
a more limited pejorative sense and, for this reason, a dictionary 
which has to include all these uses is of limited use. 	 The teacher 
in White's example might well call what he is doing indoctrination (in 
the pejorative sense) but I think most people would find it a somewhat 
odd use of the term even though they would agree that the activity in 
question is indeed an example of miseducation of some kind or other. 
Other counter-examples adduced include: "He does not regard Pop music 
as music because he , has been indoctrinated to believe that only 
classical music is music", "He believes that it is always wrong to act 
illegally because he has been indoctrinated to do so" and "He has been 
indoctrinated to believe in the existence of ghosts".14 	 These 
examples have in common that the beliefs in question are fairly 
controversial and I would expect their contexts to show that they were 
taught in a way that was less rational than it could have been given 
the conditions in my third version of the method criterion earlier. 
I would expect them to meet the method criterion but do they meet the 
criterion of doctrinal content? 
	 Without a context we cannot say but 
I would suggest that it is not impossible that they should. 
	 The 
first example could be uttered by a devotee of some cult movement 
which holds that Elvis Presley is still alive. The second could well 
be about someone who has been on the receiving end of a Thought Reform 
Programme in a totalitarian state and the third could refer to an 
initiate into spiritism of some form. 
	 I would maintain that these 
examples make more sense if both content and method criteria apply to 
their uses of 'indoctrinate'. To say, for example, 'He has been 
indoctrinated to believe that the square of seven is forty-eight' does 
not make sense in the same way. 
The more plausible counter-examples to a criterion of doctrinal 
content are such as to be likely to have been taught using an 
indoctrinatory method and for which a background of a doctrinal system 
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is not unlikely. 	 Here I am using the term 'doctrinal system' in a 
slightly wider sense than, for example, John White does when he refers 
to a "close-knit system" of political or religious beliefs and in 
relation to which he takes "communist systems of political education 
or, perhaps, the teaching of religion in Roman Catholic schools" to be 
paradigm cases of indoctrination.15 	 My wider sense refers to 
worldviews and these need not be close-knit or explicitly formulated 
but this sense need not be so wide as to render the use of the term 
'doctrinal system' meaningless. 
	 After all, we are dealing here with 
concepts which are "fuzzy round the edges".16 	 It is in this wider 
sense that indoctrination may take place in any part of the school 
curriculum. Beliefs may be imparted along with tacit presuppositions 
that come to form the framework of the pupil's world-and-life-view. 
There could be a 'hidden curriculum' being taught - not necessarily 
knowingly or intentionally - in that, say, the examples used in a 
mathematics lesson are racist or the impression is being given that 
human reason must always have the last word in all matters. Some 
form of naturalism could be imparted in this way in a science lesson. 
Doctrinal content is not sufficient for indoctrination since any 
content whatsoever can presumably be handled in a morally acceptable 
manner but, in the pejorative sense of the term as I am using it, it 
is necessary for indoctrination. 
	 Perhaps there is something of a 
stipulative or persuasive definition in the way I have gone about this 
but I do think it conforms to the general usage of the term and covers 
the most plausible examples. 
6.3 INDOCTRINATION AND INTENTION 
I have maintained that both method and content are necessary for 
indoctrination but are they jointly sufficient for it? I think they 
are because I find the other main candidate - an intention criterion -
to be unnecessary and I shall attempt to show fairly briefly why I do 
SO. 
Some have argued that an intention criterion is necessary for 
indoctrination and, indeed, some have argued that it is also 
sufficient. Among these are John White who suggests that 
"indoctrinating someone is trying to get him to believe that a 
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proposition 'p' is true, in such a way that nothing will shake that 
belief"17 and I. A. Snook who writes:- 
"A person indoctrinates P (a proposition or set of propositions) 
if he teaches with the intention th§t the pupil or pupils 
believe P regardless of the evidence." 1°  
White's definition is wider than Snook's since, presumably, beliefs 
may be shaken by factors other than counter-evidence, e.g., the 
influence of a charismatic personality or peer-pressure. 	 But both 
have it in common that what makes an activity indoctrinatory is what 
the indoctrinator intends or attempts to accomplish through the 
activity rather than what kind of activity he engages in or what it 
actually accomplishes. 	 White would probably say that it is a false 
dichotomy to oppose intention to kind of activity since he holds that 
we normally distinguish one activity from another in terms of the 
agent's intention.19 	 He points to the example of a person raising 
his arm and argues that observing his bodily movements does not tell 
us that he is signalling rather than doing P.T. nor does observing the 
results of what he is doing because in both cases a taxi might draw 
up. I am not sure that the same would apply in cases other than 
those consisting of a simple physical action like the one that White 
chooses for his example. 	 If the action were more complex, e.g., 
those involved in signalling from the floor of the New York Stock 
Exchange, or if it involved speech, then I think distinguishing 
between activities would not require reference to the agent's 
intention. 
I would further maintain that an intention criterion is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for indoctrination. 
	 On the one hand, a 
person may be indoctrinated unintentionally or even nonintentionally. 
It is possible to have indoctrinatory systems of education where the 
person engaging in the indoctrinatory activity may simply be 'going 
through the motions' quite unthinkingly or with the intention of 
simply doing what is expected of him. 
	 If I am correct in this then 
an intention criterion is not necessary. 
	 On the other hand, a person 
might intend to indoctrinate or, at least, to implant fixed beliefs or 
some such end result of his activity - for there cannot be many who 
actually intend to indoctrinate in a sense that they would accept as 
pejorative - and this person might fail to achieve what he intends. 
A failed attempt to indoctrinate is never indoctrination so intention 
cannot be sufficient for indoctrination. 
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Of course, the proponents of an intention criterion generally show 
their awareness of counter-arguments like these. 	 White, for example 
allows the possibility of something like unintentional indoctrination 
which he distinguishes from "the full-blooded intentional sense" of 
the word but he is reluctant to term it indoctrination. 	 He writes:- 
"Just as one can offend people without meaning to, so too, 
perhaps, one can indoctrinate them without meaning to. 	 But it 
does seem rather odd to say this, for if indoctrinating is a 
matter of getting people to believe things unshakably, does it 
make sense to talk of getting someone to do something without 
meaning to."" 
But White begs the question by introducing an intentional word like 
'getting' into his definition! 	 If instead he had written '... for if 
indoctrinating is a matter of engaging in activities that tend to make 
people believe things unshakably ...', he could not have made his 
point. 
Snook introduces a 'weak' sense of 'intention' to cope with some of 
the counter-examples to his intention criterion whereby a person would 
be indoctrinating if he foresees that it is likely or inevitable that 
as a result of his teaching his pupils will believe what he is 
teaching regardless of the evidence.21 	 It is very questionable 
whether this is a genuine sense of 'intention' at al1.22 	 Suppose, 
for example, that I find myself required by a syllabus to teach quite 
young children about the evils of taking drugs. 
	 Suppose further that 
I make every effort in doing so to bring it about that the children do 
not begin to take drugs but, at the same time, I am aware that their 
home backgrounds, environments or the like - together with the effect 
of my drawing their attention to drugs in my teaching them of the 
dangers of addiction - are such that I can foresee it as likely that 
they will experiment with them. Snook's weak sense of 'intention' 
entails that I intend these children to get involved in drug-taking 
notwithstanding all my efforts to discourage them. This does not 
seem at all plausible. 
The intention to indoctrinate is wrong but it is not indoctrination. 
Assuming then that there are no other strong candidates for a 
criterion of indoctrination, I conclude that indoctrination is a 
combination of certain methods with certain kinds of content. 
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6.4 METHODS, CONTENT AND BASIC BELIEFS  
I shall now bring the two criteria for indoctrination together and 
examine how they apply to the characteristic themes of Reformed 
epistemology and their place in education. Method and content 
criteria can be combined as follows:- 
X indoctrinates Y with a proposition p if and only if both: 
(i) given the capacities of both X and Y, X teaches p to Y in a 
way that is less rational than it could be in that it tends to 
restrict the development of Y's ability to assess the grounds 
upon which his belief that p is based; and 
(ii) p belongs to an inter-related set of propositions which is 
based upon certain propositions or postulates that cannot be 
demonstrated to be unquestionably true and which taken together 
tend to have repercussions for the way in which the believer 
views the world and for the way in which he lives his life. 
Of the two conditions given here, I think that the method one is the 
more important but I nevertheless feel that general linguistic usage 
and the paradigm examples of indoctrination justify the inclusion of 
the reference to content. 
There can be no doubt that beliefs in God and in self-authenticating 
divine revelation are included in the category of doctrinal content 
and, therefore, to teach them or beliefs that presuppose them meets 
the requirements of the second condition for indoctrination. 
	 But the 
second condition is, on my account, insufficient on its own and so the 
important question is whether it is inevitable that they be taught in 
a way that meets the requirement of the first condition. 	 Only then 
is it justified to hold that to teach them is indoctrinatory. 
However, as we saw earlier, it is impossible to teach basic beliefs in 
a way that is less rational than it could be simply because they are 
not justified inferentially. 	 Indeed, if there is immediate 
justification of such beliefs, to teach that belief in God ought to be 
based on reasons and evidence is, in a way, less rational than it 
could be because it is more 'rational' than it ought to be! In other 
words, if this kind of account is along the right lines, it is 
impossible to indoctrinate belief in God because it is properly basic. 
On the other hand, if belief in God is not properly basic, then it is 
indoctrinatory, all other things being equal, to teach it as if it 
were. 
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What of beliefs that presuppose a properly basic belief? 	 How should 
they be taught since they too meet the content criterion for indoc-
trination as I have presented it? Here I would suggest that the pre-
suppositions of these beliefs should be made explicit if, all other 
things being equal, the teaching method is to be as rational as it 
could be. 	 In this way, it can escape the charge of indoctrination in 
the more subtle form referred to earlier. 	 Of course, all other 
things may not be equal and it would seem difficult, for example, to 
show a young child how one belief presupposes another, much less give 
him a lesson in Kantian transcendental deduction! 
All this means that I am not indoctrinating if my belief in God is 
properly basic and I assume his existence in my teaching. 
	 Nor do I 
have to make an epistemic ascent to the level of this present 
discussion in order to be justified in my belief in him or, 
presumably, in my open declaration of this belief in the classroom or 
anywhere else. 	 At this point, someone who does not share my basic 
commitment is likely to raise the Hirstian objection that commitment 
to any set of religious claims is something that a sophisticated 
concept of education cannot assume or pursue.23 	 I think I can then 
reply that my concept of education does meet Hirst's requirement that 
it be concerned with passing on beliefs and practices "according to, 
and together with, their objective status" and, further, I am not 
seeking any commitment "beyond the grounds, reasons or objective basis 
for the claims concerned".24 I am being as rational as I can be so 
how can I be faulted or, at least, how can I be guilty of 
indoctrination? I can only be guilty of it if, in fact, the regress 
of justification stops elsewhere than with a properly basic belief in 
God. 
I think that this shows how Hirst's account comes from within a 
strongly internalist framework and assumes that reasons or evidence 
can be demanded for any belief whatsoever. But if these religious 
beliefs are properly basic it is impossible that they be justified in 
this way. 	 In this respect, these beliefs are like the basic axioms 
of a mathematical system. 
	 They differ from them in other respects 
and not least because they are not universal and because, being higher 
in the hierarchy of perspectives upon reality, they are more 
comprehensive. The believer can account for the non-universality of 
professed belief in God so that hardly makes him any less justified in 
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his belief. 	 That a belief has greater implications for a person's 
worldview or way of life hardly makes it any less justified either. 
Therefore, what Hirst demands it is logically impossible for the 
believer to provide - if his belief is properly basic. 
Further, if the Hirstian objects to commitment, he must also face up 
to the question of whether he himself is committed to one or other of 
the three alternatives of traditional rationalism, the professedly 
irrational faith in reason of the Popperian critical rationalist and 
what I have argued is the anthropocentricism of Bartley's pan-critical 
rationalism. These, I believe, share an assumption of unlimited 
rational autonomy in one form or another and their proponents are just 
as committed as the believer who submits himself to what he finds to 
be a self-authenticating authoritative divine revelation. 
	 And if 
these basic assumptions are mutually exclusive then it is not possible 
to argue against one of‘ them from the perspective of the other. 
Epistemic ascent to the meta-level of discussing these differences 
'from above', as it were, does not guarantee access to neutral ground 
because even there these basic presuppositions may have their 
influence. 
It seems therefore that what we have are opposing positions whose 
basic assumptions are mutually exclusive so that each - on the basis 
of my definition given earlier - can accuse the other of indoc- 
trination. 
	 The Reformed Christian who adopts an account along the 
lines I have sketched out may accuse Hirst of indoctrinating because 
his teaching presupposes basic assumptions which he can not justify 
(because they are basic) and which, on his own account, he ought to be 
able to justify. On the other hand, his opponent thinks the Reformed 
Christian of this kind is indoctrinating if he proceeds on the 
assumptions of his belief in God without first rationally justifying 
that belief. 	 There is here the possibility of an important a- 
symmetry in that the Reformed Christian is pointing to internal 
incoherence in his opponent's approach whereas his opponent's 
accusation of indoctrination does not make use of the Reformed 
Christian's assumptions. Apart from that, it seems that, for both 
parties, indoctrination is possible in their own teaching but 
inevitable in that of their opponents. Indoctrination is not simply 
what the other person does - it is what he must do and what I may do. 
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This raises at least two major questions. 	 First, what is the 
teacher's responsibility in relation to teaching alternative 
worldviews and how is he to discharge it? 	 Secondly, if he cannot 
indoctrinate his own basic beliefs, what about other non-rational 
methods for imparting beliefs of this kind? I have touched upon this 
second question briefly already and I shall return to look at it more 
fully shortly. 	 First, I shall seek to outline a range of possible 
approaches to teaching alternative worldviews. 
6.5 COMMITMENT, NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY 
Brian Hill has sketched an outline of alternative approaches to his 
own and other worldviews for the committed Christian teacher.25 He 
labels these respectively 'exclusive partiality', 'exclusive 
neutrality', 'neutral impartiality' and 'committed impartiality'. 
Exclusive partiality is a stance that represents the teacher's 
decision "to impart his personal and religious beliefs in a manner 
which precludes challenge" and at the other end of the continuum is 
exclusive neutrality which represents a decision "to keep such 
controversial areas of study as religion and politics out of the 
curriculum altogether". 	 The third stance is that of neutral 
impartiality which provides for the inclusion of "descriptive material 
in areas of controversy" and invites discussion and analysis of them 
but the teacher must remain neutral in the sense that "he does not 
reveal his own personal stance". 	 The other remaining stance is that 
of committed impartiality which differs from neutral impartiality only 
in that the teacher may reveal his personal beliefs "at relevant 
points in classroom interaction". 
Hill's stances seem to vary according to whether or not controversy is 
excluded from the class-room (exclusive-inclusive), whether or not the 
teacher's personal beliefs are revealed (committed-neutral) and 
whether or not there is bias toward the teacher's beliefs (partial- 
impartial). 	 This would theoretically give eight possible 
combinations but two are impossible because a stance cannot be both 
partial and neutral and the remaining two are probably omitted 
because, on the one hand, committed impartiality is taken to be 
unlikely to coexist with the exclusion of controversy and, on the 
other hand, committed partiality would tend not to allow it. 
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The exclusive-inclusive distinction could perhaps be more helpfully 
termed 'closed-open'. 	 Hill suggests two ways in which an approach 
can be exclusive - or, in my terms, closed - and they are the 
alternatives of (i) excluding controversial religious, political and 
other basic worldviewish matters altogether from the curriculum and 
(ii) allowing only one perspective and that in a way that 'precludes 
challenge'. 
The first of these is exemplified in the public (state) schools of the 
United States where religious studies is totally excluded from the 
curriculum. 	 Hill mentions that a similar approach can be found in 
his own country of Australia and the result is what he terms "a 
bleached, fact-loaded academic curriculum".26 	 Hill says that this 
distorts the balance in the curriculum. 	 However, it is possible to 
respond to this by questioning whether the balance of the curriculum 
has to be achieved altogether within schools. 	 There are other 
educative agencies, e.g., family, church, media and the like, so, it 
might be argued, why should not the state's part in the educational 
process be confined to certain parts of the curriculum? After all, 
at least in Britain, education is recognised to be the responsibility 
of the parent and the teacher is 'in loco parentis'. There may be 
some merit in this kind of case but I think it is outweighed by 
considerations that arise from the unified and integrated nature of 
knowledge. If knowledge consists of a complementary set of 
autonomous areas or even strictly incommensurable areas, then it might 
make some sense to assign the immediate responsibility for different 
areas to different institutions. But if it is as I have presented it 
- a hierarchical set of increasingly comprehensive perspectives upon 
reality - then to divide it up into discrete areas taught in separate 
institutions seems inevitably distorting. 	 At least where it is 
taught in different classrooms by different teachers in different 
departments or faculties of the same institution, there is greater 
possibility of co-operation and integration. 
Assuming such an integrated view of human knowledge and the pervasive 
influence of presuppositions which are philosophical-theological and 
central to worldviews, the exclusion of religion will distort the 
balance of the school curriculum regardless of what happens in the 
home or any other place of educational influence upon the child. 
Further, it can give the impression that these matters of basic 
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outlook and basic values do not matter and it may even promote by 
default what Hill terms "a vague kind of secular humanism which is the 
more pernicious for being unadmitted and therefore unexamined by the 
students at the level of presuppositions"27 (an example of 
unintentional indoctrination). 
If such basic matters of belief and value should not be excluded al-
together from the school curriculum then perhaps they should be 
included but only in the form of a particular position imparted in a 
way that can not be challenged. 	 The official position is taught and 
controversy is excluded because critical questioning is not allowed. 
This is Hill's 'exclusive partiality' and it is found, for example, in 
some Christian and Islamic schools and also in schools in some 
Communist countries or, at least, it was in pre-glasnost days. 	 This 
is clearly indoctrination by the definition given earlier. 
	 I think 
this is so regardless of the age-level of the pupil because, if the 
child is capable of critical questioning, not to allow it makes the 
method less rational than it could be. 
However, the position is not so clear if such questioning is allowed 
and the stance, although still committed and partial, becomes 
inclusive rather than exclusive. This is one of the possible stances 
omitted by Hill presumably because he takes it to be unlikely. 
Unlikely it may be but, I think, not impossible. 
	 I can conceive of a 
school which has an official position which it teaches along with the 
reasons and evidences upon which it is based as far as it is logically 
and practically possible to teach them and allows - even encourages -
critical discussion to ascertain whether the official position is 
internally coherent. This is not obviously an example of Hirst's 
'primitive concept' of education whereby beliefs and values are passed 
on by one generation to the next simply because they are held to be 
true and valuable. 	 It has much in common with his 'sophisticated 
concept' because reasons and grounds are communicated in a way that 
does not preclude critical scrutiny even down to the foundations. 
This could and, all other things being equal, should provide for the 
consideration of defeaters and defeater-defeaters of the set of basic 
beliefs in question. This could even be done with an awareness that 
it is not a universally shared set of beliefs but without necessarily 
going into any detail about alternative perspectives. 
-173- 
I am not sure that this stance of inclusive or open partiality is 
indoctrinatory in the waq that the exclusive or closed alternative 
obviously is. 	 Assuming my earlier definition of indoctrinatory 
method, I do not think it can be faulted. 	 It does not tend to 
restrict the development of the student's ability to assess the 
grounds upon which these beliefs are based unless we assume that 
knowledge of alternative beliefs and belief-systems is required for 
such assessment. 	 If this knowledge is required, it would seem that a 
person cannot be justified in believing something unless he has 
considered and is justified in rejecting all the alternative beliefs 
and belief-systems which are opposed to it. 	 It does not seem 
reasonable to require this so I suggest that whatever this stance is, 
it is not indoctrinatory as it stands. 	 It might be claimed that it 
is miseducative because it deepens the divides between groups in 
society -with different worldviews or it fails to prepare the student 
adequately for life in such a society (and of this there will be more 
in the next chapter). It may be miseducative without being 
indoctrinatory. 
It might be objected that such a stance is partial and therefore 
biased towards a particular worldview. But bias in itself is not 
wrong: I may be biased towards something because it is good or true or 
valuable and I may be biased against something because it is not good 
or true or valuable but I cannot be faulted for such biases. This 
kind of bias is not necessarily prejudice in the sense of having made 
up one's mind without considering all the reasons, evidences and 
grounds. I conclude that this kind of open partiality is not as 
clearly unacceptable as either Hill's exclusive partiality or his 
exclusive neutrality. At least, it is not obviously indoctrinatory 
or biased in unacceptable senses of those terms. 
The third stance in Hill's list is that of neutral impartiality. 
This is neutral in that the personal commitment of the teacher is not 
revealed and impartial since it is intended that there be no bias 
towards the teacher's viewpoint or any particular worldview. It is 
inclusive or open in that controversy is not excluded from the class- 
room. 
	 The ways in which controversial material is handled can vary 
from the purely descriptive through encouragement to clarify the 
student's own values to discussion, analysis and critical assessment 
of a variety of viewpoints but always under the chairmanship of the 
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'neutral teacher'. 	 The purely descriptive handling of controversial 
material would give an approach which would be better classified as 
'exclusive neutrality', as would the version of this stance that 
excludes religious beliefs altogether from the classroom. One of the 
main problems with the inclusive versions is not dissimilar to that of 
the unintentional indoctrination of exclusive neutrality. 	 It has to 
do with the kind of model the neutral teacher becomes for the pupil. 
In seeking to avoid abusing the institutional power vested in his 
position and his generally superior intellectual resources in relation 
to an educational audience which Anthony Quinton terms "the most 
abject of all in its captivity",28 the teacher seems to have his 
colours nailed rather firmly to the fence. 	 This position is false to 
the reality of his own commitment and of his relationship with his 
pupil as a fellow pilgrim after truth and, I would suggest, tends to 
indoctrinate into a viewpoint which devalues commitment and turns 
discussion of such important matters into a playground for 
intellectual frolics. 
	 In addition, as Hill and others point out, 
neutrality is impossible to maintain since the teacher is always 
unintentionally revealing his values and attitudes in all sorts of 
ways.28 
So why not stop play-acting and reveal one's own commitment to one's 
pupils? 	 This takes us to Hill's fourth approach, that of committed 
impartiality. 
	 This stance is, like neutral impartiality, inclusive 
of controversy and differs from it only in that the teacher can come 
down off the fence at appropriate moments and in appropriate ways. 
This is a very difficult stance to maintain without allowing the 
teacher's position to exert undue influence but difficulties may be 
there to be overcome rather than to be avoided by adopting another 
stance. 	 Indoctrination is possible but not inevitable. 
A final possible stance is committed impartiality which excludes 
controversy. This is omitted by Hill and does seem unlikely. It 
would require a purely descriptive and unchallengeable account of 
alternative worldviews including the teacher's own which is simply 
identified as such. 
	 As before, excluding critical analysis of 
worldview beliefs seems clearly indoctrinatory because it tends to 
restrict the development of the pupil's ability to assess the grounds 
of these beliefs. 
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Having looked briefly at these six alternatives - including the two I 
have added to Hill's four - I have rejected four. Those which 
exclude controversy do not allow critical analysis of any worldview 
beliefs and are therefore indoctrinatory. Neutral stances distort 
the nature of knowledge and commitment and tend towards unintentional 
indoctrination. 	 This leaves just two stances, both of which are 
inclusive (open) and committed. 	 They differ only in that one is 
partial and the other is impartial, i.e., in that one deals only with 
one worldview and the other deals with a range of worldviews. 
	
They 
can be equally rational in assessing reasons and evidences as far as 
is logically possible and in encouraging discussion right to the 
foundations of the set or sets of beliefs and their potential 
defeaters. 	 As committed stances, both face the problem of the 
possibility of the teacher's position exercising undue non-rational 
influence upon the pupil but this is something to be fought against in 
using these approaches rather than a reason for not adopting either of 
them. 
Perhaps these two stances are not mutually exclusive as far as the 
pupil's total school career is concerned: perhaps the partial approach 
of dealing with just one worldview is more appropriate with the 
younger child who having come to understand one perspective better is 
then in a better position to appreciate others. For the Christian, 
the partial stance is only possible within a Christian context and 
this is likely to mean that of a Christian school. A different kind 
of Christian school - no less committed - could provide the context 
for committed impartiality but it is also possible in schools which 
are not committed to any worldview - if that is possible. This 
brings us to the subject of the next chapter so I shall defer further 
discussion of it until then. 
6.6 NON-RATIONAL METHODS AND BASIC BELIEFS  
If properly basic beliefs are not a matter of rational justification 
and if, as a result, it is not possible to indoctrinate them, the 
question arises: does anything go as far as imparting them is 
concerned? 	 We saw earlier how Price claimed that no procedure that 
brings him to believe that he feels warm can be unreasonable since 
such a belief is not a matter of reason. But there are a variety of 
procedures that may bring me to feel warm other than immediate 
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awareness of warmth. 	 It seems conceivable that some form of hypnosis 
or conditioning might make me believe I was warm when I was in danger 
of becoming frost-bitten. 	 In such circumstances, these techniques 
may not be unreasonable - or reasonable - in the sense that they do 
not involve the use of reasons and evidence as a basis for the beliefs 
in question but the use of such procedures may be unreasonable in the 
sense that it is morally unacceptable. Because a method does not 
involve argument it does not follow that we cannot argue about the use 
of the method. 
However, my adaptation of Price's example is not one that rules out as 
morally unacceptable the method as such but only the method used to 
impart a false belief. 	 What, say, of the use of an aggressive de- 
programming technique on the brainwashed victim of a cult to replace 
false beliefs with true beliefs, assuming, of course, the 
unavailability of a rational method? What is acceptable and what is 
unacceptable in relation to basic beliefs? 
It would seem helpful at this point to look again at what constitutes 
a properly basic belief. I have proposed that, to be properly basic, 
a person's belief involves his immediate awareness of the object of 
the belief and his believing understandingly in the light of this 
immediate awareness. I cannot be immediately justified in my belief 
that I am being appeared to red-ly if I am not being appeared to red- 
ly and if I have no understanding of redness. Nor can I be 
immediately justified in my belief that God is speaking to me through 
the words of the Bible if he is not speaking to me through them and 
if, say, I have no understanding of the words. 	 I proposed earlier, 
on this basis and following Paul Helm, that the internal testimony of 
the Spirit should not be thought of as merely acting as a mechanical 
stimulus.30 
What this entails, I think, is that the conditions under which a 
person comes to hold a basic belief must be appropriate for him if he 
is to be immediately justified in his belief. Otherwise he lacks the 
immediate awareness and understanding necessary for such 
justification. 	 Just as there are conditions necessary in order that 
a belief which could be indoctrinated should not be so, e.g., 
appropriate reasons and evidences are provided and grasped, so, also, 
there are conditions here in relation to the imparting of basic 
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beliefs if they are to be properly basic. 	 An acceptable method for 
the Reformed Christian to deal with the basic beliefs that 
characteiise Reformed epistemology is to bring about the appropriate 
circumstances for coming to be immediately justified in holding these 
beliefs. 
It is therefore not true that anything goes where teaching properly 
basic beliefs is concerned. 	 Indeed, 'teach' might seem an 
inappropriate term to use in relation to basic beliefs. 	 They may be 
caught rather than taught or, to adapt, an old saying:- belief cannot 
teach to unbelief, it can only preach to it. D. Z. Phillips, in 
dealing with a similar problem in relation to his 'groundless beliefs' 
suggested "elucidation ... displaying a thing of beauty" would be 
appropriate.31 The problem with basic beliefs is similar to that of 
how to teach that something is beautiful and the solution.may be to 
display the thing and talk about it and its features. 	 The hope is 
that the pupil will come to see for himself. 	 He should not be 
hypnotised or brainwashed into seeing it and he cannot be argued into 
seeing it but, in the appropriate conditions, he may find himself with 
the belief that it is beautiful. 
Elucidation of the Reformed Christian worldview will be a case of 
displaying it and pointing to its features in order to bring about 
understanding of them. 
	 These features may include its internal 
coherence. 	 It is not a case of presenting reasons for believing but 
of meeting objections to belief and removing hindrances to it. 
	 If it 
is possible, i.e., if students are capable of appreciating and 
understanding it, then it could include epistemic ascent to the meta- 
level of considering the nature of immediate justification. All in 
all, it is a matter of bringing about the conditions in which 
immediately justified belief may occur. And an education whose 
assumptions exclude the possibility of this happening is not neutral 
in relation to this kind of view of belief in God. 
This could form part of a confessional approach to education which is 
not indoctrinatory because it respects reason within its logical 
limits and repudiates purely mechanical teaching methods which do not 
bring about belief with understanding. 
	 It would seem appropriate for 
a Christian home, school or church and distanced from the 
indoctrination that can sometimes take place in home, school or 
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church. 	 But what about the non-denominational school? 
	 What about 
preparation for life in a pluralist society? What about common 
ground with those of other worldview outlooks and co-operation with 
them in coming to understand the world? 	 Should all schools be 
identified with their particular worldviews - Christian (of many 
different kinds?), Muslim, Jewish, Humanist, etc.? These and related 
issues are the subject of the discussion of the final chapter. 
7 
CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY 
'Pluralist' can be used both in a descriptive and an evaluative sense. 
A society might be said to be pluralist in the former sense if it is 
the case that there exists within it significant numbers of adherents 
to a plurality of world-views. These may include not only religious 
outlooks but also those which are alternatives to them and which have 
the same kind of function in the life of the individual or group as 
those which are clearly religious. 	 In this first descriptive sense, 
it seems evident that modern Western societies are pluralist. 
Indeed, the state schools of such societies are also likely to be 
pluralist in this sense and within any classroom in such a school - at 
least at the secondary level - the teacher will probably be relating 
to pupils who represent among themselves a plurality of worldviews. 
The second sense goes beyond mere description to a positive evaluation 
of this plurality of worldviews. This evaluative sense applies more 
to outlooks than to societies but a society is pluralist in this sense 
to the extent that such an outlook finds general acceptance among its 
members. This sense has both strong and weak versions. 
	 A weaker 
version might hold, for example, that plurality of worldviews is a 
good thing because it provides for the possibility of change and 
development through the competition of differing outlooks for 
acceptance and the dialogue that may take place between them. A much 
stronger version might seek to transcend the variety of competing 
alternative worldviews with an outlook which both explained this 
variety and sought to replace it with an all-embracing view or a 
'world theology' so-called. 
The task for the Reformed epistemologist who seeks to work out a view 
of education which is consistent with his theory of knowledge is two- 
fold. It has to do with both the attitude he ought to take towards 
those whose viewpoints differ from his own and the extent to which he 
ought to engage in co-operative activity with them in a task as 
important as the education of children. 
	 He might hold that dialogue 
with holders of opposing viewpoints is itself a compromise of his 
position and that the only appropriate kind of school for the Reformed 
Christian teacher or student is one that is itself Reformed in 
outlook. 	 Indeed, he might go further and advocate a form of 
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apartheid in the separate development of communities of believers of 
different basic outlooks, each with their own schools for their own 
children. This is the antithetical form of Calvinism taken to its 
logical outcome and there are examples of its outworking to be found 
in some parts of the world. 	 However, as we saw earlier, there has 
generally been a tension between this emphasis in Reformed theology 
and the more positive account which, on the basis of a doctrine of 
'common grace', gives more place to common notions or common ground 
between differing outlooks. A more positive Reformed Christian could 
well take a rather different attitude toward those of differing basic 
outlook and would find it rather more acceptable to work along with 
them in a common educational institution. 
The problem here is one of the limits of tolerance. 	 Of course, this 
is a problem not only for the Reformed Christian but also for the 
holders of a wide variety of other worldviews, if not for all. 	 Even 
the most thoroughgoing of liberals faces what has become known as the 
'paradox of liberalism' for, it seems, liberalism provides for and 
even requires the tolerance of all viewpoints except those which are 
intolerant. The most liberal advocates of multi-faith religious 
education do not give the same credence to all viewpoints: they do not 
generally encourage teachers to develop in their pupils sympathetic 
insights into Nazism or Satanism. 	 The limits of tolerance can also 
be a problem among holders of more or less the same worldview. 
	 The 
problem here concerns how far a viewpoint may diverge from what is 
accepted as 'orthodox' and how to relate to a fellow-believer over 
those points of belief and practice over which there is disagreement. 
Those Christians who lay most stress on the antithesis between 
Christian and non-Christian viewpoints are often those who tend most 
easily to sectarian division among themselves. 
7.1 CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TO OTHER FAITHS  
Discussions in recent years of how different religious viewpoints 
should relate to one another have tended to take place within the 
framework of a classification proposed by John Hick. He suggests 
that the three main views of the relation between the different 
religious traditions are what he labels 'exclusivist', 'inclusivist' 
and 'pluralist'. 
	 He defines these as follows:- 
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"By 'exclusivism' I mean the view that one particular mode of 
religious thought and experience (namely, one's- own) is alone 
valid, all others being false. 
	
By 'inclusivism' I mean the 
view ... that one's own tradition alone has the whole truth but 
that this truth is nevertheless partially reflected in other 
traditions; and, as an additional clause special to 
Christianity, that whilst salvation is made possible only by the 
death of Christ, the benefits of this are available to all 
mankind. And by 'pluralism' I mean the view - which I advocate 
- that the great world faiths embody different perceptions and 
conceptions of, and correspondingly different responses to, the 
Real or the Ultimate from within the different cultural ways of 
being human; and that within each of them the transformation of 
human existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness 
is manifestly taking place."1  
Before I go on to examine these in an attempt to see which would be 
more consistent with Reformed epistemology, there are a couple of 
general comments which I shall make on Hick's classification. 
First, Hick presents these three alternatives as progressive stages 
through which "most thinking Christians"2 have been moving over the 
last hundred years or so. 	 He likens this to the changes within 
astronomy from a simple Ptolemaic picture of the universe with the 
earth at the centre through the stage of the addition of epicycles or 
smaller circles centered on the original circles to the third stage of 
a Copernican revolution and its paradigm-shift to a helio-centric 
picture of the universe.3 	 However, I think it can be plausibly 
argued that both exclusivism and inclusivism are well represented on 
the contemporary Christian scene and that both are held by thinking 
Christians and that pluralism is more of a minority view-point at the 
present time. 	 If so, Hick's likening of these options to the 
successive stages of a process of scientific development seems quite 
questionable since there has been by no means a complete 'paradigm-
shift' from exclusivism to inclusivism and still less from inclusivism 
to pluralism. 
Secondly, Hick's alternatives are not exhaustive of the possibilities. 
For example, he ignores the alternatives of relativism and syncretism 
although they could perhaps be viewed as forms of pluralism albeit not 
identical with that which he advocates. He also leaves out 
naturalism in all its forms since the naturalist is not, in his terms, 
"open to the transcendent".4 However, it might well be argued that 
many have sincerely considered the religious options and concluded 
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that a naturalistic humanism is the right response to life as they 
find it. Further, Hick's exclusion of these alternatives suggests 
that his own account is itself exclusivist and that this form of 
pluralism also has its own limits of tolerance. I shall return later 
to the issue of the criteria for the exclusion of some worldviews and 
the acceptance of others. 
7.1.1 IS REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY NECESSARILY EXCLUSIVIST?  
The advocates of Reformed epistemology have often been charged with 
holding an exclusivist theology. 	 John Hick says that contemporary 
Reformed epistemologists and notably Plantinga tend to be 
theologically extremely conservative and probably strongly inclined 
towards an exclusivist theology of religions and he calls upon them to 
abandon their allegiance to "a sixteenth century set of theological 
ideas".5 He suggests that this need not involve abandoning the basic 
tenets of Reformed epistemology since, he says, he himself has long 
held a view which is similar to Plantinga's on basic belief in God. 
Hick makes a distinction between basic beliefs such as the belief that 
he is in the presence of God and and what he terms "secondary ... 
optional ... interpretative theories" such as that Jesus had two 
distinct natures or that the Christian awareness of God is the only 
authentic awareness of God. However, some of the beliefs that 
Reformed epistemologists put forward as being properly basic seem 
difficult to link with Hick's pluralism. He himself gives 'I am in 
the presence of God' as an example but this seems to make God personal 
as do other examples of Plantinga's and Alston's, such as 'God is 
speaking to me'. But Hick says elsewhere that different conceptions 
of the ultimate - some of which take God as personal while others do 
not - arise from the variations between different sets of human 
conceptual schema and spiritual practice.6 	 If it is acceptable to 
Hick to take as a basic belief one that entails that God is personal 
then it would seem that he must allow that basic beliefs are also 
interpretative. This seems to remove the basis of his distinction 
between basic beliefs and secondary interpretative theories although 
it does raise the problem about the theory-ladenness of claimed 
perceptions of God with which I attempted to grapple earlier.7  
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Perhaps there is some truth in the claim that theology and epistem-
ology can be separated since, for example, a claim which is formally  
similar to that of Reformed epistemology could be made for the 
statements 'Allah is speaking to me' or 'the Bhagavad-Gita is a self- 
authenticating divine revelation'. 	 Nevertheless, if there is a 
priority over epistemology of ontology (part of which has to do with 
the nature of spiritual reality and is therefore theological), our 
assumptions concerning what is there to be known will influence our 
theory of how we know it. 	 So when it comes to making a substantial  
claim in epistemology, this will require reference to particular views 
of what is there or what God is like. To claim that 'God is speaking 
to me through the scriptures' requires use of particular concepts of 
God and of scripture. This is part of what I earlier termed 
'semantic information' which is necessary for the existence rather 
than the justification of the basic beliefs in question.8 No 
particular belief can be properly basic without concepts like these 
because no such belief can exist without them. 
If a Christian claims that God is speaking to him through the 
scriptures and authenticating to him statements about the death of 
Christ on the cross and a believer from another religious tradition 
claims that his scriptures tell him that Christ did not die on the 
cross, the Christian who is a theological realist cannot accept both 
these incompatible beliefs as being true. His self-authenticating 
belief seems to exclude incompatible beliefs and to that extent at 
least he must be exclusivist. What if the other claimed a divine 
revelation which supplemented rather than contradicted his Christian 
revelation? 	 How he will respond to this will depend on his beliefs 
about the finality of revelation in the Christian scriptures and he 
may well hold that the Christian scriptures claim finality for 
themselves. 
So if the Reformed epistemologist makes the claim that God is speaking 
to him through the scriptures, the meaning of such a claim depends on 
the concepts of God and scripture that he is operating with and how 
exclusivist his position is will also depend - at least in part - on 
those concepts. And because appeal is being made to a revelation 
which is both personal and propositional, it would seem that he must 
at least be exclusivist in relation to claims to revealedness for 
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those propositions which clearly contradict those which he holds to be 
divinely revealed. 
Insofar as Reformed epistemology is exclusivist, why exactly is this 
taken to be something objectionable? 	 What is wrong with being 
exclusivist? 	 After all, to believe something is to believe that it 
is true and therefore, presumably, that what contradicts it must be 
false. 
Hick and others give a number of reasons for finding exclusivism an 
unacceptable view of the plurality of religions. Foremost among them 
is the argument that it is largely a matter of geographical accident 
whether one grows up a Christian or Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist so that 
exclusivism on the part of an adherent to any one of these religions 
makes possession of truth and salvation depend upon an accident of 
birth. Hick allows that there are "spiritual immigrants" but claims 
that these are very few in comparison with the populations through 
which religious traditions are transmitted from generation to 
generation. 	 He writes:- 
"Realistically viewed, one's religious commitment is usually a 
matter of 'religious ethnicity' rather than of deliberate 
comparative judgement and choice."9  
But how does this show that exclusivism is mistaken? It can easily 
be turned against Hick's own exclusion of non-religious alternatives 
wherein there is no spirituality or, as he puts it, no 'openness to 
the transcendent'. There are areas of the world and populations 
where the predominant worldview is not a religious one so it would 
seem to be a matter of 'ideological ethnicity' (extending his idea) 
whether one grows up with any religious view at all. If Hick's own 
argument is valid, it would seem to count against his own exclusion of 
these alternatives. 
	
In addition, talk of how few 'spiritual 
immigrants' there are makes the whole world religious situation rather 
more static than perhaps it really is nowadays - whatever it may have 
been in centuries past - for there are parts of the world where 
thousands of people are changing their religious affiliations - and 
many, it would seem, are doing so in a direction which is away from 
any religious faith at all. 	 What I would term Hick's 'geographicism' 
also fails to take account of the influence of mass media across 
geographical and cultural boundaries in this dynamic situation. And, 
I think, he fails to take account of the distinction between 'nominal' 
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adherence to a religion and becoming a committed believer, a step 
which the presence in one's situation of both the practical atheism of 
nominal religion and the theoretical atheism of secularism makes 
rather less automatic and more a matter of deliberate judgement than 
he seems to allow. 
Further, it is argued that exclusivism (in, at least, its traditional 
Christian form) condemns the majority of the world's population to 
hell and that this is inconsistent with the Christian doctrine of the 
universal love of God. 	 Perhaps this is what really underlies the 
preceding argument for Hick writes of "the old Christian presumption 
of a monopoly of saving truth" which, he says, "generated the paradox 
of a God of universal love who has ordained that only the Christian 
minority of the human race can be saved" and, he continues, "it is 
precisely this paradox that has called for a 'Copernican revolution' 
in our Christian theology of religions".10 	 However, again, this 
argument may be too strong for Hick's purposes for, if valid, it must 
count against any view of salvation which is less than universalist 
and it would seem that, according to Hick's own view, it is the great 
world religions that are ways of salvation and their different 
conceptions of salvation are "specifications of what, in a generic 
formula, is the transformation of human existence from self-
centeredness to a new orientation, centered in the divine Reality".11  
It would seem that there is no salvation outside the great world 
religions and, again, what Hick terms the problem for the exclusivist 
(Christian *or other) of a plurality of religions becomes for him as a 
religious pluralist the problem of a plurality of worldviews, some of 
which are non-religious. 	 Admittedly, Hick is talking of the 
experience of salvific transformation in this life rather than of a 
person's destiny on the great day of eschatological verification but 
by no means all conservative theologians would say that those who have 
never heard the gospel of Christ go to hell. 	 It would seem that the 
varying possibilities in the doctrines of the fall, sin, grace and 
human responsibility need to be taken into account before it can be 
assumed that the paradox that Hick alludes to cannot be resolved 
satisfactorily. 
In addition, Hick criticises Christian exclusivists for failing to do 
justice to the universal love of God and, at the same time, he holds 
that the policy of converting the world to Christianity is "an 
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anachronistic by-product of a past imperial age".12 	 The Christian 
exclusivist is held to be indifferent to the fate of non-Christians 
and to condemn millions to hell but if he engages in missionary work, 
then, apparently regardless of his attitude or manner of approach to 
those of other faiths or even how much he may have to suffer for his 
belief in the uniqueness of Christianity, he is an imperialist! 
A third kind of argument against exclusivism takes up the note of 
presumption and claims that the religious exclusivist ignores human 
fallibility,13 the influence of cultural factors upon beliefs14 and 
the like. But although this may be true of some religious 
exclusivists, it is not necessarily the case and therefore does not 
count as an argument against the position per se. A person may well 
be fairly strongly exclusivist and yet hold many of his beliefs -
including some of the more basic of them - in a way that does admit at 
least the logical possibility of his being mistaken in them. 
	 The 
version of foundationalism set forth earlier may be linked with a 
fairly exclusivist view but it is nevertheless a moderate  
foundationalism as against the stronger versions of classical 
foundationalism. 	 Such a position can coexist with a deep commitment 
to controversial opinions and, as Hick himself says of his own 
position, the logical possibility of being mistaken - in relation to 
what he admits to be a minority view - "should not prevent us from 
proceeding upon the best understanding that we have".15  
It is also sometimes argued that exclusivism tends to be sectarian16  
and, as a result, productive of social disharmony.17 	 This can be 
answered in a similar way by simply denying that a person with 
exclusivist views is necessarily sectarian unless it be the case that 
to hold a controversial set of beliefs shared by some but not by all 
is inevitably sectarian. I shall return to the issue of social 
disharmony later in this chapter. 
So, insofar as the Reformed epistemologist holds a cognitive view of 
faith and a propositional account of divine revelation, he will hold 
that certain beliefs are true and that those which contradict them are 
false. 	 To that extent at least, his position will be religiously 
exclusivist. 
	 But the arguments against exclusivism can just as 
easily be turned against any position which seeks to maintain its 
beliefs against those which contradict them - as Hick does in his 
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defence of religious pluralism - and so cannot count against 
exclusivism. We are exclusivist if we hold that what we believe is 
true and that what is incompatible with what we believe is false. 
This hardly seems objectionable. 
7.1.2 IMCLUSIVISM AND REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY 
The case against exclusivism may well be based upon a caricature of 
the range of views that could be termed both conservative and 
exclusivist. For example, the 'no salvation outside the church' 
doctrine may be presented as if, in all its forms, it always and only 
requires membership of the 'visible church' through baptism. 	 But 
many believe that there may be members of the visible church who are 
not Christians - in the sense of an allegiance which goes beyond 
purely nominal adherence held on to because, say, of parents' wishes 
or social pressures - and that there may be, on the other hand, those 
who are not baptised whom God will accept. 
	 Again, if exclusivism is 
presented in terms of a believing response to divine revelation, the 
impression can be given that the exclusivist holds that only those 
whose belief systems are fully in accord with traditional orthodox 
Christian doctrine are truly among the people of God. 
	 But there are 
many who would maintain that only those who are regenerated and have 
faith in Christ are truly accepted by God - and in maintaining this 
are in that respect exclusivist - who would at the same time be quite 
unwilling to say how much or how little revelation of Christ is 
required for a response of saving faith or how full an adherence to 
traditional Christian doctrines is needed. Presumably some minimal 
apprehension of Christ is required to make it meaningful to say that a 
person has faith in him. 
	 This would not be to say that a maximum of 
true belief is not to be sought after or thought desirable for the 
follower of Christ but only that it is not required for salvation in 
the sense of divine acceptance. 
It is this range of viewpoint that makes the distinction between 
exclusivism and inclusivism rather unclear. There are several 
distinct, albeit not independent, ways in which a religious position 
may be said to be (more or less) inclusive or exclusive. 
	 One way of 
defining exclusivism and inclusivism is in terms of truth. 
	 The 
exclusivist claims that one tradition alone possesses the truth while 
all others are false whereas the inclusivist allows that the truth 
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possessed wholly by his own tradition may nevertheless be partially 
reflected in other traditions. 	 However, as it stands, this is not an 
adequate basis for the distinction in question. 
	 If by 'truth' we 
mean any true belief whatever or by 'the truth' we mean the entire set 
of true beliefs, then nobody could claim that his tradition alone 
possesses the truth. 	 For a start, unless one is omniscient, there 
must always be more truth to discover. 
	 Secondly, such an exclusivist 
could not communicate his truths to anybody of any other tradition 
since there would be no common apprehensions, concepts or insights to 
provide a base for communication. 
	 It would therefore seem impossible 
that people of other traditions should always be incorrect in all 
their beliefs! 	 In this sense inclusivism is the only possible option 
and even then it has to be modified to allow that the whole truth 
cannot be possessed by any tradition or individual but only, 
presumably, by God. 
So the distinction cannot be made simply in terms of truth but only in 
terms of truths of a certain kind. 	 Here there is a range of 
possibilities including religious/theological truths, the truths of 
the core beliefs of a tradition, revealed truths and saving truth. 
To make the distinction that we are seeking in terms of 
religious/theological truths would seem to leave the exclusivist 
committed to the position that a person who does not share his 
position cannot make any true theological statements. So that if he 
is a Christian exclusivist he is forced to deny, for example, the 
truth of the Muslim claim that God is compassionate. As it stands, 
this would seem an untenable position but it is rather more plausible 
when developed in terms of the different concepts of God and of divine 
compassion that may be held by the Christian and the Muslim. The 
Christian may well and, I think, plausibly affirm that the Muslim is 
talking of a God who is rather different from God as conceived within 
traditional Christianity. 
	 It may be claimed that the Christian and 
the Muslim differ in the content of their basic or core-beliefs and 
that this is at least part of what makes the distinction between 
Christian and Muslim meaningful and, in the same way, that between 
exclusivism and inclusivism. In this sense, exclusivism could be 
seen as the claim that the core-beliefs of a particular worldview are 
exclusively true while inclusivism would allow that some of the core- 
beliefs of the favoured position may be 
	 reflected in other 
traditions. 	 However, I do not think this gets to the root of the 
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matter because it is likely that the Christian exclusivist will go on 
to maintain that his core beliefs are true if they are revealed by God 
and only insofar as they are revealed by God - and the same could 
apply to the exclusivist of another tradition, e.g., the Muslim or the 
Mormon. 
I think this reference to revelation is more central to the claims of 
the Christian exclusivist and to those of exclusivists of at least 
some other traditions. 	 Understood in these terms, the inclusivist 
will see some other scriptures or parts of them as containing divine 
revelation insofar as they overlap in content with or cohere with or, 
at least, do not contradict statements in the scriptures of his own 
tradition. The Christian exclusivist whose theology is conservative 
- as Hick sees Plantinga's to be - is likely to claim that the 
Christian scriptures are uniquely the self-authenticating divine 
special revelation. 	 This is not to deny that there is a general 
revelation available to all but simply to limit the scope of special 
revelation for our time to the contents of the Christian scriptures. 
Nor is it to deny the possibility of God's revealing some of this 
content to people who do not have access to the written scriptures 
themselves as, for example, in the stories told by some missionaries 
of how they have found peoples or individuals who already have parts 
of the Christian gospel revealed to them in dreams, visions or the 
like long before anybody came to them with a knowledge of the 
Christian scriptures. Indeed, it would seem quite possible on such 
an account that the scriptures of other traditions might contain 
either generally or specially revealed truths. Rare indeed would be 
the Christian exclusivist who would deny that the Jewish scriptures 
are the Word of God. 	 Indeed, both his and their scriptures contain a 
substantial section in the 
	 'Wisdom Literature' of Proverbs, 
Ecclesiastes and Job where what could be termed common sense is 
incorporated into the scriptures although, significantly, it is set in 
what Charles Martin terms "a God-fearing framework".18 
The Christian exclusivist whose exclusivism is defined in terms of 
revealed truth will regard the contents of his scriptures as uniquely 
the special revelation of God which authenticates itself to him under 
certain appropriate conditions. 
	 This does not mean that his 
interpretation of them has this kind of status 
	 since this is 
something that he should always be prepared to submit to the 
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scriptures for validation and, where he finds it necessary, correction 
or improvement. 	 If he adopts this attitude then he avoids the charge 
of presumption or arrogance and he can consistently be inclusivist at 
least to the extent of allowing (provisional) truth to parts of other 
scriptures and to common sense insights whilst at the same time 
maintaining that other traditions are basically mistaken in their core 
beliefs and concepts. 
The spectrum of opinion from exclusivism to inclusivism could also be 
defined in terms of saving truth. 	 Hick uses this phrase in relation 
to the exclusivism of religions which compete in their claims "to 
possess the saving truth"  .19  Use of the phrase 'saving truth' can be 
misleading in that it suggests that it is true beliefs that themselves 
save a person rather the grace of God through the person's faith- 
commitment to the object of those beliefs. It is, I think, 
traditional Christian belief to require at least a minimal awareness 
of divine grace in the death of Christ for saving faith and, in that 
minimal sense, true beliefs. But, although true belief to that 
extent may be necessary for salvation, it cannot be held to be suffic-
ient since it would seem that the devil must be one of the most 
orthodox in his beliefs. Possession of a complete set of true 
beliefs is therefore neither necessary nor sufficient for salvation 
while the kernel of true belief that is at the heart of faith- 
commitment is necessary without being sufficient. A person cannot 
trust in Christ without some awareness of who he is and what he has 
done but such awareness without trust cannot save. This is, I think, 
in accord with traditional Reformed Christian interpretation of the 
scriptures. 	 It can have more inclusivist implications than might 
appear obvious at first sight in that, although it might insist that 
there is no salvation outside the church, it would allow that what 
counts is membership of the invisible church rather than of the 
visible church through its sacraments. 
	 In this way, it would seem 
possible that somebody brought up in another religious tradition and 
outwardly conforming to the general requirements of that tradition 
might really be a Christian believer because he has that minimal 
awareness of Christ and has responded to him in faith. 
	 Such a person 
might be an 'anonymous Christian', albeit probably not in as inclusive 
a sense as that of Karl Rahner's use of the term to apply to those who 
do not have an explicit Christian faith but who nevertheless seek, 
consciously or unconsciously, to do God's will even though they do not 
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regard themselves as Christians and even though they may insist that 
they are not Christians but Muslims, Jews, Hindus, or whatever.20 In 
the face of such possibilities it would seem best not to judge a 
person's spiritual state too hastily but rather to acknowledge with 
the apostle Paul that "the Lord knows them that are his" 21 
The preceding are all definitions of the inclusivist/exclusivist 
distinction in terms of truth but Hick considers it more profitable to 
make the distinction in terms of salvation which he uses in a way that 
includes its functional analogies in the other major world religious 
traditions (liberation, enlightenment, fulfilment and the like).22  
Hick distinguishes two concepts of salvation - a juridical concept and 
a 'transformation-of-human-existence' concept. Under the juridical 
concept, salvation is a matter of God's acceptance of a person on the 
basis of Christ's' atonement. The exclusivist limits this to those 
who respond to it with an explicit act of faith whereas the 
inclusivist extends it to include those who have never heard of the 
death of Christ. 	 Under the latter concept - which Hick himself opts 
for in the development of his pluralist position - salvation is a 
matter of the transformation of human life which may also be held to 
be exclusively experienced by Christians or inclusively extended to 
take place within the contexts of the other great world religions.23  
Hick seems to regard these concepts of salvation as mutually exclusive 
and in the way he develops his own concept they do become so but there 
is no necessary contradiction between these ideas. Indeed, the 
Reformation theme of justification by faith properly understood cannot 
form an excuse for an antinomian casting off of all obligations to 
live a good life. The ideas of justification and sanctification go 
together in traditional Reformed theology so that both faith without 
works and works without faith are held to be dead. Sanctification is 
taken to be God's gradual transformation of the believer into 'the 
image of Christ' in a process which is only complete in the world to 
come and then immediately so. 
	 This is a restoration of the divine 
image in man which was marred through sin. 
	 The effects of the fall 
are such that man is not as bad as he might be since the restraining 
effects of God's common grace prevent him from going altogether to the 
bad and underlie his search for truth and goodness. 
	 On the other 
hand, the immediate effects of regeneration are not that the believer 
becomes altogether perfect at once - he is still a sinner and still 
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has to struggle with sin in this life. 	 This view of salvation 
• 	 certainly is exclusivist in that it confines salvation to the 
regenerate but they are not to be completely identified with the 
adherents of a 'religion' of Christianity and its institutional 
structures. In addition, it is inclusivist in that all that is good 
in the world is to be seen as evidence of God's common grace to all if 
not of his special grace to the redeemed. 
This gives a basis for the Christian believer to respect others as 
being made in the image of God and as truth-seekers like himself 
whilst at the same time recognising the reality and the effects of sin 
in them and in himself. 	 He can thank God for every act of love and 
every evidence of the transformation of human existence. 	 He can 
respect the integrity and sincerity of others even though he may see 
their belief system to be mistaken in certain, even fundamental, 
respects or some of their practices to be idolatrous. 	 He can see 
others not as Hindus, Muslims or whatever but as people who share a 
common humanity with him and who are, like him, sinners in need of the 
grace of God and as such, like him, capable of intellectual self- 
deception and even very evil deeds. 	 Such an attitude is rather more 
open and inclusive than that which the stereotypical exclusivist is 
generally seen to hold and yet it is quite consistent with an 
exclusivist insistence upon the need for regeneration or with Kuyper's 
talk of two kinds of people. 
This attitude and approach is, however, open to the objection that it 
restricts the possibility of progressive transformation and, with it 
saintliness to those who are regenerate through faith in Christ. 	 But 
what Hick takes to be the inductive basis of his pluralism is that, as 
he puts it, "the salvific transformation of human existence is going 
on, and so far as we can tell going on to a more or less equal extent, 
within all the great traditions".24 	 Hick sees the great world 
religions as being centrally concerned with ways of salvation and 
salvation as being "an actual change in human beings from self-
centeredness to a new orientation centered in the ultimate divine 
Reality".25 	 He sees this new orientation as having spiritual and 
moral aspects. 	 The spiritual is most clearly discernible in those we 
call saints and Hick claims that all the great world religions have 
those who are particularly "open to the transcendent" so that it seems 
doubtful that there is any higher incidence of saintliness within any 
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one tradition. 	 In regard to the moral aspect, he suggests that there 
is no good reason to believe that any of the great religious 
traditions has been more productive of love or compassion than any 
other. 	 From this he concludes that no one of the great world 
religions is salvifically superior to the others. 	 I think the main 
weakness with this argument is that it fails to account for the fact 
that it is not only the great world religions which produce 
outstandingly good or compassionate people. 
	 Hick excludes some from 
consideration because he sees them as not being open to the 
transcendent but the problem is that his criteria for the recognition 
of saintliness - "largely free from self-centred concerns and 
anxieties and empowered to live as an instrument of 
God/Truth/Reality" 26 - could be applied to a secular saint as well. 
Hick accuses Christian exclusivists of defining salvation in such a 
way that only Christians can be saved but, because the criteria he 
offers for recognising the fruits of salvation in human life can be 
applied to other than adherents of the great world religions, his 
restriction of salvation to the great world religions is also a case 
of defining salvation in such a way that it is a necessary truth that 
only Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims and members of other great 
world religious communities can experience salvation.27 On the other 
hand, traditional Christian theology is not necessarily embarrassed by 
the examples of what Hick terms saintliness from within other 
religious traditions since, as we have seen, it can well account for 
them in terms of its doctrines of man, sin and grace. 
7.1.3 PLURALIST ALTERNATIVES  
Reformed epistemology with its stress on the cognitive core of the 
faith response, its basic belief in a personal God and its emphasis on 
a self-authenticating propositional revelation seems to cohere most 
readily with an exclusivist approach to the plurality of world-views. 
However, this does not necessarily entail the kind of hard-line 
exclusivism which denies the possibility of any true belief about God 
to all but Christian believers. 
	 It can affirm all that is true and 
good in people of other outlooks albeit with a critical eye for all 
that is neither good nor true in others or, for that matter, in the 
Reformed Christian himself. 
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Reformed epistemology can therefore be more inclusivist than might at 
first sight seem likely but not to the extent of the thoroughgoing 
form of inclusivism which allows all the benefits of the death of 
Christ to extend to those who have no faith whatever in him. The 
move to such an inclusivist stance would require a fairly radical 
redefinition of the central Christian claims. 
This would be even more true of a move to one of the pluralist 
alternatives. 	 One of the best-known of these is that advocated by 
Hick himself. 	 He proposes that we see "the thought-and-experienced 
deities and absolutes as different manifestations of the Real within 
different historical forms of human consciousness" and "the divine 
noumenon, the Real an sich, as experienced through different human 
receptivities as a range of divine phenomena, in the formation of 
which religious concepts have played an essential part".28 He 
writes:- 
"We should therefore not think of the Real an sich as singular 
or plural, substance or process, personal or non-personal, good 
or bad, purposive or non-purpose". 49  
Hick talks of the Real 'revealing' itself to human beings but he goes 
on to qualify this by insisting that it does not entail divinely 
disclosed propositions or miraculous interventions in the course of 
human history but that it is "a response to the circumambient presence 
and prevenient pressure of the divine Reality"." 	 Clearly here the 
possibility of special/propositional revelation is dismissed and 
Hick's approach becomes essentially anthropocentric. 	 It would seem 
that it cannot be reconciled with Reformed epistemology with basic 
themes such as those elaborated in the central section of this study. 
Although Hick may claim support for his thesis of the ineffable Real 
an sich in some of the writings of mystics of various traditions,31 he 
effectively tells the followers of most if not all traditions that 
their view of the Real is deficient and proposes a new theology to 
replace those that exist at present. His is not a purely descriptive 
thesis at a different logical level from those of the sets of beliefs 
of the major world religions, a thesis which leaves everything as it 
is. 	 He tells the traditional Christian believer that the time has 
come to leave behind the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation 
"together with its protective envelope, the doctrine of the Trinity" 
which makes it difficult for Christians to move to a pluralist 
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position.32 	 He suggests that the advaitist Vedantic Hindu is 
mistaken in thinking that the Real is only authentically experienced 
as the impersonal absolute being, Brahman.33 	 Presumably, too, 
notwithstanding his protestations that as a Christian he is not in the 
business of telling members of other faiths how to conduct their 
affairs,34 he must regard them as just as much in need of 
demythologisation and a similar kind of Copernican revolution in their 
exclusivist theologies of uniqueness as that which he advocates within 
Christianity. 
Because of this I think it can be fairly claimed that Hick is just as 
exclusivist in his own way as those he criticises. 	 His theology may 
seem wider in that it attempts to embrace the plurality of world 
religions but it is in fact quite narrow if it requires radical change 
in them all to a new and different way which rests on the basic 
premise that salvation is equally going on in them all. 	 It is also, 
as I noted earlier, exclusivist in the way in which it grades 
religions and excludes altogether the loving and compassionate 
naturalistic humanist whose openness to the transcendent has led him 
to a considered judgement'that there is no transcendent ultimate 
Reality. He may exclude the member of the Jim Jones cult for lack of 
love/compassion/unselfish good will but his exclusion of what I have 
termed the secular saint shows that salvation is also a matter of 
basic belief. This, I think, makes his exclusivism, although 
different in scope, no different in kind from that which he condemns. 
7.2 CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY?  
The qualified exclusivism that I have suggested should characterise 
the Reformed Christian is often associated with a move to set up 
separate Reformed Christian schools. However, there are at least two 
questions to face in relation to the setting up of separate Christian 
schools. One is whether Christian parents should entrust their 
children's schooling to institutions which are not explicitly 
Christian and this is the one which tends to receive most attention in 
discussions among Christians. But a second question is one faced by 
Christian teachers: should they teach in schools which are not 
explicitly Christian or should they, if possible, withdraw into 
Christian schools? This second question has not received by any 
means the same amount of attention in recent discussions. 
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Sometimes the former issue is approached from the point of view of an 
attempt to reconcile the apparently opposing principles that require 
the Christian, on the one band, to be the salt of the earth and light 
of the world and, on the other, to bring up his children in a 
Christian way under Christian influences.35 	 Something of the 
conflict between these principles might seem to be resolved if the 
salt-light principle is applied to the choice facing the Christian 
teacher and the Christian upbringing principle is applied to that 
facing the Christian parent. 	 However, the position is not as clear- 
cut as this. 	 If the Christian teacher finds the system or curriculum 
to be humanist, naturalist, Marxist or whatever in its basic outlook 
and therefore, at that level, impossible to reconcile with his basic 
Christian beliefs, he still has to balance acting upon the salt-light 
principle with that which requires him to teach consistently with his 
Christian outlook. 	 So the avoidance of compromise with what he sees 
to be in error will be an issue for such a teacher. 	 And it is surely 
this avoidance of the corruption that is perceived to be in the world 
- manifested partly in false views of reality - that also underlies 
the obligation that the Christian parent may feel to bring up his 
children in a Christian environment. If a curriculum is unacceptable 
for its Marxist or Muslim or Humanist presuppositions then it is so 
both for the Christian teacher and the Christian parent. 	 On the 
other hand, the Christian parent will probably see the education of 
his children as, in part, a preparation for life in a world which is 
far from Christian and will face the problem of how best to prepare 
them, if they are also Christians, to be salt and light in that world. 
Being 'cocooned' from it in the environment of a Christian school may 
not be the best preparation for this. Perhaps at root the problem 
for both teachers and parents is how to follow the teaching of Jesus 
by being in the world and yet not of the world. 
Those Christian teachers or parents who favour the setting up of 
separate Christian schools have to face some fairly major objections 
to the whole idea of having a system of separate schools to reflect a 
pluralism of worldviews. I shall examine ways in which a Reformed 
Christian might respond to these objections. 
7.2.1 THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO AN OPEN FUTURE?  
That children's future choices are restricted thereby is a fairly 
common objection to the 'closed pluralism'36 of separate schools for 
children of different faiths and worldviews. Paul Hirst expresses it 
as follows:- 
"The committed ethos of the school will restrict undesirably the 
choice of children in important aspects of life when they should 
be open to a variety of influences within the generally agreed 
framework of the common morality of the society."37  
To this it could be responded that every school has a 'committed 
ethos' of some kind or other. 	 I think that Hirst would agree that 
this is so but he would go to insist that the kind of school that he 
would commend would be committed in a way that did not tend to 
restrict children's future choices but would rather, on the contrary, 
enlarge and deepen their capacity for choice. This would be provided 
by a commitment to an education which seeks that "in all areas, 
beliefs, values and attitudes and so on are held by individuals 
according to their rational status, there being a fundamental 
commitment to the progressive rational development of personal beliefs 
and practices rather than uncritical adherence to, or determined 
defence of, any particular set of beliefs 	 and practices whatever 
their source."38 	 Such commitment is, according to Hirst, logically 
more fundamental than any particular religious commitment but if some 
of the discussion of rational autonomy earlier in this study is along 
the right lines then we may have here two basic commitments which are 
mutually exclusive. The kind of commitment which Hirst advocates is 
exclusive of faith-commitment in response to a self-authenticating 
divine revelation. The strong internalism of its insistence upon 
reasons and evidence means that immediately justified belief of this 
kind is not acceptable. 
However, a 'tu quoque' answer is not the only response that can be 
made to this objection. 	 The Reformed Christian could go further and 
argue that his approach could be held to be more acceptable than one 
based on Hirst's commitment provided that it is worked out in a way 
that recognises and brings about an understanding of the religious and 
controversial nature of such basic commitments. 
	 The Reformed 
Christian's commitment does not need to render him any less opposed to 
indoctrination than anybody else - he can encourage rational 
questioning to the limits of rationality but he may define them 
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differently to Hirst. 	 It may not be so much the fact of the 
committed ethos of the school that matters as the way in which it, is 
exhibited and communicated to children. Undoubtedly, Christian 
schools can be highly indoctrinatory in their procedures - as can 
separate schools of other faiths and, indeed, state maintained schools 
as well - but they do not have to be so. Hirst may be effectively 
acknowledging this in his use of the word 'tend' in a separate 
objection to the setting up of separate schools when he writes:- 
"They will tend to be inadequate in their support of open, 
critical, rational education, ,rparticularly in the areas of 
religious and moral education."3/  
The tendency may well be there but this is something to be recognised 
and resisted within Christian schools rather than accepted as a reason 
for not setting up such schools. 
There is another way in which the committed ethos of the school might 
unjustifiably restrict children's future choices and this has to do 
with content rather than method. This may be nearer to the heart of 
Hirst's objection since he says that the children "should be open to a 
variety of influences within the generally agreed framework of the 
common morality of the society". 
	 The concern may be that, however 
rational the method, the approach could be that of what I earlier 
termed 'committed partiality' in that only one worldview is dealt with 
rather than the range of outlooks of the alternative of 'committed 
impartiality'.40 
 I suggested then that neither of these fell foul of 
the definition of indoctrination that I was proposing but I left open 
the possibility of one of them being held to be miseducative on other 
grounds. Denial of what Joel Feinberg terms 'the child's right to an 
open future' ,41 could form just such grounds. 
In order to avoid the controversial issue of whether it is meaningful 
to talk in terms of moral rights - as opposed to legal rights - I 
shall pose this problem in terms of the educator's obligations rather 
than of children's rights. Is there an obligation upon parents, 
schools, teachers or others responsible for a child's education to try 
to see that he becomes acquainted with and gains an informed 
understanding of a range of worldviews? 
	 This is something unlikely 
to be true of education under some totalitarian regimes, e.g., in some 
Communist and Islamic states, and in some closed communities within 
pluralist societies. 
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A clear example of this closed educational situation is in that 
provided by stricter communities of the Protestant Amish people in the 
United States. The religious faith of the Amish is expressed in a 
total way of life which is regulated by biblical texts and community 
rules. 	 They are very efficient farmers even though they refuse to 
use modern technological aids. 	 They are extremely self-sufficient, 
try to insulate their communities from outside influences and refuse 
to become involved with any of the state's provisions, e.g., social 
benefits or insurance. They are a law-abiding people but they have 
come into conflict with the state in regard to their educational 
provision for their children. 	 This is because they believe that 
their children's formal education should cease at the eighth grade 
when the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic necessary for 
their community life, work and worship have been mastered and it is 
this that has brought them into conflict with the authorities in at 
least two states in the United States.42 	 Less extreme cases than 
that of the Amish might not restrict the child's future choices to the 
extent of making him fit for only the way of life of a pious farmer 
but Christian, Muslim or Communist schools could well have in common 
with the Amish the restriction of influences to that of just one 
worldview. 
Is restriction of education to just one worldview wrong and, if so, 
why exactly is it so? 	 In line with the suggestion that separate 
schools restrict children's future choices, it could be argued that if 
such schools teach only one worldview - not that the fact that a 
school is a Christian school entails that there is no teaching about 
other faiths but assuming that the curriculum is limited in this way -
they thereby pre-empt children's decisions about which faith they 
should adopt. And the Christian should surely hold that this is a 
much more important matter than restricting the choice of career to 
that of being a pious farmer or a pious farmer! However, as stated, 
this argument is rather voluntarist and it is questionable whether it 
is really a matter of deciding to adopt a faith. Certainly, as far 
as Reformed epistemology is concerned, becoming a Christian may not be 
at all a matter of weighing up reasons and evidence for and against a 
position.43 But even if stated in less voluntarist terms this 
argument, pursued to its logical conclusion, would place an impossible 
burden upon educators. How many alternative faiths must a person 
know about and which ones and to what depth of knowledge before he can 
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make such a choice? 	 Is it necessary anyway to know about any of the 
other major world religions before one could conclude that one could 
not accept the Christian position? 	 I would suggest that potential 
defeaters of Christian basic beliefs are by no means limited to 
arguments from within other woridviews and obvious counter-examples 
include internal incoherence and such obstacles to belief as the 
problem of evil. 	 An adequate education in the Christian worldview 
should face such potential internal defeaters honestly and openly but 
I would argue that the 'choice' for or against Christianity does not 
really depend upon knowing about any particular alternative 
perspective. 
Hirst's limiting of alternative influences to the "framework of the 
common morality of the society" would seem surprisingly relativistic 
in its implications. It would presumably exclude Satanism and 
Fascism, for example, from the legitimate influences in our society 
but it would exclude Humanism and Christianity in some Islamic states 
and could insist upon voodooism in some societies. I think a case 
can be made for studying the major faiths that find allegiance in the 
global village of our world but on grounds other than an appeal to the 
need to widen children's choices. A stronger objection to separate 
schools that teach only one worldview is along the lines that they 
encourage social fragmentation and it is to this I now turn. 
7.2.2 DO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS LEAD TO SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION?  
The perceived tendency towards social fragmentation is a common 
objection to the idea of separate schools for those of different 
woridviews. 
	 Hirst expresses it in the following terms:- 
"Such schools necessarily encourage social fragmentation in the 
society along religious lines. 
	 The pluralism of a system of 
separate schools seems to me not to be the pluralism of a 
positively-developing rational critical society, for such a 
society will wish its major institutions to encourage unity 
amongst its members, a unity born of an open, rational, critical 
approach to all of life's concerns."44  
Again, I think this argument is only valid on the two-fold assumption 
that these separate schools go in for indoctrination and that they 
only teach the worldview of those who run the school. Neither of 
these need- be the case but I do think there is an argument here for 
the teaching of other faiths in all schools. 
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It may not be the case that to understand all is to forgive all but 
surely misunderstanding and prejudiced views of others contribute in a 
major way to hostility and strife between peoples. It is not that 
peace and social harmony is the only value but it is a Christian 
value. The way of love for others is a way that seeks to understand 
them. 	 Love seeks to communicate and inter-communication requires 
mutual understanding. 	 Understanding of others must include 
understanding of their basic outlooks and of the ways in which they 
look at the world. So I think an adequate Christian education based 
on central Christian beliefs and values will seek to promote accurate 
understanding of other worldviews. This would seem completely in 
line with the doctrines of God's creation of all in his image, his 
love for all and, not least, the Reformed Christian theme of his 
common grace to all. 
	 This would preclude caricaturing the beliefs of 
another worldview or comparing the worst elements in another worldview 
with the best in the Christian outlook or, as Nipkow puts it, 
introducing the beliefs of another merely "as a black foil in order to 
put the Christian answers in a bright light".45  
Seen in this way, multi-faith education is far from being a threat to 
Christian commitment - it is positively required by it. The fallen 
world in which children are growing up is a world of diversity in 
belief and learning to live in such a world requires understanding of 
that diversity. 	 This understanding should not only be accurate but 
it must also avoid being superficial. 
	 It goes further than the kind 
of comparative religion which Charles Martin terms "a patronising 
Cook's tour of what the natives do".46 And yet there are limits to 
the understanding and empathy beyond which teacher or pupils cannot go 
in an education which is consistent with the exclusivism that I have 
suggested is entailed by Reformed epistemology. 
	 The approach 
advocated by the second half of the following comment from a 
prescription for an adequate religious education lies, I think, beyond 
those limits:- 
"Religious education ... does more than study the role of 
religion in culture, investigate objectively the sacred 
writings, rituals and cultural products of religious 
communities, compare religions, or explore the religious 
phenomenon. It is not possible to understand the faith of 
others without participation in their worship and spiritual 
life. We cannot understand Buddhism without learning Buddhist 
forms of meditation."47 
Granted that seeking to understand another means more than merely 
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looking at his beliefs and practices, it would nevertheless be 
inconsistent with a Reformed Christian outlook for a teacher or pupil 
to participate in the worship of another faith and insofar as 
understanding is said to require doing so then such understanding is 
unattainable. 	 Respect for another's beliefs is one thing but 
participation in his worship is quite another. 
	 Of course, it is not 
only the Reformed Christian who draws lines like this. 
	 There are for 
all theories of education and understanding acceptable limits to the 
process of identification with other outlooks. 
	 For example, it is 
unlikely that any would advocate participation in a Satanist ritual 
even though the sincerity of those involved may not be in question. 
All approaches to education will be exclusivist in that they will seek 
to encourage children to try to understand others but only within 
certain limits and the limits set by the Reformed Christian may well 
be narrower than those set by the common morality of his society. He 
cannot participate in the worship of those of other faiths unless he 
not only understands their beliefs but actually shares them. But 
insofar as the beliefs of others are opposed to his own basic beliefs, 
he cannot share such beliefs. 
An additional reason suggested by some for teaching about other 
worldviews is that the study of the faith of others can illuminate 
facets of one's own faith. This is fairly vividly portrayed in the 
following extract:- 
,1 ... the messages of other faiths - whether it be the primal 
vision present in African religions, the note of joy and abandon 
(or, again, contemplation and discipline) in Hinduism, the notes 
of comprehensiveness, detachment, mystery, zeal and quietude in 
Buddhism, the rejection of racialism and class in the Muslim 
brotherhood, the passionate prophetism of many a new cult, the 
sense of history and law in Judaism or even the notes of 
critical judgement in modern agnosticism - ... leave us with an 
echoing note that rings out from within our own Christian 
tradition, but, were it not for the others, we might not hear 
it. 	 The spontaneity of the festival in another religion may 
remind us that it is children who are to enter the kingdom and 
the note of quietude in many an eastern faith presents a 
challenge to 'poor talkative Christianity' which may have 
forgotten that 'the Lord is in his holy temple ... let all the 
earth keep silent before him' (Habakkuk 2:20)."48  
Again a belief in God's common grace and general revelation gives 
support to such a suggestion although it is by no means as compelling 
a reason as that which relates to social harmony. 
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Another reason for studying other worldviews is put forward by Anthony 
O'Hear. He suggests that even if a religious faith were true, its 
full meaning and implications would emerge only when confronted with 
contrary opinions and he continues:- 
"Heresy and secular thought have been instrumental and vital to 
the development and understanding of Christian dogma itself 
(especially in the patristic period) and of the significance of 
Biblical texts (for example, in the Victorian worry about 
evolution). 
	 Where there is no opposition to a ruling ideology, 
stagnation of thought is inevitable, and there are surely strong 
grounds for objecting to this, even if one is convinced of the 
truth of a religious faith or some other ideology."4' 
This seems rather like saying that we would not understand goodness 
unless we also experienced evil. 
	 Perhaps there is some truth in such 
a statement but it does not seem altogether right. 
	 Does the 
recognition of mathematical truth require its being confronted with 
mathematical error? O'Hear follows Karl Popper on this point but, as 
we saw earlier,50 Popper assumes that truth is not manifest and 
thereby excludes the possibility of a self-authenticating divine 
revelation. 	 To this Reformed epistemology stands opposed but, given 
our fallenness and fallibility in interpreting revelation, I think 
that the Reformed Christian can go some of the way with O'Hear in 
allowing some but not ideal value to the diversity of an open 
pluralist society and this without granting the whole critical 
rationalist and evolutionary epistemology which underlies his 
argument. 
On the point of social harmony, it might be objected that the study of 
other worldviews is somewhat abstract when separated from meeting and 
communication with those who come from other traditions and that a 
Christian school is unlikely to provide opportunities for this. How-
ever, this objection rests on the assumption that the Christian school 
is part of a whole life insulated from external influences as is the 
life of the Amish. 	 This is not necessarily so. 
	 A Christian school 
may well be open to the children of people of other faiths provided 
that they are clearly aware of its committed stance - and this is 
certainly true of some of the new Christian schools in this country. 
The children of Christian parents may also meet those of other faiths 
and worldviews in everyday life outside school and in a Christian 
school they should be encouraged to go out into the community as salt 
and light. 
	 A very significant factor is that of probable access to a 
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vicarious meeting with other worldviews through the media and, in 
particular, through that of television. 
Restriction of children's future choices and the promotion of social 
disharmony may well be the consequence of education in a separate 
Christian school but it seems to me that in a good Christian school 
this will not happen. The presence of bad examples does not make the 
good either undesirable or unattainable. 
7.2.3 DOES NURTURE HAVE A PLACE IN SCHOOL?  
Another objection to the setting up of Christian schools is that it 
confuses nurture with education and ascribes to the schoolteacher a 
role which belongs to parents and/or churches. I shall contest this 
argument and suggest that it can actually be turned around and become 
an argument for Christian schools. 
Hirst distinguishes what he terms 'catechesis' - but which others use 
fairly interchangeably with 'nurture' - from education because, he 
says, the former necessarily presupposes a particular religious 
position while the latter does not.51 	 John Hull says that religious 
nurture is a "convergent teaching process ... which intends to foster 
or deepen the commitment of those who are already believers or are 
already inside the religious community" and he terms it 'convergent' 
because the personal faith of the teacher converges with the content 
of his lessons and with his hopes for his pupils. 	 He distinguishes 
this from education which does not seek or assume convergence so that 
a teacher can educate a pupil with respect to Islam whether he (the 
teacher) is a Muslim or not and such an education will not necessarily 
deepen the pupil's Islamic faith and will certainly not discourage 
him, should he be a Muslim. 	 A teacher can educate a pupil in a 
religion and a pupil can benefit from such education whether or not 
either of them are believers in that religion but nurture can only be 
carried out by a teacher who is a believer in the religion in question 
and in relation to somebody who is inside that community of faith.52  
From these definitions it seems clear that a Christian parent may both 
educate and nurture his children. It would also seem that a teacher 
in a Christian church may both educate and nurture children in the 
church. 	 Why then should it be thought undesirable that a parent 
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delegate part of the responsibility for nurture as well as that for 
education to teachers in a Christian school? After all, both are 
legitimate activities where parents and church teachers are concerned 
and, Hirst suggests, "education and catechesis, based respectively in 
reason and faith, are properly to be seen as complementary".53 So it 
would seem that these complementary activities could well be carried 
out by Christian teachers in Christian schools. 
Hirst allows the possibility of both being carried on in church 
schools provided they are kept sharply distinct from each other.54  
Hill argues against Christian nurture being seen as a part of 
schooling because of its institutional features of compulsory 
attendance, compulsory curriculum and compulsory assessment and he 
continues:- 
"In addition, many (Christian schools) exhibit a benevolent 
pressure to conform, and to engage in religious acts of personal 
commitment, which violate the private space of the individual. 
... the school (is) a partner with other essential agencies in 
the full project of a child's education, notably the home and 
voluntary groups such as Christian Unions in schools and youth 
groups in churches. 	 The attempt to subsume the tasks of such 
agencies under the umbrella of schooling runs a grave risk of 
either inciting students to rebel against the pressure they 
sense they are being put under, or reducing them to a state of 
conformity and dependency which augurs ill for their ability to 
survive and witness in the open society."55  
The dangers that Hill alludes to undoubtedly do exist in many 
Christian schools but do they necessarily exist and is it not 
overstatement to term these risks 'grave'? Awareness of the dangers 
can lead to their avoidance by means of good practice. 
Perhaps the problem is that, in spite of statements made about nurture 
and education being complementary, these activities are actually seen 
as being antithetical to and in conflict with each other. 
	 This comes 
out in Hirst's characterising of them as being based respectively in 
faith and reason along with his linking of nurture with what he 
variously terms 'traditionalist' and 'primitive' approaches to 
education in contrast with a 'sophisticated' concept of education.56  
I think that the Reformed Christian should resist this sharp 
distinction between the bases of nurture and education. 
	 Both are 
based in a faith-commitment and are aimed at commitment. 
	 For the 
Christian his approach to education - like everything else he does -
should be ultimately based on his faith in God and aims at commitment 
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on the part of his pupils to beliefs which are justified either 
immediately or mediately. 
	 Hirst's sophisticated education is, he 
says, under-pinned by critical rationalism.57 	 This is a faith which 
operates at the same logical level as the Christian's religious faith. 
Hirst's education aims at commitment "to the most rationally 
justifiable beliefs and values as (the pupil) can judge these in his 
particular circumstances".58  
At this point the basis of the distinction between these terms seems 
to be evaporating and nurture is becoming identified with a Christian 
teacher's education of a pupil who is within the Christian community 
in the content of the Christian faith. 	 In other words, Christian 
nurture is education in a particular context and content. 
	 But this 
blurs what is a meaningful and helpful distinction and I think it can 
be at least partly recovered by making a distinction between aims that 
are more immediate and those that are more ultimate. Nurture and 
education may share the same ultimate aims but, in relation to the 
Christian faith, education aims more immediately at understanding of 
the faith and nurture at personal commitment to Christ. Putting it 
another way, education in this context aims more immediately at faith 
at arm's length and nurture at faith on one's knees.59 
I think it is fairly obvious that this kind of Christian nurture would 
be very out of place in the context of a captive audience in the 
classroom of a state school but I question whether it is so in that of 
a Christian school and whether the suggestion that it is not so can be 
sustained as an argument against the setting up of Christian schools. 
If I am correct in this then in a Christian school the Christian 
teacher can well combine the roles of educator and nurturer in these 
senses provided they are kept distinct. He can act both in loco 
parentis and in loco pastoris with, I think, a clear conscience. 
7.3 THE CHRISTIAN TEACHER IN THE STATE SCHOOL 
Much of the discussion of the issue of Christian schools versus state 
schools focuses on the bad examples of schools, text-books, teachers 
and so on taken from the category which is being argued against and 
good examples from that which is being argued for. There are good 
and bad Christian schools and good and bad state schools since there 
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are different respects in which a school may be good or bad and these 
are not simply a matter of its religious commitment. 
I have attempted to defend the setting up of Christian schools by 
arguing that they can be good - they do not need to indoctrinate or 
pressurize children and they ought to teach more than one worldview 
and the like. I also allow the right of Muslim, Jewish and other 
religious communities to set up separate schools for the nurture and 
education of the children of their communities. 
	 But arguments 
against Christian teachers working in state schools or Christian 
parents sending their children to state schools can be along the lines 
that they are based on a secular public ethic and inevitably 
indoctrinate into secularist beliefs and values. The Christian 
teacher who co-operates in this process, it is claimed, is therefore 
guilty of compromising his basic beliefs. 
It is true that a system of state schools in a pluralist society 
requires a secular public ethic as a base. But it does not follow 
that this ethic is necessarily opposed to that of Christianity at all 
points. 	 Values can be shared even when they are derived from 
different basic positions. 
	 For example, honesty is undoubtedly a 
Christian value but one does not have to be a Christian to value 
honesty and the same could be said of a host of other values which can 
be common to people of a variety of worldviews. 
	 This may be a matter 
of Van Til's 'borrowed capital' referred to earlier60 or it may simply 
be the logical point that the same conclusion can follow from 
different sets of premises but, whatever the explanation, for the 
Reformed Christian it is ultimately due to God's common grace to all 
(rather than the basis of a natural theology). 
It is these shared values and concerns that provide a basis for 
Christian co-operation with non-Christian in an enterprise such as 
education. As Charles Martin puts it, "all play in the orchestra, 
but some are watching the composer-conductor while others ignore or 
dispute the existence of any conductor" .61 
Of course, there may well come points at which the Christian teacher 
cannot co-operate. 
	 A Christian doctor may well work happily in a 
general hospital but he may not be able to carry out abortions on 
demand in that hospital or go to work in an abortion clinic. 
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Likewise, a Christian teacher may well be able to go along with much 
of what happens in a good state school but he may not be able to use 
what he regards as pornographic literature even though it may be 
recommended for a certain course. It all seems to be a matter of 
judgement of how large is the area of shared insights and values and 
where and to what extent conflict occurs. 
	 To be secular is not 
necessarily to be secularist in philosophy but a secular school could 
be secularist in its ethos and, if so, a Christian teacher might well 
find that he could not, in good conscience, teach in such a school. 
Further, it would seem likely that the state schools of some 
totalitarian regimes might well be places where a Christian teacher 
could not teach without compromising his faith. 
It may be objected that Christian ethics are for the whole of society 
and not just for Christian people so that a Christian in education 
cannot merely passively go along with what he is not unhappy about but 
should rather seek to see that God's law is known and obeyed. But it 
does not follow from the fact that God's law is for all that a 
Christian can impose this law upon anyone against their will. As we-
saw earlier in relation to theory-construction,62 the appropriate 
strategy is transformationalist and not reconstructionalist. God's 
way is that of persuasion rather than coercion. 
In certain situations, working in a state school may be impossible for 
the Reformed Christian teacher. In others it will be quite possible 
and in keeping with his commission both to fulfil the creation mandate 
and to be salt and light to the world as people see his good works and 
work. I therefore conclude that to teach in either a Christian 
school or a state school can well both be quite consistent with the 
Reformed Christian worldview. 
In this chapter I have argued that Reformed epistemology coheres with 
a fairly exclusivist attitude towards other worldviews but one that is 
not necessarily as hard-line as it is sometimes portrayed. It 
provides room for shared insights and common values even though basic 
beliefs differ greatly. 
	 It provides a basis for respect for others 
as made in the image of God and seekers after truth. 
	 It is opposed 
to those forms of pluralism that require radical re-definition of 
basic Christian beliefs. 
	 In line with this, it is consistent with 
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the setting up of good Christian schools wherein education and nurture 
may both take place and which do not indoctrinate or necessarily 
promote social disharmony. 	 At the same time, Christian teachers may 
be able to work in state schools provided that their curricula and 
basic stances are not opposed to Christian basic beliefs and values. 
It may not be an ideal situation for the Reformed Christian but it can 
be one into which he may go with confidence in the common grace of God 
to all and the possibility of some commonness of insights and aims in 
spite of divergence at the ultimate and basic level. 
CONCLUSION 
This study has been an attempt to examine some characteristic themes 
of Reformed epistemology in order to develop a coherent account of 
them and to work out something of their significance for education. 
These themes are that belief in God is properly basic, that divine 
revelation is self-authenticating, that sin has noetic effects and 
that differences in worldview may be reflected within science. All 
of these themes are present in the writings of Abraham Kuyper, 
Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga. 
	 The first of them is dominant 
in the way in which Plantings has so far developed his version of 
Reformed epistemology and has also dominated discussion of this kind 
of epistemology in the philosophy of religion of the last decade or 
so. The ideas of opposing basic presuppositions and of the 
sinfulness of the assumption of autonomy were particularly prominent 
in Van Til's writings. The proper basicality of belief in God is 
perhaps less prominent in an explicit form in Kuyper's writings 
although it does tacitly underlie much of his account. 
To claim that belief in God is properly basic is to hold a form of 
foundationalism which does not necessarily require of the foundations 
that they be infallible, indubitable or incorrigible. It is to hold 
a moderate foundationalism which claims immediate prima facie 
justification for belief in God. This is quite different from the 
claim that belief in God, as a framework belief, is groundless. 
Belief in God may be grounded in experience without being inferred 
from experience. Epistemic regress is terminated in the supervening 
of the epistemic upon the non-epistemic and one way in which this 
could happen is through an immediate awareness of God. 
	 To hold that 
this is so is to appeal to a form of religious intuitionism. 
	 This 
shares with empirical intuitionism several major philosophical 
objections but these are not obviously unanswerable. 
	 The respects in 
which sense experience and experience of God differ are not 
epistemically relevant, i.e., they do not affect the justifiedness of 
beliefs grounded in one as against that of those grounded in the 
other. In particular, the non-universality of claims to experience 
of God does not render them any less justified since it is quite 
explicable in terms of the account being proposed. Further, it is 
not required for justified belief that the believer should be able to 
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show that his belief is justified. 
	 To engage in discussion of these 
claims and to attempt to show their coherence or respond to counter-
arguments is not to base belief in God upon such reasoning or, 
thereby, to deny that it is immediately justified. 
The experience of immediate awareness of God is not like that of an 
impersonal object in the world but it is rather of a person and 
involves self-revelation on the part of that person. It has an 
immediacy in the sense of psychological directness although it may be 
mediated through things the person does or makes. 
	 Central to this is 
the role of verbal communication so that the fact that divine 
revelation is personal does not mean that it is not propositional. 
Much is made in the Reformed tradition of this revelation being 
mediated through the propositions of the Christian scriptures. 
	 It is 
claimed that this revelation is self-authenticating. 
	 This may be 
matter of intuiting the revealedness of these propositions in grasping 
their point and in an immediate awareness that God is speaking to one 
through them. 
The claim of the Reformed epistemologist that sin affects the 
intellectual life is, in part and perhaps centrally, that it consists 
in an unacceptable form of the assumption of the autonomy of reason. 
The various form of rationalism can provide bases for such an 
assumption and a recently developed form which has had some influence 
upon educational theory is that of pancritical rationalism. 
	 It 
claims to have solved the dilemma of alternative competing ultimate 
commitments and to provide an adequate response to the 'tu quoque' of 
some, including Reformed writers, when charged with irrationality in 
their basic commitments. 	 This form of rationalism denies that there 
are logical limits to rationality by claiming that justification 
should be replaced by criticism and that all positions - including 
that of pancritical rationalism itself - can be held open to rational 
criticism. 	 It is exclusive of commitment to God in response to a 
self-authenticating revelation. 
	 However, it seems doubtful that 
justification and criticism can be unfused in the way this requires or 
that there is not in it an underlying commitment to reason which is 
essentially anthropocentric. If so, this approach is not an adequate 
counter to the claims that belief in God and trusting response to 
divine revelation are immediately justified. This form of the 
autonomy ideal and the Reformed epistemologist's form of an ideal of 
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theonomy are fundamentally opposed to each other. 	 They are mutually 
exclusive but the choice between them, for the Reformed 
epistemologist, is neither a matter of arbitrary commitment nor one of 
weighing up reasons and evidences. A person may freely respond to a 
self-authenticating revelation of God or, sometimes, he may wilfully 
reject it. 
Development of these three themes in this way is an example of a 
particular strategy for the integration of faith and learning. On 
the one hand, it does not leave faith and learning in epistemology or 
any other area of knowledge lying side by side in unrelated 
complementary compartments. On the other hand, it does not conform 
to the hard-presuppositionalism of some Reformed writers which 
requires the reconstruction of all areas of knowledge on distinctively 
Christian foundations. 	 It seeks to take a middle way in introducing 
Christian presuppositions into the areas of knowledge to transform 
them from within and the influence of these presuppositions is more 
evident in the forms of knowledge that are higher in the hierarchy of 
increasingly comprehensive perspectives they take of reality than in 
those which are lower down. Part of the effect of introducing these 
presuppositions is to set the assumptions of traditions within these 
areas of knowledge in a new light and to expose some assumptions which 
may have been hidden. These hidden assumptions may be exclusive of 
the assumption of the existence of a God who can speak to people 
through a self-authenticating revelation which requires obedient 
response rather than autonomous judgement. 
	 This is of double 
significance for education since it provides a basis for the claim 
that it is meaningful to talk of a Christian theory of education and 
also a basis for developing the areas of knowledge which are the 
subject-matter of education in a Christian way. 
A particular debate within educational theory - and one of particular 
relevance to a Reformed Christian approach to education - is that 
about the nature of indoctrination. For this the Reformed critique 
of rational autonomy and the opposing to it of an ideal of trusting 
response to an authoritative revelation is of significance. Much of 
the discussion of this subject has assumed either the strong 
internalism of the more traditional forms of rationalism or the more 
recent developments of pancritical rationalism. It has therefore 
excluded from the outset the possibility of belief in God being 
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immediately justified or divine revelation being self-authenticating. 
Indoctrination is a matter both of doctrinal content and of a method 
that is less rational than it could be. If this is so and belief in 
God is properly basic, it is impossible to indoctrinate belief in God 
since its justification is not a matter of inference from other 
justified beliefs. 	 But to teach on the basis of a taken-for-granted 
commitment to reason may be so. 	 It does not follow from this that, 
in relation to the teaching of a basic belief in God, anything goes. 
Some ways of imparting such a belief would be inconsistent with 
beliefs which are based upon it, such as respect for persons as being 
made in the image of God. Because belief in God is properly basic 
only under certain circumstances, a pupil cannot be immediately 
justified in holding it if he is not in these circumstances. 	 An 
appropriate way of teaching from this perspective would be that of 
displaying the divine revelation as a thing of beauty and pointing to 
its features in the hope that the pupil will come to respond to it for 
himself. 	 This could involve enabling him to understand objections to 
these beliefs and to respond to them rationally. 	 It provides for 
rational autonomy to the extent to which it is possible within this 
perspective and it challenges the supposed neutrality of alternative 
approaches. 
Christian education in a pluralist society may involve the setting up 
of Christian schools. 	 The exclusivism of the claims of the Reformed 
epistemologist follows from his theological realism. 	 Because he 
holds a cognitive view of faith and a propositional account of divine 
revelation, he can be termed exclusivist but this does not mean that 
he necessarily adheres to the hard-line exclusivism of the 
antithetical Reformed writers. He may instead have a more positive 
approach to those of other worldviews which makes much of God's common 
grace to all and of the possibility of shared values and insights in 
spite of opposing basic assumptions. He may nevertheless and quite 
consistently oppose those forms of pluralism which call for a radical 
revision of the basic beliefs of all faiths. In accordance with this 
outlook he may favour the setting up of Reformed Christian schools 
wherein neither the commitment of the teachers nor the committed ethos 
of the school necessarily restricts the child's future choices. An 
adequate education in a Christian worldview should face openly and 
honestly the potential defeaters of its basic beliefs. It will also 
involve study of other faiths, not so as to increase the pupil's 
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capacity for choice but because understanding of and communication 
with others is a basic Christian value. This cannot, however, extend 
to participation in the worship of other faiths since that would 
require not only understanding their beliefs but actually sharing them 
in respects in which they are opposed to basic Christian beliefs. A 
Christian school may be involved in both Christian education and 
Christian nurture. 
	
These are both based in Christian commitment and 
aimed ultimately at commitment. 	 They differ in that education is 
aimed more immediately at understanding of the faith and nurture at 
personal commitment to Christ. 	 Christian nurture is not possible in 
a school that is not Christian but a Christian teacher may 
consistently with the requirements of his Christian beliefs - teach in 
a school which is not distinctively Christian. 	 To be secular is not 
necessarily to be secularist but there may well come points at which 
the Christian teacher finds shared values and insights too few to be 
sufficient as a basis for co-operation with others in the education of 
children. 	 Insofar as he does he may ascribe this to the grace of God 
to all and at the point where he cannot in good conscience continue to 
work together with others in education he may, with sorrow, put this 
down to the influence of sin, aware that he too is a sinful being. 
In a world affected by sin, an ideal and perfect education will not 
exist but the Christian should seek to promote the ideal within the 
limitations of the real. 
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